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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 More than four years after the September 11 attacks, it is time to reexamine the 
state of American grand strategy to identify possible refinements to improve 
synchronization, resource allocation and policy execution at all levels.  This research 
examines U.S. grand strategy to determine the nation’s plan for employing five 
instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law 
enforcement.  It develops seven fundamental features of a grand strategy, and compares 
thirteen national strategy documents to these fundamentals to determine areas for future 
refinement.  The study uses a brief analysis of national responses to the IRA, Sikh 
militants, and Hezbollah in Lebanon to illustrate these features in action.  The study 
concludes by proposing a series of steps to refine America’s grand strategy as well as a 
framework to integrate instruments of national power in the struggle against transnational 
terrorism.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This research compares America’s plan to employ diplomatic, informational, 
military, economic, and law enforcement power in the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT).  Seven fundamental features of a grand strategy are employed to evaluate U.S. 
grand strategy, and a brief analysis of others’ responses to three terrorist movements (the 
IRA, Sikh separatists, and Hezbollah) is presented.  The study concludes by proposing 
refinements to America’s grand strategy in an age of terrorism.   
A. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY 
America’s diplomatic strategy stresses democratization in an effort to create a 
safer environment for U.S. citizens and interests.  This diplomatic strategy is not 
completely synchronized with execution.  The U.S. supports many nations with weak 
democratic traditions and practices, and this dichotomy creates problems for other 
instruments of power. The vignettes presented in Chapter IV suggest that American 
diplomatic strategy needs to be refined to focus on developing democratic traditions that 
provide mechanisms for substantive participation by a broad spectrum of groups in a 
society.  The recent election success by Hamas challenges American diplomacy to 
recognize a democratic success story, while maintaining a consistent stance against 
terrorism.     
The vignettes presented in Chapter IV offer a second lesson for diplomatic 
strategists: engagement and negotiation are crucial to maximizing the gains created by 
military and police forces.  The key to effective negotiations with the IRA was that the 
British found partners that could speak for the IRA or put pressure on the group, Sinn 
Fein and the Irish Republic.  American diplomats must figure out who can influence 
groups like al-Qaeda and begin substantive dialogue with these actors.  This initiative 
may mean normalizing relations with Iran, negotiating with Syria, or talking to anti-U.S. 
tribal leaders in the Pakistani border regions. The important thing is that American 
diplomats cannot be limited by biases against traditional adversaries or unfriendly 
governments. 
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The nation’s core strategy documents employ informational power along two 
tracks: enhancing situational understanding and persuading foreign audiences.    
Situational understanding requires a vastly improved ability to collect, process, and share 
information among U.S. and international partners.  All three vignettes highlight the 
importance of possessing timely and accurate intelligence in defeating terrorist 
organizations.  As the 9/11 Commission’s follow-up report indicated, this nation may not 
be doing enough in these areas.1   
The “battle of ideas” is being waged daily by virtually every organization in the 
U.S. government, and various supporting strategy documents emphasize the importance 
of this effort.2   The focus of these efforts is to persuade audiences throughout the world 
that American policy and actions are just and beneficial to all.  American efforts to 
persuade foreign audiences are difficult to analyze because they are not defined in any 
substantive way.  The administration’s recent efforts to enhance the Department of 
State’s public diplomacy capability indicates that it is serious about this effort; however 
the message that American will send to the world remains unclear.  The lack of a national 
information strategy makes it difficult for this diverse group to project a unified message 
and avoid unsynchronized action.3   
American military strategy is not well defined in overarching national strategy 
documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) or National Strategy for 
                                                 
1 Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, December 2005, 9/11 Public Discourse 
Project, http://www.9-11pdp.org (accessed January 19, 2006).  Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations: Part II Reforming the Institutions of Government, October 20, 2005, 9/11 Public 
Discourse Project, http://www.9-11pdp.org (accessed January 21, 2006). 
2 Donald Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Department of 
Defense, http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dod/nps18-031605-15.pdf (accessed September 6, 
2005), 9. This document will be referenced as the NDS.  Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy of 
the United States of America, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dod/nps17-052404-01.pdf (accessed November 1, 2005), 12.  
This document will be referred to as the NMS.  Colin L. Powell and Andrew S. Natsios, U.S. Department 
of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/ (accessed October 30, 2005), 30-32. 
This document will be referenced as the DOS/USAID Strategic Plan. 
3 Carnes Lord, “Psychological-Political Instruments,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2004), 225-234.  Robert Satloff, The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public 
Diplomacy in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 19-
34. 
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Combating Terrorism (NSCT).  The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National 
Military Strategy (NMS) do a better job establishing goals, and describing broad military 
activities; however, both are unclear about military priorities, specific objectives, or 
measures of effectiveness.  American military strategy is generally combative, seeking to 
identify and destroy terrorist organizations wherever possible to prevent attacks on the 
U.S. or its interests.  The focus is on direct military action to defeat terrorist 
organizations, and indirect actions to support and develop allies.   
National economic strategy revolves around two core ideas: the expansion of free 
markets to strengthen foreign partners in the GWOT, and the provision of developmental 
aid to undermine the root causes of terrorism.  The U.S. employs a number of trade 
agreements in an effort to create partners with an investment in opposing terrorist 
organizations.  This effort has the added benefit of creating interdependencies that will 
serve the U.S. well in times of crisis.  These aid packages generally focus on improving 
the recipient’s ability to conduct counterterrorism operations and deny terrorist 
organizations much needed resources. 
This study has characterized U.S. law enforcement strategy in terms of 
“cooperative prosecution:” the employment of federal law enforcement agencies to work 
with and through foreign security forces to prosecute terrorists and destroy their financial 
support.  This strategy attempts to prosecute terrorists and their organizations wherever 
there is sufficient legal infrastructure and political will.  In the absence of one or both of 
these critical features, law enforcement organizations are working with their foreign 
counterparts to develop them.  Few if any refinements are required to law enforcement 
strategy.  Cooperative prosecution attacks terrorism as a criminal act, just as military 
strategy attacks it as an act of war.  This allows the U.S. to pursue opportunities wherever 
as develop in the conflict. 
B. SUPPORTING FEATURES 
Grand strategy employs all available national power in the achievement of 
national security objectives in both war and peace.  Successful grand strategy constrains 
national objectives according to available means, and seeks to balance the two while 
striving to achieve defined goals.  To exceed available means courts disaster, and 
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necessitates deliberate efforts to generate additional resources.  Finally, grand strategy 
focuses on national security, the accomplishment of those interests political leaders deem 
vital to national survival.4  Contemporary American grand strategy must exploit the 
international environment by blending the components of national power.  Chapter II 
describes seven common features of a successful grand strategy.  These features are: 
defined interests and objectives; identified threat; plans to employ instruments of power; 
maintenance of power; balanced ends and means; horizontal and vertical synchronization; 
and a “hybrid” nature. 
The most significant deficiency in American grand strategy is the lack of a 
common set of interests and objectives to focus the planning effort.  Core and supporting 
national strategy documents do not reflect a consistent understanding of the reasons that 
the U.S. is at war.  This glaring deficiency makes it virtually impossible to integrate the 
programs of disparate agencies across the federal government.  The definition of 
terrorism and who exactly is America’s enemy is one that creates additional problems for 
grand strategy.  The recent electoral victory of Hamas challenges America in part because 
the group falls within the NSS definition of a terrorist organization.5  This problem is 
created in part by the evolving nature of the nation’s adversary.  Is the threat a specific 
terrorist organization of a radical religious ideology?  The question has not been 
answered in enough detail yet to focus all the instruments of national power.6 
The NSS and the NSCT do not include plans to maintain the instruments of 
national power.  This is a significant deficiency given that many of the sources of 
national power are shared by multiple instruments, and few mechanisms exist to 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion of the definition of grand strategy see Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in 
War and Peace, ed. by Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 5-6; Edward 
Luttwak, Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 179; and John Collins, Grand 
Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 14-15.  J.H. Elliot, 
“Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain,” Grand Strategies in War and 
Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).   
5 George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed February 10, 2005), 5.  This document will be referenced 
as the NSS. 
6 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a 
Grand Strategy, eds. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), 46-73.  Satloff, 59-69.  Interview with Mr. Robert Andrews, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC), conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School on March 1, 2006. 
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prioritize demands.  While select supporting strategies attempt to transform their 
practices and organizations to generate more power, a deliberate plan to maintain the 
sources of national power is absent.  American grand strategy also makes little effort to 
balance ends with available means in the fight against terrorism.  This is difficult to judge 
because of the vast quantity of resources required for continued operations in Iraq, and 
America’s need to maintain the ability to conduct large-scale conventional operations.  
However, grand strategy should guide a nation through a conflict to create a better peace 
by limiting objectives to avoid exhausting resources.  American grand strategy does not 
appear to make any effort to prioritize or constrain the initiatives of various departments 
through any mechanism other than the budgeting process.  Finally, the Fiscal 2006 
budget indicates that there may be a lack of balance in American grand strategy.  The 
financial resources of the nation are predominantly devoted to the DOD.  It could be 
argued that greater funds should be allocated for foreign developmental aid or homeland 
defense initiatives.   
American grand strategy does not adequately address the subject of vertical and 
horizontal synchronization.  The interagency process of coordination and staffing has 
proven too cumbersome to effectively manage the GWOT.  Lead agencies for policy and 
programs are not clear, and coordinating mechanisms do not facilitate synchronization.  
This problem has manifested itself most starkly in the negative effects of detainee 
operations on a variety of instruments of power.   
One of the strengths of American grand strategy is its hybrid nature.   The 
prevailing strategic pattern is cumulative action to defeat a variety of enemy 
organizations.  Within this pattern, grand strategy is simultaneously persuasive, 
combative, and developmental.  This hybrid nature is essential to exploit the global 
environment. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study develops a series of seven recommendations to improve the conduct of 
grand strategic planning and the content of U.S. grand strategy in an age of terrorism.  
These recommendations focus on refining the existing strategy and systems rather than 
radically recreating then.   
 xx
1. Plan for strategic action. 
America’s strategy documents do not provide clear linkages between strategy and 
programs to enable integration and synchronization.  The interagency system should 
adopt a military-style planning process that stresses: decisive actions to secure national 
strategic objectives, shaping actions to create a favorable environment for decisive 
actions, and sustaining actions to maintain existing gains and develop additional national 
power.  Chapter V presents a framework to conduct grand strategic planning in a manner 
that clearly illustrates these linkages. 
2. Organize for strategic action.   
The interagency system is dominated by committees and departments with 
individual and organizations biases.  This system has not produced a well synchronized 
grand strategy.  Two organizations, the National Security Council’s Counterterrorism 
Security Group and the National Counterterrorism Center, have the potential to resolve 
this problem.  These organizations must be empowered to act and provided with clear 
roles and responsibilities that facilitate leading the interagency system. 
3. Develop a National Information Strategy.   
The nation must develop a formal information strategy that focuses on supporting 
the efforts of the multiple agencies to persuade foreign audiences and improve situational 
understanding.  This strategy should stress shared values, but it must do more than just 
present American versions of these to the world; it must engage target audiences in 
debate over substantive issues relating to these values.  The 9/11 Commission’s series of 
follow-up reports published in 2005 illustrated that we still have a great deal of work to 
be done to improve situational understanding across federal, state and local governments.  
A formal national information strategy should organize and prioritize these efforts to 
ensure that resources are used effectively. 
4. Define national interests and strategic objectives. 
The NSC should immediately develop a set of prioritized national interests and 
national strategic objectives.  This set must address the total scope of US interests, not 
just the GWOT, to enable strategists to allocate resources with the entire effort in mind.  
Strategic objectives should be interdepartmental in nature, directly linked to national 
interests, and describe how the nation will achieve each goal.  In the absence of these two 
 xxi
critical focusing elements, various federal departments and committees identified their 
own without a common priority or focus.   
5. Align national strategy documents. 
Upon completion of the national interests and objectives, each organization must 
revise and update their strategies to support this new structure.  Current national strategy 
documents were written out of sequence and describe a great many initiatives that are 
underway, complete, or overcome by events.  They do not reflect existing budget 
constraints, interim decisions, or the current global environment.  This revision will 
improve the strategic alignment and enable decision makers to understand the totality of 
effort directed against any strategic objective. 
6. Update U.S. supporting strategies annually. 
Each agency and committee responsible for carrying out U.S. grand strategy, must 
publish an annual update to their supporting strategy.  This document should describe the 
progress made since the last report, any changes to the strategy, and the focus for the next 
reporting period.  It should be published at the start of the budget cycle and include 
budget priorities that have been synchronized across the departments.  This will serve two 
functions.  First, it will provide the American public an annual report of progress in the 
GWOT and an appreciation for the way ahead.  Second, it will provide the President a 
tool during the budget process to ensure that key programs do not become the victim of 
bureaucratic politics. 
7. Plan to maintain power. 
The NSC and HSC should begin studying policies and programs to maintain and 
further develop the sources of national power.  This is a cross departmental initiative that 
should focus on things like geography, resources, population, economic development, 
political structure, national morale, and national reputation.  These sources of power are 
interrelated, and combine to produce an aggregate level of national power, but they 
cannot be directly employed.7  Because they are not the direct responsibility of any one 
department or agency, little thought has gone into maintaining these sources of power for 
the conflict.  This must change if the nation is going to stay the course in a protracted 
conflict.                                                  
7 A.K.F. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1958), 102-107 & 116-117. 
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1 
I. AMERICA’S GRAND STRATEGY 
We will direct every resource at our command - every means of 
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war 
- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. 
- President George Bush 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
With these words the President made it clear that success in the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT) required a grand strategy to address this new and unique threat.8  He did 
not outline a grand strategy or suggest any sort of priorities for the nation.  Grand 
strategies integrate all the elements of national power to achieve broad national security 
objectives.  This is not to suggest that all instruments have an equal part to play; the 
actions of each instrument are constrained by its capabilities and limitations, resources 
available, and the global environment.  America’s grand strategy is explained in the 2002 
National Security Strategy, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and a 
variety of supporting strategies from cabinet agencies.  While the US is not unfamiliar 
with the threat of transnational terrorism, it is not the traditional nation-state enemy that 
America is well prepared to fight.  Transnational terrorism will not be defeated with 
conventional military forces on a classically defined battlefield; in fact military forces 
may have only a small role to play in the conflict.  The clandestine and networked nature 
of this threat requires a strategy that shapes the global environment to reduce the 
conditions that enable transnational terrorist organizations, while at the same time 
attacking these organizations from multiple directions.  To win the GWOT, American 
grand strategy must reflect the realities of the global environment and exploit it by 
blending multilateral and unilateral policies across the full spectrum of national power.   
More than four years after the September 11 attacks, it is time to reexamine the 
state of American grand strategy to identify possible refinements that could improve 
synchronization, resource allocation and policy execution at all levels.  There are many 
                                                 
8 George W. Bush, “Address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” September 
20, 2001, The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 
(accessed November 15, 2005). 
2 
indications that this refinement is overdue.  One of the most telling of these indicators can 
be found in the 2005 federal budget.  This budget allocates $401.7 billion to the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and only $10.3 billion to the Department of State (DOS).9  
These numbers represent the total funds allotted to the DOS for the employment of US 
diplomatic, informational, and economic power throughout the world.   These numbers 
include money for everything from the salary of Foreign Service officers to foreign 
military assistance programs and humanitarian aid.  The DOS is expected to accomplish 
its objectives on only 2.6% of the DOD’s budget, and only 1.26% of the entire budget for 
discretionary spending.  Paul Kennedy, in his book Grand Strategies in War and Peace, 
ascribes great importance to balancing ends and means, and emerging from a conflict 
with one’s economy intact.10  The brief example noted above suggests that American 
strategy may not be balanced yet to effectively integrate and utilize the elements of 
national power in this conflict.   
Grand strategy must respond to the unique environment that evolves around every 
threat-response conflict.  In 1996 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross suggested that the 
changing global environment at the end of the Cold War necessitated a reevaluation of 
U.S. grand strategy; the U.S. faced no peer competitor in this new environment.  Their 
article, entitled “Competing Visions for a US Grand Strategy,” argued that four strategic 
archetypes have historically dominated American foreign policy: neo-isolationism, 
selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy.  The specific elements of each 
strategy are interrelated and interdependent; thus, unique features of each strategy cannot 
be taken in isolation.  These grand strategies developed out of a global environment that 
was particular to the time.11  The U.S. is again faced with a unique global environment, 
one that is significantly different from 1996.  The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) created a new threat to the survival 
                                                 
9 Summary of Department of State and Defense 2005 Budgets, Office of Management and Budget, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/budget.html (accessed November 18, 2005). 
10 Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. by Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1991). 
11 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions or U.S. Grand Strategy,” International 
Security 21, no.3 (1996): 5-16 & 52-52.  The authors compare neo-isolationism, selective engagement, 
cooperative security and primacy as grand strategies.  They identify the environmental conditions that 
shaped each, and discussed select policy implications.  Their most significant conclusion was that while 
each strategy had similar features, “for the most part one cannot indiscriminately mix and match across 
strategies (as both post-Cold War administrations have attempted to do) without running into trouble.”  
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of the nation and changed America’s understanding of its place in the world.  Today’s 
enemy is a transnational terrorist movement that is loosely bound together by a radical 
ideology but with disparate political goals which are often unacceptable to the western 
world.  It is time to reassess America’s grand strategy for this unique 21st Century 
conflict.   
David Baldwin proposes a useful methodology for understanding instruments of 
power in his book Economic Statecraft.  This methodology provides boundaries that are 
academic constructs, but that serve to organize and focus how states attempt to influence.  
Baldwin proposes three criteria to define an instrument of power:  
1.  Conformity with scientific canons requiring parallel categories to be 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive of all cases. 
2.  Avoidance of unnecessary departures from common usage.  Ideally, 
categories would be consistent with common usage by laymen, academics, 
and policy makers. 
3.  Utility in identifying and clarifying policy options for modern 
statesmen.  The important thing is to capture the richness and variety of 
available techniques without overwhelming the policy maker with a huge 
number of categories.12  
The first and third criteria are closely related, and may cause some confusion.  Baldwin 
seems to be saying that the domains of each instrument do not overlap; for example 
diplomatic actions may often be distinct from military actions.  However, Baldwin 
recognizes that there is overlap; diplomatic activity is meaningless without military and 
economic power to lend force to diplomacy.  In the case of overlap, the definition of a 
particular instrument should provide a useful understanding of a set of policy options.   
Informational power, which supports every other instrument of power, may not be 
exclusive enough to be considered by Baldwin a separate and distinct instrument.  Yet 
information strategy, expressed in terms of activities to employ or generate soft power, 
does provide decision makers with a way of thinking about unique options for 
influencing adversaries and friends.  Thus, Baldwin’s third principle can be applied to 
define information as a distinct instrument.  The key point to take away is that, contrary 
to Baldwin,  there may be some overlap between powers, but that utility to decision 
                                                 
12 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 12.  
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makers should be the deciding factor in defining an instrument of power.  This study will 
argue that five distinctive instruments provide utility to planning grand strategy in an age 
of terrorism: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and law enforcement.  A 
deeper discussion of each is presented below. 
Chapter I describes how America plans to employ the instruments of national 
power; in short to explain American grand strategy.  It will accomplish this by comparing 
policies and programs across the population of strategy documents to identify the plan to 
employ the five instruments of power.  Chapter II will build on this work by conducting a 
literature review to develop an outline of the fundamental components of a grand 
strategy.  This framework will allow us to examine U.S. grand strategy as a larger entity, 
rather than as a collection of policy statements.  After briefly discussing America’s 
historical grand strategies, Chapter III will compare current strategy documents with the 
fundamental components identified in chapter two to gain a fuller understanding of the 
current grand strategy.  The heart of this chapter will be the elements that focus, 
synchronize, and enable the policies and programs identified earlier.  This section will 
conclude by identifying gaps in the current strategy that could negatively impact on 
America’s efforts in the GWOT.   
Chapter IV presents three brief vignettes that examine the forces directed against 
the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Sikhs in India, and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.  Each of these conflicts is relatively recent and pits a transnational covert 
movement, motivated at least in part by religion, against an established legitimate 
government.  These cases also offer examples of the range of force that may be employed 
by a government, and illustrate the positive and negative effects of integrated instruments 
of national power.  The outcome of these cases reflects the range of possible resolutions 
to a terrorist conflict, and the legitimate governments involved cover the spectrum from 
developing to developed world.  America may be able to take advantage of this trend and 
use it to encourage other groups to moderate their practices before they reach a point 
where they threaten national interests.  This study will focus on how select elements of 
grand strategy were applied in each conflict to identify lessons for the current 
environment.   
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Chapter V presents the study’s conclusions and recommendations for decision 
makers and researches. These conclusions include: a theoretical framework to 
synchronize the instruments of national power in strategic planning; a recommendation to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the various committees charged with planning and 
implementing grand strategy; and various immediate refinements to existing grand 
strategy to improve synchronization.  Additional study is suggested to validate the 
supporting strategies of each instrument of power, and continue to refine the threats and 
opportunities of the current environment.  Finally, further work is also needed to develop 
a comprehensive national information strategy that addresses both the need to improve 
situational awareness and persuade foreign publics. 
A comprehensive definition of grand strategy has three critical features.  First, 
grand strategy plans to integrate select national powers in the achievement of national 
security objectives in both war and peace.  Second, grand strategy tailors national 
objectives to available means, and seeks to balance the two while striving to achieve a 
degree of national security.  Third, grand strategy is focused on the accomplishment of 
those interests that the political leadership deems are important to national survival.13  
Briefly stated, the development of a grand strategy is dependent on six features that are 
critical to effectively employing national power: a definition of national interests and 
strategic objectives; a clear identification of the threat; a plan to maintain the instruments 
of power; a balance between ends and means; vertical and horizontal synchronization; 
and a hybrid nature.  The plan to employ instruments of national power emerges out of 
these six features during the planning and execution of policy and programs.  Chapter II 
examines each of these features in greater detail.  American grand strategy is not 
contained in a single statement of policy; rather, it is spread over thirteen loosely aligned 
documents which were developed by disparate agencies often out of logical sequence.  It 
is critical that we consider these documents as a whole in order to identify gaps, and 
determine where they may need to be refined or refocused. 
B. U.S. GRAND STRATEGY 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the centerpiece of American grand 
strategy, but it is not a stand alone statement.  Three documents form the core strategy: 
                                                 
13 Kennedy, 5-6; Luttwak, 179; and Collins, 14-15. 
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the NSS, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), and the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS).  This core is expanded and sharpened by the ten 
supporting strategies: 
o The National Defense Strategy (2005) 
o National Military Strategy (2004) 
o National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
o U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development 
Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009 
o The National Maritime Strategy (2005) 
o The US Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) 
o The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets (2003) 
o The National Money Laundering Strategy (2002) 
o The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003) 
o The National Drug Control Strategy (2003)  
Figure 1 presents a way to understand how these strategies relate to each other.  
Classified strategies and plans are not included in this diagram and will not be addressed 
in this analysis. 
National Security Strategy
DOS/USAID Strategic
Plan
National Defense 
Strategy
National Strategy to 
Combat WMD
National Defense Strategy
USCG Maritime Strategy
For Homeland Security
National Drug
Control Strategy
National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism
National Strategy for 
Homeland Security
Grand Strategy for the GWOT rand trategy for the  
National Maritime Strategy
National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace
National Money Laundering Strategy
National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure & Key Assets
 
Figure 1.   US Grand Strategy for the Global War on Terrorism 
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Each document varies in scope and authority, and articulates a part of the plan to employ 
the instruments of national power.  The following section examines the policy initiatives 
contained in each supporting strategy to determine how national power will be employed 
by the various agencies of the federal government.  After analyzing the initiatives the 
study attempts to explain the general plan for using each instrument of national power.   
 The grand strategy that these documents describe, and that national leaders have 
attempted to articulate, is summarized in Table 1.  To eliminate the threat of transnational 
terrorism, American grand strategy focuses diplomatic power on a strategy of 
encouraging democracy institutions and multilateral action against terrorist organizations.  
Information power attempts to persuade foreign audiences and improve the nation’s 
situational understanding of the terrorist threat.  Military strategy is generally combative, 
rather than deterrent, attempting to engage and defeat terrorist organizations whenever 
possible.  This grand strategy includes economic initiatives to enhance free market 
cooperation and develop weak societies.  Both of these efforts are intended to create 
stronger partners in the war on terrorism and deny enemies access to key resources.  
Finally, the nation’s law enforcement strategy is characterized as cooperative 
prosecution; federal agencies working with and through domestic and foreign law 
enforcement organizations to attack the criminal aspect of terrorism. 
Instrument of Power Strategy for Employment 
Diplomatic Democratization & Multilateralism 
Informational Persuasion & Situational Understanding 
Military Combative & Preventive 
Economic Free Markets & Development 
Law Enforcement Cooperative Prosecution 
Table 1. U.S. Grand Strategy 
 
1. Diplomatic Strategy 
 There are two themes that run throughout the policies and programs that describe 
the use of American diplomacy: democratization and multilateralism.  The President has 
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frequently made the case that the nation will be more secure in an environment where 
foreign governments are representative of, and responsive to, their populations; in short, 
where they are some form of representative democracies.14  In a 2005 address to the 
National Endowment for Democracy, the President emphasized the importance of 
democracy to the struggle against transnational terrorism.  Democratic countries are 
stronger and more capable of denying terrorists safe havens from which to plan and 
coordinate operations.  Democracy is also essential to reducing the underlying 
frustrations and anger that enable radical Islamists.15  The recent success of the terrorist 
group Hamas in January’s Palestinian elections illustrates the danger of this strategy; 
terrorist groups have the potential to muster public support to gain the legitimacy of an 
elected government.  This is not a major problem if the government in question does not 
have the resources to seriously threaten U.S. security or interests.  However, if a 
democratization strategy creates a similar situation in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan the U.S. is 
faced with a much more serious problem.16 
The NSS contains one of the strongest statements about democratization when it 
states that the U.S. will “expand the circle of development by opening societies and 
building the infrastructure of democracy… .” The document goes on to state that freedom 
and the rule of law will be cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy and bilateral 
negotiations.17  The strategy envisions using diplomacy to strengthen relationships with 
other nations, primarily in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, in order to improve the 
abilities of these nations to participate in the GWOT, and enhance their ability to deal 
with terrorism at the state or regional level.  The theme of spreading the costs of 
counterterrorism runs throughout the NSS; for example, there is mention of involving 
Europe in efforts in Africa as a way to develop the region.  The document also contains a 
number of initiatives that other countries may find objectionable, such as efforts to 
                                                 
14 George W. Bush, “President Bush Discussed Freedom in Iraq and the Middle East at the National 
Endowment for Democracy,” November 6, 2003, The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html (accessed January 27, 2006). 
15 George W. Bush, “President Discussed the War on Terror at the National Endowment for 
Democracy,” October 6, 2005, The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/20051006-3.html (accessed January 19, 2006). 
16 Elaine Shannon, “Rice’s busy Week in the Mid East,” CNN.com, February 23, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/21/rice.week/index.html (accessed March 3, 2006). 
17 NSS. 
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protect American citizens from the International Criminal Court, and to tie humanitarian 
aid to quantifiable governmental or human rights reform. 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) discusses the use of 
diplomatic power throughout its list of initiatives in a manner very similar to the NSS.  
Both documents feature plans designed to enhance or compel a multilateral effort to 
increase partner nations’ capabilities and commitment to counterterrorism, while at the 
same time enhancing their ability to deny terrorist organizations a foothold.  The NSCT is 
more aggressive in its initiatives however.  There is a mention of differentiating policy 
towards a nation according to their status as an able, weak or reluctant state in the fight 
against transnational terrorism.  The strategy requires the Chief of Mission to report on a 
nation’s counter terrorism efforts, and further implies that aid will be contingent upon 
action.  In contrast, the DOS/USAID Strategic Plan recognizes the importance of partner 
nations and developing their capabilities, but is less aggressive than the NSCT and does 
not suggest any sort of coercive diplomacy.  More significant is NSCT’s mention of 
“compelling unwilling states” to cease providing support to terrorist organizations.  This 
initiative is not developed in any serious detail in any strategy document.  The NSCT 
states that the US will hold accountable states that “sponsor or actively provide sanctuary 
to terrorists.”18  While both military supporting documents consistently include state 
sponsors of terrorism as threats and potential targets, the subject does not receive this sort 
of explicit attention.19  There is no mention of diplomatic initiatives that could be 
directed against “unwilling” nations in the DOS/USAID Strategic Plan.  This is an 
example of a cross-instrument policy that the NSCT has developed, but no other 
document recognizes. 
The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan is the supporting strategy specifically concerned 
with the employment of US diplomatic power.  It is an extensive plan that includes 
thirteen “key priorities,” three principles aims, four strategic objectives, and twelve 
strategic goals with seventy-nine included policy initiatives.  It is interesting to note that 
although this strategy contains goals and policy initiatives that address terrorism, winning 
                                                 
18 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf 
(accessed February 10, 2005), 20-21. This document will be referenced as the NSCT. 
19 NSCT, 21.  NDS, 8.  NMS, 4. 
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the war on terrorism is not a “key priority” or even a strategic objective of the plan.  The 
closest the document gets is to designate “achieving peace and security” as a strategic 
objective.  The plan recognizes the importance of international partners and reflects the 
NSS and NSCT’s emphasis on developing multilateral alliances to increase international 
participation in the war on terrorism.  To that end there are a number of initiatives that 
focus on using diplomacy to work with international partners “to identify, disrupt, & 
destroy terrorist organizations of global reach.”20  The plan reflects the common focus on 
improving the ability of partner nations to conduct counterterrorist activities, and deny 
terrorist organizations safe haven.   
 Although the DOS/USAID plan has some disconnects with other strategy 
documents, there are many notable consistencies.  The plan recognizes the diplomatic 
work that will be required to secure the nation’s borders; policy initiatives such as build 
“smart borders” reflect this recognition.  This is the system of layered checks intended to 
track foreign shipping and individuals from their point of origin, through foreign and 
domestic ports, to their final destination.  The Smart Borders program is major objective 
of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) that levies a variety of 
requirements on many supporting agencies and strategies.21  Another consistency is in the 
area of drug trafficking.  The DOS/USAID plan recognizes the need to coordinate 
counter-narcotic efforts in the Andean region as well as in Afghanistan and central Asia.  
This is consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy’s efforts to fight drugs on the 
home front and overseas.22 
 There are some elements of U.S. diplomatic strategy that many nations may find 
objectionable.  Many of the initiatives that support the democratization strategy promote 
democratic traditions and institutions in a part of the world where they threaten the status 
quo.  This may seem like an attempt to foist the American system of government, which 
                                                 
20 DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 9. 
21 DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 11; George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office 
of Homeland Security, http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nat_strat_hls.pdf (accessed March 
3, 2005), 22.  This document will be referenced as the NSHS. 
22 DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 15.  George W. Bush, National Drug Control Strategy, The White 
House, http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps13-042604-11.pdf (accessed March 9, 
2005), 30-39.  This document will be referenced as the NDCS. 
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many in this world object to, on other nations.23  These initiatives are critical if one 
believes that democratic nations are less likely to fight one another, or that terrorism will 
cease to be an appealing tactic if people are prosperous and have a legitimate outlet for 
political discontent. 
The strategy of democratization and multilateralism is generally well coordinated 
across formal policy documents.  The focus of the NSS and NSCT is consistently on 
rewarding democratic reform and encouraging representative government.  The 
DOS/USAID Strategic Plan lays out a strategy to encourage democratic reform in an 
effort to  build partners that actively participate in the GWOT and are capable of handling 
terrorist within their own borders without assistance.  Diplomatic initiatives compliment 
the  Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to provide military assistance.   
As we will see, in many areas of America’s grand strategy there is a great deal of 
work to be done.  Democracy and multilateralism will help to set the conditions for 
constructive interaction with Middle Eastern governments, but they will not eliminate 
support for anti-American terrorism.  As Hamas demonstrated in the recent Palestinian 
elections, democracy may bring this nation’s adversaries greater legitimacy and power.  
Michele Dunne eloquently points out, in his article “Ending Support for Terrorism in the 
Muslim World,” that much of the animosity towards the U.S. is a direct result of foreign 
policy decisions that various administrations have made with respect to he Middle East.  
Dunne argues that a progressive reexamination of all the governments and societies in the 
region should form the basis of a new effort to support true agents of democratic change 
in the Muslim world.  He does not advocate breaking off relationships with partners in 
the region, rather using America’s influence to support and encourage real change in 
nations.24  This is one approach that has not been tried, and has great potential for 
yielding high dividends in increased support, legitimacy and freedom of action in the 
region.  
 
                                                 
23 DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 19-27. 
24 Michelle D. Dunne, “Ending Support for Terrorism in the Muslim World,” A Practical Guide to 
Winning the War on Terrorism, ed. By Adam Garfinkle (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2004), 55-
58. 
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2. Information Strategy 
There has been a great deal of focus on “winning the war of ideas,” so much so 
that one could understandably assume that this was the essence of America’s information 
strategy.  However, the nation’s core strategy documents employ informational power 
along two tracts: enhancing situational understanding and persuading foreign audiences.   
It is the former program that has received the most support and attention.  Arguably this 
is because it is easier to grasp and has potential for greater immediate rewards.  The 
NSCT highlights the importance of improving intelligence collection, processing, 
analysis, and dissemination in the effort to prevent attacks and defeat terrorist 
organizations.25  Programs to improve America’s situational understanding are expanded 
upon by the NSHS and the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets (NSPPCIKA).  These strategies include initiatives that recognize the 
need to improve technical collection systems to track everything from terrorist finances to 
WMD agents and technology.  These initiatives also have a human component that 
recognizes the importance of improving human intelligence collection, and our ability to 
accurately analyze the collected data.  The NSPPCIKA even goes so far as to describe 
what amounts to a total reexamination of domestic intelligence requirements and 
procedural obstacles in an effort to provide more effective support to domestic 
counterterrorism efforts.26  Finally, all three strategies devote significant attention to 
programs for improving information sharing throughout government, at the federal, state, 
local levels, and with the public and private sectors.   
One theme that frequently appears in the strategy documents, especially the  
NSCT and the National Maritime Strategy is the idea that America must develop total 
“domain awareness” in our efforts to identify, track, and act against any threat to the US 
or its citizens.27  This is an ambitious goal that may be effective as an ideal endstate, but 
may be totally unworkable as an achievable objective.  The country cannot hope to 
deploy enough high technology systems to monitor every inch of its borders, and even 
                                                 
25 NSCT, 16-19.  As with other strategy documents, this theme runs throughout the NSCT both 
explicitly and implicitly in a variety of policies and programs.   
26 George W. Bush, National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, The 
White House,  http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/physical_strategy.pdf (accessed March 9, 
2005), 25-27.  This document will be referenced as the NSPPCIKA. 
27 NSCT, 25.  
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the most advanced system can be deceived.  That is not to suggest that the nation should 
not strive to improve its awareness of threats, rather that initiatives like the “smart 
borders” program are a better investment.  The maritime strategy effectively describes the 
difficulties with achieving maritime “domain awareness” and identifies realistic advances 
that can be made.28 
Two key elements of government’s effort to improve communications with the 
public are the Homeland Security Advisory System and a series of sector specific 
Information Sharing Analysis Centers (ISAC).  The advisory system is the government’s 
primary means of providing security information to the general public; it is a system that 
continues to be developed and refined to maximize its effectiveness.  The ISACs are 
organizations that focus on exchanging industry specific security information, 
vulnerability assessments, and sharing threat warnings.  This system is far from ideal.   
Participation in ISACs is voluntary, and while procedures are being developed, 
safeguarding proprietary information is an issue.29   
The NSCT, and to a lesser extent the NSS, envisions winning the “war of ideas” 
as a means to erode support for radical organizations.  This is a critical component in the 
nation’s grand strategy, but the two most active national security organizations, the 
Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, reflect very different approaches to this 
challenge.  The national military strategies are about fighting conventional wars and do 
not effectively support fighting at the level of ideals, values, or ethics.  The National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) recognizes the importance of attacking terrorist organizations at 
the ideological level, but fails to identify any role for the DOD in this effort.  The DOD 
has begun a variety of initiatives to improve its capability to persuade at the strategic 
level, some more successful than others.  The most public of these was the Office of 
Strategic Information, which was disbanded in 2003 amid controversy over its mission.  
Other initiatives include the restructuring of U.S. Strategic Command to conduct IO and 
the establishment of an Information Operations Center of Excellence at the Naval 
                                                 
28 George W. Bush, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, The White House, 
http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps03-092305-02.pdf (accessed November 8, 2005), 16-17.  This 
document will be referenced as the NSMS. 
29 NSPPCIKA, 27. 
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Postgraduate School.30 The National Military Strategy (NMS) recognizes the need for a 
strategic communications plan, but the focus is on deterring threats by demonstrating 
strength and resolve.  Neither document recognizes that military action may be damaging 
to US soft power, and that operations may need to be conducted with second and third 
degree effects in mind.31   
The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan includes initiatives to enhance the nation’s 
ability to communicate with the world in order to improve overall understanding of 
American policy and motivations.  The departments will pursue this goal through policies 
and programs designed to increase the nation’s capability to conduct public diplomacy 
and respond to negative propaganda.  The strategy emphasizes the traditional tools of 
public diplomacy, broadcast media and educational exchange, as well as includes some 
new ones like the World Wide Web.  Most important, the strategy states that the 
departments will listen to the international community and “inform the policy process 
through accurate readings of public opinions in foreign countries.”32  This is significant 
because it indicates two things.  First, it shows that there is awareness that the US must 
improve its understanding of the perspectives of foreign audiences.  Second, there may be 
an effort to consider the reaction of the international community when crafting foreign 
policy.  This was reinforced by Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen 
Hughes in her confirmation hearings when she recognized the critical link between 
“policy and public diplomacy.”  Hughes stated that Secretary Rice intended for “me 
personally and public diplomacy institutionally to play a key role in policy 
development.”33  
American information strategy pursues a bifurcated path that reflects the dual 
nature of informational power.  The first aspect of this strategy are initiatives to improve 
                                                 
30 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2006, Department 
of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/ (accessed March 3, 2006).  Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon and Bogus 
News: All is Denied,” The New York Times, December 5, 2003; http://proquest.umi.com (accessed March 
3, 2006). William M. Arkin, “Defense Strategy; The Military’s New War of Words,” Los Angeles Times, 
November 24, 2002, http://proquest.umi.com (accessed March 3, 2006). 
31 NDS, 9.  NMS,12.   
32 DOS/USAID Strategic Plan, 30-32. 
33 Karen Hughes, “The Mission of Public Diplomacy,” U.S. Department of State, 
www.state.gov/r/us/2005/49967.htm (accessed January 19, 2005). 
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situational understanding among federal, state and local governments as well as with 
foreign partners in the GWOT.  There are certainly initiatives to improve intelligence 
collection, but in reading the strategies a great deal more effort is being put into analyzing 
and sharing the information that already exists.  Information sharing is a major theme in 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security as well as in the reorganization plans 
ongoing in many agencies.  A great deal of work is still left to be done, however.  
Although the process of reform and reorganization is underway within national security 
agencies, as the 9/11 Commission’s December 2005 report shows the nation has not yet 
made significant progress in improving information sharing or communication.34    
The second aspect of information strategy is the U.S. government’s attempt to 
engage the world on the level of ideas, values, and ethics by aggressively pursuing 
traditional diplomacy, and by reviving public diplomacy organizations.  This information 
campaign attempts to persuade various societies of the rightness of American policies and 
programs, while simultaneously discrediting terrorism and violent Islamic movements in 
general.  It is thought that an improved international reputation will increase America’s 
ability to peacefully influence the actions of other nations.35  The travels of Secretary 
Rice and Undersecretary Hughes in late 2005 exemplify the beginnings of an effort to 
explain American foreign policy.  However, Undersecretary Hughes’ information 
strategy may never enjoy any real success until it begins to address the very real issue 
that many people throughout the world understand but object to American foreign policy; 
it may not be a question of simply explaining American motives and objectives better.36   
                                                 
34 Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, December 2005, 9/11 Public Discourse 
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Two critical pieces are missing from US efforts to employ information power.  
First, the US lacks an explicit information strategy that prioritizes efforts to improve 
intelligence and information sharing, while at the same time fully developing initiatives 
to engage foreign audiences.  The NSS contains a short section devoted to the subject, but 
it lacks any specific policy initiatives, priorities, or concept of how the goals will be 
accomplished.37  Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes described 
a sort of information strategy in her July 2005 confirmation hearings.  Undersecretary 
Hughes called for a program of “engagement, exchanges, education and empowerment.”  
It is impossible to debate the merits of this strategy because it is not described in any 
significant detail, but there are indications that it may not be well thought out.  Education 
is an example of this danger.  It is briefly described as “the path to upward mobility and 
greater opportunity.”  Education program will focus on English language training as a 
means to “improve their own [people in underdeveloped countries] lives and learn more 
about our [American] lives.”38  This is troubling because English is only a small part of 
what education programs should try to teach; the programs should be focusing on areas 
like HIV/AIDS prevention, civil engineering, reading, writing, and a whole host of other 
topics where education could make a difference in their lives.  Second, the US lacks a 
coordinated plan to inform the American public about the conduct of the GWOT, an 
important aspect to maintaining national will.  The American public is inundated with 
information from the media, the government’s web sites are difficult to navigate, and the 
dynamics of governmental politics makes it difficult for the President to communicate 
effectively.  In this environment the American public has no concept of where the GWOT 
stands or how it is going, all they know is that soldiers are dying daily in Iraq and the al-
Qaeda is still a threat four years after September 11th. 
3. Military Strategy 
The strategy to employ military power outlined in the NSS and other core 
documents is surprisingly vague, although it is clear that there is a large military 
component.  The NSS states that the US will employ “direct and continuous action using 
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all the elements of national and international power,” against terrorist organizations.39  
However, the NSS in no way outlines a strategy to employ the military in this fight.  The 
NSCT makes the strongest statement when it notes that the US will “focus decisive 
military power & specialized intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks 
globally.”40  The document goes on to reflect the complexity of this task by directing 
regional commanders to begin planning for humanitarian operations as well as implying 
that the military will have a role in denying terrorist access to ungoverned areas of the 
world.  The military strategy described in these documents is a broadly stated set of 
themes that do little to constrain or integrate the military effort.  
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) do a 
significantly better job outlining the strategy to employ military power in the conflict.  
Both documents lay out a set of general objectives for military forces, and describe what 
the military will do to carry the fight to the enemy.  Neither document makes any attempt 
to outline specifically how the military will conduct operations, presumably preferring to 
leave operational planning to the regional combatant commanders.  The NDS establishes 
four “strategic objectives,” and concentrates on defeating adversaries overseas before 
they can make it to America.41   The strategy states that the military will accomplish this 
task by accomplishing a set of goals that include “limit [sic] adversaries’ options, deny 
them their means of support, defeat organized resistance, & establish security.”42  What 
is missing is a description of how the military will accomplish these goals.  The strategy 
reflects the need to share intelligence, improve the nation’s ability to conduct defensive 
military operations, and support civil authorities in times of crisis.  Just as the core 
documents stress the importance of allies, the NDS stresses working with and through 
allies to improve their ability to conduct counterterrorist operations, participate in the 
international effort, and exert control over ungoverned areas of the world.  Finally, the 
NDS focuses on transforming the entire Department of Defense, from the civilian 
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bureaucracy to the military forces.  This initiative is intended to improve efficiency and 
flexibility, while at the same time developing a force that is more capable of fighting 
transnational terrorist organizations. 
The NMS differs little from the NDS in content or style, but the few ways it does 
diverge are important.  The NMS states very clearly that the 1st priority of the military 
forces is “winning the war on terrorism,” surprisingly this is not commonly stated in 
many other strategy documents.43  The NMS links NDS’ strategic objectives with 
supporting military objectives and Joint Operations Concepts (JOC) to describe how the 
military operate.  This nesting that is extremely effective in illustrating how higher 
objectives can guide the planning process for subordinate organizations.44  Full spectrum 
dominance (FSD) is a feature of the NMS that is not included in the NDS.  This is similar 
to the issue of domain awareness discussed in the previous section.  The NMS however, 
recognizes FSD as a general goal, and uses it to focus initiatives to improve information 
collection and exchange.  One initiative intended to deliberately cross the boundary 
between military and information power, is the Counter-Terrorist (CT) Joint Interagency 
Coordination Groups (JIACGs).  These are teams designed to facilitate integration & 
information sharing at the interagency level.  This program has great potential to enable 
military operations and improve the overall outcome of military activities.45 
One of the most interesting features of the national military strategies is their 
focus on a capabilities-based approach to force development.  Both documents repeatedly 
state that they are concerned with developing the capabilities that allow the military to 
effectively fight in any environment, against any enemy.46  This is an enemy neutral 
approach to force development in an environment characterized by vastly different types 
of adversaries.  In essence capabilities based forces must be prepared to fight every sort 
of enemy that they might encounter; the same force that is prepared to fight a tank battle 
must be prepared to fight a counterinsurgency.  As events in Iraq are illustrating, this is a 
                                                 
43 NMS, iv. 
44 NMS, 3. 
45 NMS 21-23. 
46 NDS, 11-17.  NMS, Chapter III. 
19 
very difficult task to demand of the force.47  This feature will most likely hinder the 
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to fight the transnational 
terrorist organizations because, instead of forcing change it enables the status quo.  The 
military will always train to defeat the most dangerous threat, with the assumption that 
anything not as dangerous can be handled as well.  A capabilities-based force design 
encourages this thinking instead of challenging the military to focus on the enemy at 
hand. 
The strategy to employ military power is generally described in the national 
strategy documents.  The focus is on direct military action to defeat terrorist 
organizations, and indirect actions to support and develop allies.  The strategy documents 
generally describe how the military will fight, but not what the military will do in any 
specific region.  At the operational level these strategy documents may create difficulties 
in prioritizing resources.  Allocating resources may be more reactionary rather than 
deliberate because of a lack of clearly designated priority among regions, adversaries, or 
commands.  The military’s strategy is overwhelmingly combative and cumulative, 
attempting to take the fight to the transnational terrorist organizations wherever there is 
an opportunity to do so.  Iraq and Afghanistan are only the most visible of these actions; 
operations go on in South America, Southeast Asia, and the Horn of Africa daily.   
American military activities in the Philippines illustrate this strategy. United 
States military forces participate in high profile exercises such as the annual Balikatan 
training exercise and less public ones such as small unit counterterrorism training.  In 
these “training exercises” US forces work closely with their Philippine “trainees” to 
target terrorists and destroy them.  This strategy has had mixed results in the Philippines; 
while decreasing the strength of the Abu Sayyaf group, the surviving members have 
strengthened their ties to Indonesia’s Jemmah Islamiah (JI), as well as the Filipino Moro 
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Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and become increasingly lethal in their attacks.48  
While the strategy is generally combative, there are notable exceptions.  U.S. Task Force 
Horn of Africa is engaged in significant nation building efforts throughout the region to 
improve the quality of life of the population.  These efforts also degrade the terrorists’ 
ability to recruit and train, while simultaneously improving America’s image in the 
region.49  This use of resources may provide the military’s longest and most productive 
contribution to the GWOT, because terrorism will always be an available choice of 
disaffected groups in the world.  To the extent that the U.S. is not a viable, acceptable, or 
appropriate target in the mind of those groups, the nation will be safer.   
4. Economic Strategy 
Like informational power, there is no explicit plan to employ American economic 
power; this does not mean that it is unused or somehow neglected.  On the contrary, 
economic power is employed by every agency and department involved in the fight.  
Some organizations make deliberate use of this instrument to affect the behavior of 
friends, adversaries, and others in the struggle.  The problem is that there is no systematic 
overarching approach to applying economic power in this grand strategy.  This is 
surprising given that, as a “hard power,” economic resources have the potential to 
produce direct and often quantifiable results.  In general the core documents focus on 
applying economic power to reward cooperative nations and organizations, while the 
supporting strategies focus on applying economic resources to enable operations.  The 
notable exceptions to these trends are the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(NSHS) and the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International 
Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan. 
One feature of economic strategy not explicitly spelled out in the strategy 
documents is the drive to open markets throughout the world.  Since September 11, 2001 
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the U.S. has entered into, or announced the intention of entering into, Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) with various Middle Eastern and Central America nations, established 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with countries as diverse as Egypt 
and Algeria, and worked for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership for nations 
such as Saudi Arabia.50  The purpose of these FTAs is to remove the barriers to trade 
globally as a means to undermine poverty and encourage democracy.  These agreements 
will result in foreign partners less likely to support terrorist organizations, and foreign 
populations that are less vulnerable to terrorist recruiting.51  The nation’s strategy for 
employing economic power can be summed up as an active effort to increase free 
markets throughout the developing world, also referred to as marketization, and focused 
developmental aid to weak states. 
American policy documents and foreign aid programs, since September 11, have 
refocused developmental aid on nations in the Middle East in an attempt to make these 
needed improvements.52  The National Security Strategy (NSS) stresses programs and 
policies that employ economic power persuasively: developmental assistance in return for 
economic and political reform or the expansion of free markets.  The NSS does suggest 
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that foreign aid will be used as a reward for progress towards freedom and democracy.  
There is an implied threat of economic sanctions in its discussions of actions to defeat 
terrorist organizations, but no direct threats to withhold aid.  In fact, as we have already 
mentioned, the administration’s primary program to expand American foreign aid, the 
Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA), is not tied to recipient nation’s counterterrorist 
operations at all.53  As has already been mentioned, the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism (NSCT) adopts a much more aggressive tone.  The NSCT seems to conflict 
with the message of the NSS, and the precedent set by the MCAs, when it states that 
nation’s “stand on terrorism will be considered when deciding on aid.”54     
The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan is the primary mechanism for directly employing 
economic power to develop partners in the GWOT.  Aid is packaged as either 
humanitarian or security assistance and is often not linked to the recipient’s 
counterterrorism efforts.  Developmental aid to vulnerable nations and populations 
receives the most attention in this supporting strategy.  Programs and organizations such 
as the Millennium Challenge Accounts, the President’s HIV/AIDS initiative, or the 
Multilateral Development Banks have twofold effect.  The direct effect of these programs 
is to reduce the poverty, disease, and misery of populations in second and third world 
societies.  The indirect effect of these programs is to reduce the hate and rage that are 
thought to contribute to the appeal of terrorism, and increase the appeal of western ideals 
and traditions.55  The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan includes a series of initiatives that 
focus on “diminishing the underlying causes of terrorism” in countries like Pakistan, 
Nepal, and the Sudan.56  These are initiatives designed to reduce poverty, unemployment, 
and improve access to health care.  The programs illustrate the close relationship between 
political objectives and the economic resources that are often used to secure these 
objectives. 
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A striking feature of the NSHS is its attempt to manage the costs of the programs 
it advocates; this is not a common feature among supporting strategies.  The NSHS 
contains significant and costly initiatives, some of which are: recapitalizing the US Coast 
Guard, developing a common communications system for 1st responders, and developing 
new sensors to identify and track WMD.  However, the NSHS contains a section that 
recognizes the costs of these programs, discusses spreading the costs between levels of 
government (federal, state, and local), and prioritizes initiatives for the 2004 fiscal year.57  
In contrast, the DOS/USAID plan fails to contain any discussion of economic feasibility, 
and little mention of priorities, among the vast numbers of programs it calls for.  
Economic power does not suffer from a lack of employment, but it does suffer 
from a lack of focus.  Every strategy document mentions providing aid to foreign nations 
to encourage a variety of behaviors.  What is missing is a focus to these efforts.  There is 
no interagency/cross strategy prioritization of effort to allow for employment of financial 
resources.  The static nature of these strategy documents also creates a problem for 
focusing resources.  The NSHS includes a list of priorities for fiscal 2004 budget, but that 
is now almost three budget cycles old.  Under this system, in effect the federal budget 
becomes the ultimate prioritizer of the nation’s grand strategy.  U.S. economic power is 
ultimately allocated by Congress through the budget process, and economic power 
enables virtually all other powers to act.  Thus, U.S. grand strategy is at the mercy of a 
fickle system that is hampered by partisan politics.  A second feature that is missing from 
America’s economic strategy is any serious discussion of economic sanctions and how 
they might be used to influence other international actors.  There is a great deal of debate 
regarding the effectiveness of such sanctions, but that does not change the fact that they 
are a legitimate tool that should be factored into the nation’s strategy.  As it stands now 
foreign nations have no idea how positive or negative sanctions might be employed 
against their nation so they are forced to act without considering the possible effects of 
these tools. 
5. Law Enforcement Strategy 
The core US strategy documents illustrate two foci for US judicial power: drugs 
and terrorism.  Judicial power is not discussed in any detail in the NSS, but does receive 
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significant attention in the NSCT and NSHS.  The NSCT predictably focuses on 
employing law enforcement elements to prosecute criminal cases against terrorists 
wherever they operate.  To this end it advocates expanding the Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties, US law enforcement activities overseas, and “breaking the nexus between drugs 
and terror.”58  The NSHS includes multiple initiatives to increase the size, capability, and 
effectiveness of a range of law enforcement organizations.  One of the most significant 
initiatives in the NSHS is the plan to expand the number and functions of the FBI led 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF).  As of December 2004 the FBI had added 64 JTTFs 
for a total of 100; participation in these included 2,196 FBI agents, 838 other federal 
government representatives and most significantly 689 representatives from state and 
local law enforcement agencies.  This growth is in addition to the expansion and 
reorganization of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the development of an 
interagency Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and the realignment of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) under the Director of National Intelligence.59     
The explicit strategy to employ the law enforcement elements of the US 
government is contained in two documents, the National Money Laundering Strategy 
(NMLS) and the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).  The NMLS is focused directly 
on the terrorist threat, while the NDCS addresses terrorism as a lesser included challenge 
in the fight against drug trafficking.  These documents only touch on the efforts of law 
enforcement to track and prevent the action of terrorist organizations at home and abroad; 
they are primarily directed against a subset of the larger fight.  A more detailed 
description of counterterrorism operations is contained in the Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ) 2004 performance report and plan.  This document focuses law enforcement on 
investigating and prosecuting individuals and terrorist organizations, as well as to 
improving law enforcement’s capability to conduct counterterrorism operations in 
general.  The plan predictably focuses on DOJ organizations, the FBI, Immigration and 
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Naturalization Service (INS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the US 
Attorney’s Office to name a few.  It does not include the activities of non-traditional 
organizations such as the Coast Guard or the Border Patrol.60 
America’s law enforcement strategy for the GWOT could be summed up as 
aggressive and cooperative prosecution on all terrorism related crime.  While official 
strategy documents emphasize money laundering and counternarcotic efforts, the nation’s 
law enforcement is pursuing a much broader agenda.  Federal Bureau of Investigations 
Director Robert Mueller stated that the FBI’s “top three national security priorities are 
now counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber security.”  He went on to outline a 
strategy that revolves around legal attaches working with “our counterparts overseas on 
joint investigations, intelligence-sharing, and the development of new methods to prevent 
attacks.”61  This is a cumulative strategy that attempts to collapse terrorist organizations 
through an attrition scheme.  Operations to identify and eliminate the sources and 
networks financing terrorist organizations are only one part of a much larger effort.  
Cooperative prosecution describes a strategy that attempts to prosecute terrorists and their 
organizations wherever there is a legal infrastructure and a will to support these actions.  
When an inadequate legal infrastructure exists, the nation’s law enforcement agencies, in 
particular the (FBI) through its International Training Program, work to develop one.  
Programs are in place to train foreign police forces both in their country an in the United 
States.  The FBI has increased its number of agents and offices overseas and provides 
specialized investigative assistance to partner nations on a variety of crimes.62  In 
addition to conducting its own international training program, the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has an International Response Team that 
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works with the State department to “to provide technical and investigative assistance at 
international explosives and fire incidents.”63  The FBI is the leading agency for 
international law enforcement efforts, but as the example of the AFT International 
Response Team shows, it is far from the only agency working to with and through 
international partner nations.   
C. CONCLUSIONS    
America grand strategy has historically run the gamut from isolationism to fully 
engaged collective security.  Regardless of the features of the strategy, each one is a 
reflection of the constraints and opportunities of the global environment and the relative 
effectiveness of the instruments of American power at the time.64  The grand strategy that 
has developed to guide American policy since September 11 is similarly a product of the 
unique environment in which it evolved.  It is not captured neatly in one document or 
speech; to fully understand it one must look across a spectrum of policy documents and 
public statements by America’s leaders.  It is a strategy that includes a role for each 
instrument of national power.  It is also a strategy that reflects the opportunities of the 
global environment, but one that may not take into account that same environment’s 
limitations on action.   
Diplomatic power focuses on encouraging democracy in an effort to reduce the 
points of friction between societies, and to provide a peaceful outlet for social discontent.  
Informational power is used to persuade a number of audiences throughout the world.  
The object of this persuasion is to improve the image of America and her policies, while 
at the same time discrediting the message of her enemies.  Informational power is also 
concerned with improving America’s overall situational understanding of the global 
environment.  This aspect includes information collection, processing, and sharing among 
U.S. and international partners.  The military is an integral part of efforts to provide 
humanitarian assistance and strengthen foreign nation’s ability to combat terrorism within 
its own borders.  Military strategy however, is generally combative, seeking to identify 
and destroy terrorist organizations wherever possible, other missions are secondary or a 
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means to accomplish this primary task.  The strategy to employ economic power is 
characterized by the drive to open markets around the world in an effort to improve the 
economic prosperity of foreign and domestic populations.  American diplomacy 
frequently employs economic power to strengthen weak states and improve the quality of 
life for people in the developing world.  Developmental aid and health care assistance are 
examples of economic power.  Finally, the strategy to employ the nation’s law 
enforcement organizations is one of cooperative prosecution.  Federal agencies, primarily 
the FBI, will work with and through foreign partners to prosecute terrorists and terrorism 
related crimes at home and abroad. 
General Andre Beaufre examined the effects of the relationship between the 
importance of an objective, the military resources available, and the force’s freedom of 
action in his book An Introduction to Strategy.  He argued that these relationships shaped 
the strategic patterns available to the nation’s leader.  For example, in a conflict with 
moderately important objectives and large military resources available, the nation’s 
leader should adopt a strategy of threatening military action, as that may be sufficient to 
accomplish the objectives.65  One can assume that the force has sufficient freedom of 
action to make this threat believable.  Let’s try to put this reasoning into the context of 
America’s grand strategy for a moment.   
The objectives of the GWOT are not as well defined as many would like, but all 
would certainly agree that securing the nation from terrorist attack using a weapon of 
mass destruction (WMD) is one of them.  This is a highly important objective clearly, but 
how sufficient are America’s resources?  Diplomatically there are indications that the US 
has sufficient resources to discourage states from supplying WMD to terrorist 
organizations.  However, with a nuclear armed North Korea, a resurgent Iran, and 
questions of about the security of weapons in the former Soviet Union, diplomacy may 
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by insufficient to prevent terrorists from acquiring a weapon.  Militarily the nation has 
more than enough resources to seize or destroy a terrorist WMD.  The nation does not 
have adequate intelligence to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring or employing 
a WMD.  The value of economic power in this calculation is questionable.  The nation 
certainly has the resources to purchase weapons that appear on the black market, or it 
could conceivable pay scientists from developing nations not to use their knowledge.  
However, programs to prevent the spread of AIDS in Africa or increase jobs in the 
Philippines will not prevent al-Qaeda from developing a dirty bomb or chemical weapon.  
The nation’s law enforcement elements are active and capable.  With successes such as 
that against the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan, they have shown an ability to work with 
and through other agencies and governments to counter this threat.  Table 2 summarizes 
the nation’s capability to prevent a terrorist organization from acquiring and employing a 
WMD. 
 
Importance of 
Objective 
National Power Capability 
Diplomatic 2 
Informational 1 
Military 5 
Economic 3 
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Table 2. Evaluation of Resource Capability 
(5 is highest) 
 
Beaufre’s study focused on the leader’s options in employing military might, but 
some of the same logic can be applied to this example.  In this example the enemy has an 
informational advantage that cancels out America’s military advantage, and degrades the 
nation’s judicial lead.  In cases of inadequate military force Beaufre argues that the leader 
should adopt either an indirect strategy or one centering on low intensity conflict.  In the 
above example the nation has no dominant instrument of power that can carry the fight, 
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but it is faced with a highly important objective.  In this case it would seem that an 
indirect strategy that attacks the terrorist organization from a variety of directions to 
achieve a cumulative effect is the only one with a chance of success.  Beaufre also 
included the commander’s freedom to employ his forces, his freedom of action, in his 
calculus.66  In the example of a terrorist WMD, the use of military force is further 
restricted when one considers freedom of action.  America faces an information 
imbalance that makes a preemptive use of military force difficult, and a legitimacy 
problem that makes preventive one even more problematic.  The nation is free to use its 
diplomatic and informational resources, but these have little capability to achieve the 
objective.  Finally, the nation is also free to employ its law enforcement elements, and 
these have shown themselves to be effective in some instances.  However, these assets 
are only available when the terrorist organization is operating within a nation that is 
willing to cooperate with the U.S. led war on terrorism; in ungoverned areas like 
Somalia, FBI legal attachés are incapable of any significant action.67  Table 3 
demonstrates how these limitations might affect American instruments of power. 
Importance 
of Objective 
National Power Capability Freedom of Action 
Diplomatic 2 High 
Informational 1 High 
Military 5 2 Low 
Economic 3 Moderate 
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) 
Law Enforcement 5  3 Moderate 
Table 3. The Effect of Freedom of Action on Resources 
                                                 
66 Beaufre, 26-31.   
67 The federal interagency effort to disrupt and destroy the A.Q. Khan network illustrates that it is 
often impossible for WMD smuggling and development to take place entirely in nations that will not 
support the U.S. led efforts.  Although Pakistan only grudgingly cooperated after the network was 
discovered, the U.S. was able to work with and through South Africa to seize a nuclear processing facility 
destined for Lybia.  For more information see: Josh Meyer, “Case Reveals Nuts and Bolts of Nuclear 
Network, Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times, http://proquest.umi.com (accessed January 28, 2006).  
Douglas Frantz and William C. Rempel; “New Find in a Nuclear Network; A Pakistani Scientist Used 
South African Affiliated in an Effort to Outfit Libya with a Uranium enrichment Plant,” Los Angeles Times, 
http://proquest.umi.com (accessed January 28, 2006). 
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This analysis seems to present a grim future for American grand strategy.  It 
asserts that no one instrument of power is particularly capable of preventing a 
transnational terrorist organization from acquiring and employing a WMD.  Beaufre’s 
reasoning applies to the war on terrorism just as it does a conventional battle.  The nation, 
faced with a highly important objective and an array of moderately capable means, must 
employ a hybrid strategy that uses powers with great freedom of action, but limited 
capability, to develop the situation and create the conditions to employ those with greater 
capability.  Put simple diplomacy and informational power must achieve what is 
achievable within their realm, but also shape the environment to allow military and 
judicial forces to act against terrorist organizations.  This requires great cooperation 
among federal agencies to coordinate and synchronize their actions within a larger plan 
of attack. 
This study now turns to an examination of the principles behind grand strategy to 
consider how a successful strategy is constructed and executed.  The various instruments 
of national power are interdependent and must be coordinated to operate most effectively.  
As the previous example suggests, these instruments should work synergistically to 
facilitate and reinforce each other’s operations in pursuit of a larger goal.  How does this 
happen?  What are the mechanisms that allow this integration?  How effectively is 
American grand strategy using these mechanisms?  These are some of the questions this 
study will attempt to answer in the next chapter. 
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II. ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY  
A. GRAND STRATEGY DEFINED 
Paul Kennedy presents a comprehensive definition of grand strategy that serves as 
a starting point for this study.  Grand strategy, in Kennedy’s theory, is a broad set of 
long-term policies that guide a nation during peace and war by the “balancing of ends and 
means” to achieve national interests, and ensures the nation emerges from conflict better 
off than when it began.  Grand strategy focuses on maintaining peace while being 
prepared for war by bringing “together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, 
for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is wartime and 
peacetime) best interests.”  This is a critical point because it emphasizes the role of grand 
strategy during peace time: to simultaneously avoid and prepare for success in war.  
Grand strategists must look beyond the battlefield and understand the importance of 
divergent issues such as the management of critical resources, how diplomacy may affect 
the relative balance of power, and the importance of “morale and political culture” to a 
nation’s ability to defend its interests.68   
Grand strategy is defined by Edward Luttwak in his book, Strategy, as the highest 
level of national maneuvering where military operations blend with the other interactions 
between states.  Luttwak recognizes that grand strategy is much broader in scope than 
military strategy, but seems to imply that grand strategy is a product of actions taken at 
lower levels, rather than the overarching framework that guides those actions.69  In 
contrast, Kennedy argues the grand strategy is that deliberate employment of all elements 
of national power in a systematic way to secure national interests.  Luttwak adds that 
grand strategy is relatively narrow in its focus; it is focused on those relationships, 
policies and programs that directly threaten or protect the nation.70  The distinction that 
grand strategy focuses on national security confers greater gravity on the efforts of the 
strategist to plan and synchronize policies and programs.  This concept is also important  
 
                                                 
68 Kennedy, 5. 
69 Luttwak, Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 179. 
70 Ibid., 180. 
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when national leaders prioritize resources because policies and programs that affect 
national security receive a higher priority and a greater allocation of resources than 
others.   
In Grand Strategy: Practices and Principles John Collins sharpens the distinction 
between grand strategy and military strategy by explaining that grand strategy “controls 
military strategy,” with the latter being only one subordinate element of the former.71  
This concept of nested strategies is enormously useful in understanding how the elements 
of national power interrelate.  Essentially each element of national power has its own 
individual strategy for achieving specific goals; these strategies exist within, and support, 
the larger framework of national grand strategy. Collins also expands on Kennedy’s 
concept of military and non-military power by including all efforts to influence an 
adversary through “threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other 
imaginative means.”  Collins specifically discusses the importance of the economic and 
psychological elements in a nation’s efforts to influence its adversaries.72  The important 
thing to note is that military force is only one way that a nation influences its friends and 
adversaries, and it may not be the most powerful tool available.     
These authors have offered complementary definitions of grand strategy that build 
on three main points.  First, grand strategy is the employment of all available national 
power in the achievement of national security objectives in both war and peace.  Second, 
successful grand strategy constrains national objectives according to available means, and 
seeks to balance the two while striving to achieve these goals.  To exceed available 
means courts disaster, and necessitates deliberate efforts to generate resources.73  Third, 
grand strategy is focused on national security, the accomplishment of those objectives 
vital to national survival.   
                                                 
71 John Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1973), 14-15. 
72 Ibid., 14. 
73 J.H. Elliot, “Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain,” Grand 
Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).  Elliot 
describes a Spanish grand strategy the clearly exceeded the nation’s available means.  National leaders 
deliberately chose this path in an attempt to stop the Spain’s declining power in the world.  They expected 
to  increase resources to match their strategy through a series of internal reforms and victories in foreign 
policy initiatives.  Unfortunately, it is not sound strategy to depend on a victory to provide you the means to 
achieve further victory.  Spain found this out in the late 1640s. 
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American grand strategy today must exploit the international environment by 
blending the components of national power.  We should begin with a common 
understanding of the components of a grand strategy to effectively examine US efforts.  
Table 4 summarizes the seven features that this study argues are critical to crafting an 
integrated and effective grand strategy.  They are: defined interests and objectives; 
identified threat; plans to employ instruments of power; maintenance of power; balanced 
ends and means; horizontal and vertical synchronization; and hybrid in nature. 
 
FEATURES EXPLANATION 
Defined Interests & Objectives 
National interests are selected security goals that focus 
instruments of power.  Objectives enable prioritization, 
synchronization, resourcing, and planning.   
Identified Threat or Opportunity 
Enables actors to determine what must be done to achieve an 
objective. 
Affects definition of interests and objectives. 
Employment of National Power The plan integrates and synchronizes instruments of national power in pursuit of grand strategic objectives.  
Maintenance of National Power Maintains the sources of national power for a protracted conflict. 
Balanced Ends and Means 
Objectives are attainable with the resources at hand.  Prevents 
a nation from overreaching its capabilities and emerging from 
the conflict weaker than it entered. 
Horizontal and Vertical 
Synchronization 
Policy and programs are coordinated from the lowest level to 
the highest within and across instruments of power.   
Hybrid in Nature 
Grand strategy requires direct and indirect applications of 
power.  Individual policies and programs will achieve 
objective through sequential and/or cumulative action. 
Table 4. Principles of Grand Strategy 
 
B. FEATURES OF A GRAND STRATEGY 
1. Defined Interests and Objectives 
National interests express the country’s highest priorities, those which a nation is 
willing to go to war over.  In distinguishing between vital and secondary national 
interests, Collins states that survival is a society’s only vital interest.  He goes on to 
define survival as maintaining and “’acceptable’ degree of independence, territorial 
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integrity, traditional life styles, fundamental institutions, values, and honor.”  A nation 
will always fight for its survival, but secondary interests require political decision makers 
to make a value decision before committing military force.  As his case study of Korea 
illustrates, national interest evolve over time, often to a point where the loss of additional 
troops and resources are unacceptable.74   
Clearly defined national interests provide the limits and guides to decision 
makers.  Hans Morgenthau argues in his book, Politics Among Nations, that national 
interests distinguish the conduct of politics from other disciplines within the “realism 
model” because they are more influential than moral values in guiding statesman’s 
application of power.  Put in other words, foreign policy is shaped more by political 
leader’s efforts to achieve national interests, than by their personal morality or 
ideology.75  This becomes problematic, according to Morgenthau, when national interests 
and ideology become conflated.  Ideology is rarely bounded by the constraints of limited 
resources, competing belief systems, or peers with their own goals and agendas.  National 
interests are statements of a desired endstate, but they should reflect the realities of the 
global environment and the capabilities of the nation.  Ideology is unbounded and 
theoretical, national interests are constrained and realistic.    
Morgenthau does not suggest that power should be exercised to its fullest extent 
in pursuit of national interests; in fact he rejects the theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes.  
Morgenthau argues that the exercise of power should be constrained by “morality, mores, 
and law,” to ensure that the rights of all members of the society are protected.  One might 
ask in a conflict between different value systems how is either constrained.  Morgenthau 
                                                 
74 Collins, 1-2.  Collins recognizes that different cultures and societies have different definitions of 
“acceptable survival.”  He explains that the definition of acceptable is “conditioned by future prospects,” 
and illustrates this distinction with the example of post WWII Germany.  Even though the country barely 
survived as a nation, it maintained acceptable levels given the future potential.  In contrast the US would 
not accept the sort of domination imposed by the Soviet Union on countries behind the Iron Curtain 
regardless of the situation. 
75 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1973), 5. Morgenthau’s realist model, outlined on page 3-4, understands the world as 
a place that is imperfect because of the dynamics of human nature.  Moral principles cannot be fully 
realized because of conflicting interests.  It sees "a system of checks and balances [as] a universal principle 
for all pluralist societies.  It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at the 
realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good."  Power is defined on page 9 as "anything that 
establishes and maintains the control of man over man," relationships from physical violence to 
psychological pressure.   
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argues that the pressure exerted on each side in the form of “sanctions” will keep 
behavior within acceptable limits.76  This argument implies that sanctions imposed from 
within a society limit actors within that society.  This presents a problem in a situation 
where the society refuses or is unable to apply sanctions on an actor.  In this case 
Morgenthau might argue that sanctions must be imposed by an actor from outside the 
society. 
Poorly defined national interests may result in the squandering of national 
resources through the responses leaders make to perceived threats.  Jutta Weldes argues 
in her article, “Constructing National Interests,” that the realist theory fails to yield a 
sophisticated definition of national interest, and overestimates the clarity of threats to 
those interests.  The author argues that statesmen develop American foreign policy based 
on a shared understanding of “national interests,” which evolves over time in response to 
individual biases and the global environment.77  Weldes’ argues that U.S. definition of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba as a direct threat to the nation’s survival was entirely justifiable, 
but only one possible definition.  The missiles could have been defined as a defensive 
action by the Cubans or an attempt by the Soviets to establish parity with the United 
States.  Neither of these represents a threat to vital national interests.  Either of these 
definitions, Weldes argues, might have caused the Kennedy administration to react 
differently.  The presence of missiles in Cuba was clearly unacceptable regardless of the 
reason for their deployment, but their removal may have been accomplished without 
allowing the confrontation to reach the crisis levels that it did.78  The lesson of Weldes’ 
study is that in any situation there are a number of ways to understand an adversary’s 
actions.  The deeper your understanding of these motivations the more sophisticated your 
definition of national interests will be and the more efficient your response to threats.   
National strategic objectives, derived from clearly articulated national interests, 
focus policy, resource allocation, and the employment of national power.  Both are never 
                                                 
76 Ibid, 225-229.  Sanctions vary with respect to the norm violated.  They range from individual ethical 
dilemmas to jail sentences for the violation of established laws. 
77 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 
3 (1996): 276-278, http://md3.csa.com/ (accessed August 5, 2005).  
78 Weldes, 289-295.  Weldes outlines three competing understandings of the Cuban Missile Crisis: the 
conventional, Soviet defensive deployment, Soviet/Cuban attempt to balance power.   
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static, but plans cannot be built without a foundation, and the interest – objective 
construct is that foundation.  Objectives are the state’s attempt to define how it is going to 
achieve its interests; they are the stepping stones from status quo to the endstate as 
defined by the national interest.  These objectives are not specific to any one element of 
national power; rather, they are multidimensional with “political, military, economic, and 
other subdivisions.”79  Military victory in a war must not be confused with the attainment 
of strategic objectives because it is rarely sufficient to achieve the long term goals for 
which a nation goes to war.80  Military victory may not even be necessary to achieve 
political objectives in a war.  The North Vietnamese did not achieve a military victory in 
Vietnam, yet they achieved their political objective.81  No one instrument of power is 
sufficient to achieve the nation’s strategic objectives because each can only attack a part 
of the problem.  America’s counterterrorism policy is executed in the domestic and 
international sphere simultaneously by many agencies at all levels of government.  If 
each of these entities has a different understanding of the nation’s political objectives it 
will be impossible to coordinate their actions to effectively attack the total issue.  
Decision makers within each instrument of power use common strategic objectives to 
design supporting strategies which integrate the strengths of their instrument in the 
overall effort.   
Liddell Hart, in his book Strategy, discusses how instruments of national power 
should be nested in support of the political “object.”  Hart says:  
It [the term objective] has a physical and geographical sense – and thus 
tends to confuse thought.  It would be better to speak of ‘the object’ when 
dealing with the purpose of policy and of ‘the military aim’ when dealing 
with the way forces are directed in the service of policy.82   
Just as there is a “military aim” so is there an economic, diplomatic, and informational 
one.  Hart argues that “the object in war is a better state of peace,” and that a nation 
should “conduct war with constant regard for the peace you desire.”  The danger of 
allowing a nation to focus primarily on military means is that the military aim becomes 
                                                 
79 Collins, 3. 
80 Liddel Hart as quoted in Collins, 3. 
81 Luttwak, 219-225. 
82 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), 351. 
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the political object.83  Success against an Iraqi insurgency cannot become synonymous 
with success in the GWOT, because defeating that insurgency is only a small step in the 
broader conflict.  This points to another important concept relating to objectives: there is 
not one easily identifiable objective, no one achievement will defeat transnational 
terrorism.  Success in the GWOT requires a broader effort, some objectives may be: the 
defeat of existing and nascent terrorist organizations in many countries; the strengthening 
of a number of weak governments in Africa, the Middle East, and Central America; and 
the disruption of terrorist networks in Europe; the improvement of healthcare and human 
rights in a variety of countries; or a very hard to define win in the “war of ideas.”   
2. Identified Threat 
An effective grand strategy must include a clearly identified threat to allow 
decision makers to map the specific objectives necessary to secure national interests.  It is 
important to recognize that the global environment is an ever changing one, and grand 
strategy must be flexible enough to take advantage of opportunities that arise from this 
dynamic.  Opportunity, like the enemy, is rarely completely predictable; however, 
initiatives such as democratization may shape the environment to provide greater 
opportunity to secure American objectives.  Threat driven long range planning enables 
instruments of national power, many of which such as informational power require time 
to be effective, to be integrated and synchronized.   
Collins states that “national security interests, objectives, and policies are 
meaningful only when viewed in context with threats, both external and domestic.”  He 
goes on to explain that the threat is critical because it will often drive “what should be 
done, what can be done, and how to go about it;” interests, objectives, and policies are 
shaped by the nature and degree of the threat they oppose.  Adversaries and allies evolve 
over time in response to changes in national leadership, interests, or economic situations.  
To evaluate an emerging adversary the analyst must consider three factors about the 
adversary: capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities.84  These factors, along with a 
careful evaluation of the environment, allow the strategist to focus on actual threats to 
national security.  They also allow a critical rank ordering of the threat based on 
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likelihood and consequences of adversary actions.  Collins argues that a diverse and 
“hydraheaded” threat demands critical evaluation and prioritization to facilitate the 
massing of different powers against the most significant threats first.85  America has 
committed significant resources to date in the GWOT, but is this allocation based on a 
critical evaluation of the actual threat, or is it in response to perceived threats?   
The definition of terrorism has been debated and reconstructed throughout the 
years for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are academic rigor and political 
expediency.  Caleb Carr traces the historical evolution of terrorism, in his book The 
Lessons of Terrorism, to determine that terrorism has been practiced by virtually every 
nation at one time or another.  His argument that terrorism as a tactic has never been 
successful is not surprising; however, he goes on to imply that conflicts often hinge on 
which side is more discriminating in its use.86  Today many second and third world 
nations embrace terrorism as a legitimate tactic of “freedom fighters” in the struggle 
against perceived and actual oppression.  One needs look no farther than Saudi Arabia’s 
telethons in support of the families of  suicide bombers to understand that the current 
American definition of terrorism is not universally accepted throughout the world.  It 
should be noted that many terrorism scholars disagree with Carr.  Robert Pape argues in 
his article “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” that in fact terrorism is often 
successful in achieving its desired effects, and this is precisely why groups adopt it.87   
Terrorism is nothing new, and as Carr shows, it has been a tactic that nations and 
non-state groups alike turn to to affect the conflict by influencing civilian support for or 
against an adversary88  Geoffrey Levitt contends in his book, Democracies Against 
Terror, that international conventions designed in the 1970s to counter state-sponsored 
terrorism were and are ineffective because governments sympathetic to terrorist aims, and 
tolerant of terrorist means did not fully support their implementation.89  The rise of non-
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state transnational terrorist organizations has only made these conventions more 
ineffective.  Support for transnational terrorist organizations is more deniable than ever 
because these groups are very difficult to track and have considerable resources of their 
own.  Public sympathy for Islamic freedom fighters is high throughout the Middle East, 
many believe they are truly fighting a legitimate battle against a foreign oppressor.90  It is 
important that we define the enemy to enable diplomatic and informational initiatives to 
build partnerships of capable nations and influence public opinion.  As Carr points out 
these organizations, and their fighters, must be defined as a legitimate army engaged in a 
war with the United States.  To define them as mere criminals, or as some sort of 
international insurgency, risks limiting the military’s role in the conflict.91  Here again 
Carr is challenged by authors who argue that terrorism is fundamentally a criminal act.  
Terrorists should be treated as criminals, to do otherwise may undermine the international 
legal system or risk failure.92 
Levitt outlines two ways to define terrorism: deductive and inductive.  Deductive 
definitions of terrorism attempt to “sets forth a single, analytical definition to cover all 
acts the definer wishes to consider as terrorist.”93  An example of a deductive definition 
can be found in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents.”94  This definition does not attempt to identify specific 
types of violence, or characterize the political nature of the action.  This definition is 
vague enough to enable the full range of U.S. foreign and domestic policy, but is it clear 
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enough to focus that policy or engender cooperation from other governments?  Levitt’s 
inductive approach attempts to be clearer while at the same time being more flexible.   
An inductive definition of terrorism “delineates a series of specific categories of 
criminal acts that together compose an open-ended framework to define terrorism.”  This 
framework identifies “unacceptable behavior” without having to argue over the semantics 
of the label terrorism.  Levitt cites aircraft hijacking or hostage-taking as examples of 
such categories which have been successfully addressed by international conventions that 
could not agree on a deductive definition.95  This defining convention focuses on the 
actions rather than the motivations of the actors, and may be very useful in enabling 
diplomatic actions.  It is easy for nations to agree that anyone hijacking an airplane or 
detonating a bomb in a market is a terrorist, but does this facilitate interagency 
coordination and cooperation?  Is every terrorist an enemy of the US, or are some 
terrorists more dangerous than others?  The reality of framing this conflict as a war 
against terror is that terrorism is too vague an enemy to assist planners in prioritizing 
threats, synchronizing programs, and allocating scarce resources. 
A deductive definition of terrorism does not clarify the threat or narrow the field 
of adversaries, and it may even be counterproductive because it leads directly into the 
terrorist versus freedom fighter debate.  Paul Pillar outlines four types of groups that 
threaten US interests, in his book Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, they are: select 
European and Latin American leftist organizations; Palestinian militant organizations; 
ethnic separatists; and religious based organizations.96  Within these four categories are 
groups with widely disparate capabilities and aims; many of which pose no threat to US 
interests.  By identifying the enemy simply as “terrorism” national leaders may 
encourage regionally focused subordinates to allocate valuable resources against groups 
that cannot impinge on national interests.  Strategy must be flexible enough to address 
emerging threats, but rigid enough to focus on the most serious of these threats without 
becoming too wed to any one particular adversary.97   
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Finally, Carr proposes a slightly different definition of terrorism that may have 
some utility to a variety of instruments of power.  Carr states that terrorism is “warfare 
deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support 
either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable.”  Carr’s 
definition differs from that found in the NSCT by avoiding the debate over conbatent 
status, and including any violence waged against civilians, not just that conducted by sub-
national groups.  This definition takes terrorism out of the realm of the criminal by using 
the label warfare and referring to the political purpose of the action.  Carr’s point is to 
recognize these organizations as military forces engaged in a war, not as criminals.98  
Who is the enemy?  Any individual or nation that deliberately wages war against a 
civilian population is the enemy of the U.S. under this construct.  This definition may 
create a backlash among some of America’s partners in the war on terror, but it would 
facilitate seizing the moral high ground in the war of ideas.  It may help to encourage 
some of America’s partners to improve their performance on human rights issues, thereby 
deflecting some criticism of American aid to these governments.  It may even help the 
U.S. to revise conventions dealing with terrorism in the current 21st century.  However, 
such a definition would be counter-productive unless it was backed up with both positive 
and negative economic sanctions against state and sub-state perpetrators alike. 
3. Instruments of National Power 
The heart of a grand strategy is its plan to employ instruments of power to achieve 
national interests.  The theorists differ on their descriptions of these instruments, and how 
they interrelate, however.  Morgenthau suggests instruments can be divided into those 
that “are relatively stable, and those which are subject to change.”99  Joseph Nye, in his 
book Soft Power, describes instruments of national power as either hard or soft.  Hard 
powers, such as economic or military power, have quantifiable applications that can be 
tied to observable results.  Soft powers, elements such as diplomatic or informational 
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power, are less easily measured, and their effectiveness is difficult to judge.100  It is clear 
that different aspects of government bring different strengths and weaknesses to a 
conflict; the Department of Defense has different capabilities from the Department of 
State.  While Nye’s taxonomy is helpful to understand the importance of soft power, it 
does little to present options to decision makers as they craft policy and plan actions to 
achieve political objectives.  It is important to put national capabilities into a more 
restrictive common framework to understand what each contributes to counterterrorism 
struggle.   
a. Diplomatic Power 
Let’s turn to a consideration of what it is that strategic planners can expect 
diplomats and diplomacy to contribute to the counterterrorism fight.  Hans Morgenthau 
defines diplomacy as “the formation and execution of foreign policy on all levels;” 
however, it is his description of diplomacy that is more useful to this study.  It is the 
process by which instruments of national power are put to use in the service of foreign 
policy goals and objectives. 
It is the art of bringing the different elements of national power to bear 
with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation 
which concern the national interests most directly.101   
For Morgenthau, the quality of a nation’s diplomacy is the key to that 
nation’s ability to leverage long term benefits from any physical and spiritual resources 
that it might possess.  A nation with weak diplomatic institutions, or one unwilling to use 
its resources in pursuit of national interests, is doomed to have an inconsistent record of 
success in foreign policy.  Morgenthau argues that it is a focus on “tradition and 
institutions rather than upon the sporadic appearance of outstanding individuals,” that 
delivers consistent and long term quality foreign policy.  The US tends to rely on an 
imbalance of resources to achieve foreign policy successes.  This record of success is 
inconsistent because it depends on the appearance of dynamic leaders rather than strong 
institutions and traditions.102   
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Accepting for a moment that Morgenthau’s post-World War II criticism of 
American diplomacy is correct, the implications are particularly important to the war on 
terrorism.  Counterterrorism policies and programs are focused against networked non-
state actors that operate across national boundaries.  Diplomacy in this environment is 
simultaneously more difficult and more important than in any of the nation’s previous 
conflicts.  An abundance of resources may be insufficient when confronted with a 
scarcity of accessible targets.  Diplomacy, in Morgenthau’s construct, uses national 
resources to achieve foreign policy ends. In the modern American system many of these 
resources are managed and employed by unique agencies with their own unique plans to 
counter “terrorism.” Without entering into a debate about Dr. Rice’s dynamism, we must 
ask if the influence of the Secretary of State is sufficient to make up for weak traditions, 
autonomous institutions, and an environment characterized by a scarcity of targets.103    
Henry Kissinger describes diplomacy in his book, Diplomacy, as the 
official efforts of a nation to solve foreign policy issues through negotiation and mutual 
agreement (formal and informal) without resorting to violence.  Kissinger illustrates this 
description by examining Europe’s efforts to secure collective security in the early 1800s.  
The Quadruple Alliance, the Holy Alliance and the European Congress system attempted 
to establish agreements to deter aggression, and forums to work out disagreements 
peacefully.  Although this system was inherently weak, it revealed a characteristic that 
became a hallmark of European diplomacy.104  European diplomacy is pragmatic and 
focused by national interests, rather than absolute moral principles.  Peace is an elusive 
state that must be deliberately crafted by accommodating these divergent national 
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interests to achieve a common good.105  Kissinger’s description of diplomacy focuses on 
formal and informal interactions between states.  In a conflict between states and non-
state actors it may be necessary to redefine the actors whom diplomats are allowed to 
interact with.  The danger in this is that by recognizing a terrorist organization you 
legitimize it.  This redefinition is not without precedent however.  Israel has a history of 
diplomatic interactions with terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah.  Great Britain has 
interacted with the Irish Republican Army.  The United States has interacted with the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization.  It may be too soon to accept negotiations with al-
Qaeda, but it is a use for diplomacy that is not without precedent. 
Counterterrorism planners should expect the diplomatic actors and 
institutions to integrate the nation’s resources in the pursuit of targets that contribute to 
the achievement of political objectives.  Diplomacy has traditionally focused on state-to-
state interactions, but that was a function of the environment.  As non-state actors and 
non-governmental organizations gain power, diplomatic institutions must be prepared to 
enter into negotiations, establish formal and informal relationships, and perhaps even 
enter into treaties with new entities that wield power in the global environment.   
b. Informational Power 
Information as an instrument of power has a dual nature.  In one sense it is 
the influence that America’s unmatched ability to collect, process, and disseminate raw 
data engenders.  In this visualization, information can only marginally be considered a 
“mutually exclusive” category of power.  It is possible to intimidate foreign leaders with 
America’s ability to collect ground truth, but relatively low technology methods can 
defeat the best collection system.  It is possible to gain the cooperation of other nations 
through promises of information, but is this really distinct from diplomacy?   
The ability to provide a more complete and accurate recounting of facts, 
be they the history of an issue or the reality as it exists on the ground, one’s position has 
greater credibility, power, and appearance of rationality.  Jeffrey Pfeffer argues in his 
book, Managing with Power that “all organizations strive for the appearance of 
rationality and the use of proper procedures.”  Pfeffer makes the point that organizations 
attempt to make the most right decision possible given some degree of uncertainty.  Once                                                  
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a decision is made actors often strive to persuade others of the rightness of their decision; 
mastery of the facts and an appearance of unbiased rationality are very important to this 
effort.106  Governments are similar to business organizations in this regard; the need to 
appear rational and credible drove the US to the United Nations in search of a resolution 
to support the invasion of Iraq.  The ability to collect, process, and disseminate accurate 
information to domestic and foreign audiences lends some degree of legitimacy to US 
foreign policy by making it appear more rational. 
Joseph Nye captures the value of information as an enabler of other 
instruments of power in his 1996 essay “America’s Information Edge.”  American 
intelligence systems and technologically advanced weaponry all revolve around 
information; they are collectors and consumers of it.  This information system enables a 
military machine that is capable of destroying individual buildings in a crowded city or 
targeting individual enemy leaders in a frontier village.  This is a double edged sword.  
American intelligence systems and high technology weapons were designed to fight 
conventional, high intensity, state-on-state war.  The nation is now faced with a 
unconventional, clandestine, non-state enemy.  In this environment America’s 
intelligence system is uniquely ill-suited to provide the information those political leaders 
and military forces need to be effective.  It might be argued that the terrorist holds the 
informational advantage; America is an information sieve, with an internet connection the 
modern terrorist can learn a great deal more about a target than the FBI can learn about 
his organization with all the tools at their disposal.  The U.S. is a learning organization 
however.  As the recent uproar over the National Security Agency’s surveillance of 
terrorist communications indicates, the nation’s intelligence system is working to refine 
the way it uses its systems and improve their resolution.    
Accurate information allows foreign policy actors a better understanding 
of the nation’s strengths and weaknesses, which in turn allows these actors to better 
mitigate risk and negotiate from a position of strength.  Information that confirms 
strength indicates areas where leaders may take greater risks and press an adversary 
harder for concessions.  Information that shows weakness, however, should indicate to 
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policy makers areas where they cannot compromise with adversaries.  Information is also 
a tool in its own right.  Under the “information umbrella” the United States influences 
other countries by sharing information that will improve their military capabilities or 
enhance their negotiating position.  Nye asserts that the Dayton Peace Accords were 
successfully negotiated in part because of America’s ability to precisely monitor 
adversary forces and report on their actions.107  While it is impossible to judge just how 
much of an effect this capability had on the sides, it is clear that the issue of verification 
is an essential one in any agreement. 
Information has a dual nature: in addition to enabling other instruments, 
informational power has the ability to influence in its own right.  America could use its 
attractive ideals and shared values to engage foreign publics, achieving substantive 
change through dialog.  This concept is at the center of the “battle of ideas” that 
American leaders have emphasized in policy and rhetoric since September 11, 2001.108  
American ideas, values, and ethics are enormously influential in the world.  If these ideas 
are disseminated and supported in a subtle manner which does not trumpet them as 
“American,” but rather frames them as universal, they can influence large segments of 
target audiences.  This is the heart of Nye’s concept of “soft power;” the idea that 
America can influence foreign publics to cooperate and support its foreign policy by 
making America itself more acceptable and appealing.109  Information is a component of 
every instrument of power, but by articulating how ideas and values can be used to 
influence populations you present decision makers with a unique set of influence options. 
Information power can be further understood in two dimensions: 
technological and conceptual.  It is America’s ability to create “information imbalances” 
in these dimensions that has long been a source of power.  John Arquilla and David 
Rondfelt argue in their book, The Emergence of Noopolitik, that the conceptual realm has 
greater potential impact.  The world currently operates according to principles of 
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Realpolitik, which emphasizes the information as an enabler conceptualization.  In the 
future a society could operate within a system of Noopolitik, which emphasizes the 
exchange of ideas to resolve conflicts.  In this second system information technology is 
merely a tool to exchange ideas, the real work is done by these ideas.  In such a system, a 
country’s ability to achieve its national interests would depend on the quality of its 
“ideas, values, norms and ethics” as well as its willingness to share and compromise.110   
Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that global relationships are shifting away from realpolitik 
interactions as the dominant paradigm.  This emergent environment will be more suited 
to noopolitik because of its interconnected and interdependent nature.111   
The United States faces two adversaries in the Global War on Terrorism: 
the transnational terrorist, and a number of legitimate but increasingly radical Islamic 
movements dissatisfied with their way of life.  Many nations in the Muslim world are 
searching for a system of government that will embrace their values and ideals, but at the 
same time effectively provide for their needs and protect their interests.  To date the 
major modern movements in the Arab Middle East such as Pan-Arabism, Baathism, 
Wahhabism, and the Iranian Shiaism have been unable to provide an acceptable level of 
stability, security, and justice.112  These populations feel threatened by globalization, and 
consider the United States the leader in this movement.  These populations also feel 
threatened by democracy because they equate it with the style practiced in the US, 
making the general concept of democratic government seem incompatible with core 
Muslim values and ideals.  America’s relationship with Europe further degrades her 
ability to exercise noopolitiks.  In the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union, many 
European publics are beginning to object to some American policy because of a 
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perceived threat of American hegemony.113  American leaders are unable to effectively 
interact in this environment largely because of their reliance on realpolitik tools and 
traditions.  The noopolitik paradigm offers a possible method to engage the Muslim world 
and Europe simultaneously.  These two conditions are essential to winning the immediate 
fight against transnational terrorism, and establishing conditions that discourage 
disaffected groups from adopting terrorism as a tactic of choice in the future. 
c. Military Power 
 Military power is the ability of a nation to raise, project and sustain armed 
forces in actions designed to achieve national interests.  Military power is the most direct 
hard power that a country possesses, and it is the easiest to understand.  It is the coercive 
application of violence to “compel our adversary to do our will.”  Clausewitz asserts that 
the political objective, which is at the heart of all war, can be reached by action short of 
total disarmament and overthrow of an adversary.  Thus, while arguing that “disarming 
the enemy is the aim of military action,” he recognizes the importance of limited military 
actions in support of national interests.114  The nature of the GWOT makes limited war 
an important tool in America’s supporting military strategy.  Transnational terrorist 
organizations have no territory to conquer, no standing field armies to disarm, no national 
leaders to overthrow; wide scale conventional war against al-Qaeda is impossible.   
Robert Osgood argued that the U.S. should embrace and prepare for 
limited war in the struggle with Communism in his 1957 book Limited War: The 
Challenge to American Strategy.  Osgood felt that the depth of ideological conflict 
between the two forces, and the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons made this 
inevitable, and really the only form of war that was acceptable.115  Today the paradigm is 
very similar.  The U.S. is again faced with an enemy that has a violently different 
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worldview, and is apparently unwilling to compromise any part of that view.  The U.S. 
represents just such a threat to the radical Islamist terrorist.  However, unlike the Cold 
War, neither belligerent can totally destroy the other.  To be sure, terrorists with a 
weapon of mass destruction could inflict unacceptable damage on the nation, and would 
possess significant coercive power, but it could not eliminate the U.S. in the way the 
Soviet threat could at the height of the Cold War.  That said, the terrorists’ information 
advantage, their clandestine and elusive nature, and their tacit support from some nations 
make it impossible for the U.S. to use military means to totally destroy them.  In a 
situation where neither side can totally destroy the other, and where neither is willing to 
compromise their ideology, limited war is the only realistic alternative.   
Liddell Hart argues that the less a nation respects “moral obligations” the 
more it is likely to be intimidated by physical strength.  These nations can be deterred if 
they can be convinced that the threat of retribution is great enough to make the negotiated 
settlement preferable.116  In some ways, this argument can be extended to a transnational 
group.  Israel and Hezbollah maintained a tenuous truce for years by threatening the 
populations of Lebanon and Israel with renewed violence if either side strayed from 
accepted rules of their conflict.  Because both sides respected the threat of physical 
violence that the other represented, negotiations were possible.  Hezbollah is one of the 
most powerful transnational, non-state terrorist organizations, but it differs from al-Qaeda 
in a significant way.  Hezbollah has a homeland and people to protect; it is not truly 
stateless.117  To the extent that the adversary has physical resources and an identifiable 
supporting population the group is vulnerable to being influenced by coercive military 
force. 
Military capacity has both a positive and negative aspect.  Positive 
applications of military power, such as forward basing or other similar moves, can 
persuade allies by reassuring them that mutual defense treaties will be honored in the 
event of war.  Negative applications of military power, such as direct actions to destroy 
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terrorist cells, can dissuade adversary action through the threat of violence.118  While this 
section has focused on the negative application of military force, this dual nature provides 
yet another way to understand the utility of military power to the political leader.  
Military power can be used to garner the support of nations that are concerned about 
becoming targets of terrorist organizations.  Positive applications of US military power 
are exemplified by the military assistance missions that go on daily in South America to 
combat drug trafficking or in Africa to counter maritime hijacking. 
d. Economic Power  
Economic power is also often considered a “hard power” because it is 
quantifiable and it has the potential to have direct positive results.  David Baldwin’s 
definition of “economic statecraft,” found in his book of the same name, provides a good 
starting point to understand the economic instrument of power.  He defines “economic 
statecraft” as “governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a 
reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.”119  Baldwin’s definition is 
too narrow to fully define economic power because it puts too much focus on the 
employment of financial resources to actively influence international actors; it ignores a 
host of influence levers that are directly related to a nation’s wealth.  In contrast, Hart 
simply labels “wealth” as an instrument of power.  This conceptualization is too broad to 
provide political decision makers a useful set of options for exerting influence.  A better 
definition of economic power is a nation’s ability to transform financial resources and 
institutions into policies, programs, and actions that influence international actors in 
support of national interests.  Economic power is a trade agreement that reinforces the 
bonds of interdependence between allies.  Economic power is aid, military or 
humanitarian, delivered in return for cooperation.  Economic power is also the ability to 
deploy and sustain a military unit far from home for an extended period of time.   
Baldwin describes the tools to conduct “economic statecraft” in terms of 
positive and negative sanctions.  In this way he mirror’s the positive and negative aspects 
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of military power discussed in the previous section.  Positive sanctions, such as reduced 
tariffs, favorable licensing agreements, or subsidies, promise to deliver something of 
value to the target of a government’s influence efforts.  Negative sanctions, such as 
freezing assets, suspending favorable trade agreements, or punitive taxation, promise to 
increase the cost of doing business for the target nation.120  Baldwin’s taxonomy focuses 
on state to state influence; however many of these same techniques of economic statecraft 
instruments could be useful in dealing with a transnational non-state adversary.  Positive 
and negative sanctions can be used against state sponsors of terrorism, reluctant or non-
cooperative states, and in support of friends in the conflict.     
 There is a great deal of debate over the ability of negative economic to 
induce a nation to change its policies and behavior.  Negative economic sanctions 
threaten state sovereignty and generally meet stiff resistance from the target government.  
Additionally, economic sanctions often do more harm to the average citizen than other 
forms of coercion.121  Negative economic sanctions do have practical and legitimate 
benefits for the nation advocating and employing them however.  They can serve as 
signals of commitment to other nations.  Prior to their imposition, they carry a promise of 
financial cost to the target, and they can provide a measure of legitimacy to other forms 
of coercion that may become necessary.122  Negative economic sanctions directed at 
corporations, banks, or humanitarian institutions have the potential begin to drive a 
wedge between core radicals and their less motivated, but operationally critical, support 
systems.  For example, a bank in Switzerland that is allowing terrorist organizations to 
use its resources is unlikely to continue this behavior if it is directly threatened with 
denial of access to U.S. markets.123  
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US commitment of financial resources, without any direct and measurable 
return on investment, is critical to the employment of economic power in the fight against 
non-state transnational terrorist organizations.  Decision makers should also consider 
neutral or indirect sanctions in their effort to leverage economic power in the GWOT.  
Neutral sanctions refer to the use of resources and relationships to shape the environment 
and limit a terrorist organization’s freedom to conduct operations.  These sanctions differ 
from positive and negative sanctions in that they do not attempt to directly influence the 
behavior of other nations of non-state actors, they attempt to alter the operating 
environment for those actors.  The Millennium Challenge Accounts which go to 
underdeveloped countries who have demonstrated a commitment to “governing justly, 
investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom,” but are not tied to cooperation 
on counterterrorism initiatives are one example of neutral sanctions.124  Another example 
might be a clandestine program to buy any and all weapons of mass destruction available 
on the black market, or the support of military forces in the field.  Table 2 illustrates 
some possible neutral sanctions in the areas of trade, aid, and other instruments that could 
positively contribute to the GWOT.  
 
Trade Aid Other Instruments 
Programs to improve job 
opportunity. 
Programs to provide increased 
drug availability or vaccinations  
Support for extended deployment 
of military forces 
Aid to counter negative effects 
of international trade 
agreements 
Programs to increase literacy rate 
in underdeveloped nations 
International reward programs 
Boycott/embargoes of specific 
banks or businesses 
Funding for major public works 
projects in neutral nations 
Purchase of all WMD precursors 
or renegade weapons 
Table 5. Examples of Neutral Sanctions 
 
e. Law Enforcement Power 
Law enforcement power is the ability of the United States to employ its 
national law enforcement organizations in the international environment to directly or 
indirectly aid in the prosecution of transnational terrorist organizations.  American law 
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enforcement power is employed in three ways: investigative assistance, legal diplomacy 
and prosecution.  The United State has a unique ability to deploy task organized teams to 
assist other nation’s counterterrorism investigations, and maintain this assistance through 
embassy legal attaches.  These teams have access to some of the best forensic resources 
available to support these activities.  Legal diplomacy is a term used to describe the 
ongoing relationships agencies such as the FBI and DEA have with their counterparts 
overseas.  These relationships are very similar to State Department diplomats.  They can 
be used to influence the development of counterterrorism policy and activity within those 
nations.125  Finally, American legal actors could be used to prosecute cases in 
internationally recognized courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a UN 
War Crimes Tribunal.  While it would take additional diplomatic activity to enable 
United States participation, this participation would reduce the perception that the U.S. 
was acting unilaterally and convictions would increase the legitimacy of American 
actions.126  Reputational costs and benefits from actions such as these are difficult to 
predict.  Participation in the ICC could be perceived as crass a tactic designed to improve 
America’s standing in the global community, rather than an honest example the nation’s 
respect for international law.  Some authors have argued that this would be the natural 
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inclination of friends and adversaries alike.127  If this is the case then isolated actions like 
this would be meaningless unless accompanied by a firm and irrevocable commitment to 
the action over an extended period of time.   
The concept of law enforcement power describes a use for U.S. law 
enforcement agencies that is mutually exclusive of other national powers.  Diplomacy 
and military force do not investigate and prosecute terrorists in foreign courts.  Loan 
guarantees do not help to develop better police practices.  As with any instrument of 
power there are some overlaps; loan guarantees can help to influence other nations to 
craft strong counterterrorism laws or to crack down on the organizations.  The definition 
is compatible with common understandings of how law enforcement agencies function in 
the international environment.  National leaders and laymen alike expect agencies like the 
FBI or DEA to be involved with their counterparts overseas.    Much has been written 
about the criminal nature of terrorism and the importance of aggressive law enforcement 
within national borders to identify and eliminate terrorist organizations.  Many areas in 
Europe and South East Asia are not open to US military operations to destroy terrorist 
cells, but they are open to law enforcement assistance.  Defining law enforcement power 
as an instrument of power provides utility to national leaders by focusing on a set of tools 
that are often overlooked, and yet are essential to counterterrorism programs. 
4. Maintenance of the Sources of National Power 
National power is not an infinite thing; military force is expended, money runs 
out, the power of ideals is overcome by images of battlefield reality.  Each can be 
extended by more efficient employment or regenerated through dedicated efforts to do so.  
Effective grand strategy must include a plan to maintain the sources of national power if 
it is to effectively employ them over the long term.  Many authors argue over national 
power and what constitutes an instrument of power, but few distinguish between the 
instruments and their sources.  Organski makes this distinction in his book, World 
Politics, by examining six sources of national power: geography, resources, population, 
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economic development, political structure, and national morale.  To these he adds 
national reputation, describing it as the degree to which other nations believe a given 
nation has power.  These sources of power are interrelated, and combine to produce an 
aggregate level of power, but they cannot be directly employed.  One of the critical parts 
of Organski’s theory is that sources of power must be transformed through some 
mechanism into a form that can be employed in pursuit of national interests.128   
One way to understand this system is to consider each instrument of power a 
construct of raw materials, the infrastructure to convert those materials, and the 
mechanisms to employ outputs.  If any part of this construct is neglected, the instrument 
will fail to influence.  If any part of this construct is overused, the instrument will become 
unstable and ultimately ineffective as well.  This system is complicated by the fact that 
some of the same raw materials, transforming infrastructure, and employment 
mechanisms are parts of multiple constructs.  Figure 1 uses the instrument of military 
power to illustrate the system concept.  Some of the resources that enable an effective 
military are manpower, natural resources to power vehicles and equipment, financial 
resources to arm and support the force, and national willingness to commit these forces.  
The military-industrial complex that produces weapon systems, the military infrastructure 
that trains and maintains these forces, and the civilian structure that works to deploy and 
sustain these forces represent the infrastructure that transform raw materials into outputs.  
The nation’s armed forces (army, navy, air force, etc.) and their political and uniformed 
leadership represent the mechanism for employing this instrument.129 
                                                 
128 Organski, 102-107 & 116-117.  Organski lists only four instruments of power: wealth, resources, 
manpower, and arms.  Morgenthau also discusses national power but fails to make the distinction between 
instruments and sources of that power.  
129 Arthur F. Lykke, “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” US Army War College Guide to 
Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
US Army War College, 2001).  H. Richard Yarger, “Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the 
Army War College Strategy Model,”  Lykke originally presents a stool model to illustrate how military 
strategy is composed of objectives, concepts and resources.  Risk is incurred when one of these elements is 
out of balance with the other legs of the stool.  Stated simply, in Lykke’s construct, military strategy 
consists of balancing ends, ways, and means in the execution of operations.  Yarger expands on Lykke’s 
model to present eight premises of grand strategy that closely reflect many of the points in this paper. 
56 
 
Figure 2.   The Military Instrument of Power 
 
This system also illustrates the complications of interrelationships.  Financial resources 
support military forces, but also nation building diplomatic efforts, and ally reinforcing 
economic efforts.  Infrastructure to support military forces also provides relief to areas hit 
by natural disasters, and moves the commodities promised by diplomatic agreements.  
Even the mechanism of employment, the military forces themselves, often do double duty 
as in the case of disaster relief.  The point here is not to emphasize the interrelated nature 
of source and instruments, it is to emphasize that sources of power are consumed by 
many instruments.  The overarching grand strategy must regulate this drain and provide a 
plan to maintain these sources.  If any one instrument of power is allowed unregulated 
access to a resource without a plan to replenish it, the resource will be exhausted.   
Let’s examine national morale, a source of power that is under attack from a 
variety of adversaries, in an effort to better understand the importance of planning to 
maintain these sources.  Organski describes national morale as the “willingness by a large 
percentage of the individual’s in a nation’s population to put the nation’s welfare above 
their own personal welfare.”  Morale contributes to multiple instruments’ ability to 
influence because it is a measure of the nation’s commitment to employ that 
instrument.130  Collins adds that three factors shape a people’s “aptitude and stomach for 
war”: national character, will, and ethics.  These characteristics are not constant; rather, 
they are subject “to transient attitudes” that reflect the mood of the times.  National 
morale is affected by factors such as the actions of ruling elites, external and internal 
                                                 
130 Organski, 179. 
57 
pressures, and perceived ethical dilemmas.131  Organski and Collins complement each 
other is this discussion and both can be applied to a nation’s overall ability to contest an 
issue.  Some actions, such as a protracted war against a covert enemy, demand greater 
commitment of resources, and thus greater morale.  This resource is under attack by 
adversaries and enemies that question national character, disseminate propaganda, and 
employ unconventional tactics designed to create horrific damage.   
It is impossible to measure the direct relationship between terrorist actions and 
American national morale.  A recent CNN poll found that 62% of people polled were 
“dissatisfied with the way things were going in the United States.”  More than half of 
those polled, 58%, felt that the President’s second term has been a failure.132  American’s 
seem to feel safer since September 11, but they also feel that additional attacks are likely, 
and they don’t believe that America is winning the GWOT.  The nation seems to be about 
split over the issue of government wiretapping; with slightly higher numbers finding it 
acceptable under certain conditions.133  A Presidential approval poll is a poor measure of 
national morale, but other polls do begin to touch on American will.  Questions about 
support for wiretapping and confidence in the government’s ability to protect the nation 
give some indication of national attitudes.  Ultimately however, the only measure of 
national will is history; future generations will decide whether the U.S. maintained 
sufficient will to confront the threat of terrorism or if it chose to capitulate.  Al-Qaeda’s 
public statements regarding their intention to force the U.S. out of the Middle East are 
meant to degrade national morale to the point that this nation will no longer be willing to 
                                                 
131 Collins, 211-218.  When Collins is discussing “Transient Attitudes” he is speaking specifically 
about the difference between the current mood of the population and the nation’s long term national 
character.  Collins notes that national character traits cannot be discounted, but recognizes that it is difficult 
to explicitly define universal traits and dangerous to give them too much weight.  Collins argues that 
national will is a measure of the commitment of the people to the fight.  It is a critical aspect to the nation’s 
ability to maintain warfare over a protracted conflict, and a prime target for enemy manipulation.  Ethics 
are a broad category that encompasses the “morals, mores, and laws” that guide and constrain national 
leaders. 
132 CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/01/26/bush.poll/index.html/ (accessed January 31, 2006). 
133 “War on Terrorism,” Polling Report.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm (accessed 
February 1, 2006. 
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bear the costs of supporting friendly governments or maintaining forces in the region.134  
The danger of a wavering nation may be significant.  American national leaders argue 
that pulling out of Iraq or backing down from the larger GWOT will embolden terrorist 
organizations to take more aggressive action against American citizens and interests in 
the region.135   
5. Balanced Ends and Means 
Liddell Hart discusses the importance of balancing ends and means throughout his 
book Strategy.  Hart argues that a nation must “conduct war with constant regard for the 
peace you desire.”  Methods must be tempered by available resource to avoid emerging 
from conflict in a worse state than when it began.  The nation that expends all of its 
resources risks being worse off at the close of conflict than at the beginning.136  Hart goes 
so far as to suggest that in military strategy, ends should be crafted to fit available 
means.137  It is important not to take the argument too far into the realm of grand 
strategy.  During a conflict available means and their relative influences often shift.  At 
the level of grand strategy resources may be husbanded, replenished, or new ones 
generated.  Limiting national ends in response to an evaluation of currently available 
means is counterproductive.  It would be better to argue that in grand strategy the means 
should be bounded by desired end states.  The nation will be far more effective by 
focusing on the post-conflict environment, and how the use of different instruments now 
might affect that future environment.  Hart’s argument does suggest that supporting 
objectives for individual instruments should be limited by their capabilities, and 
reemphasizes the need for integration and coordination of these instruments.   
This study makes the case that grand strategy is not solely a wartime feature of 
national policy, it is a continuous one.  Walter Lippmann reinforces Hart’s concept of 
                                                 
134  “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement (1998),” Federation of 
American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (accessed February 1, 
2006. 
135 “Setting the Record Straight: Democrats On An Artificial Timetable In Iraq,” The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130-9.html (accessed March 3, 2006).  Richard 
B. Cheney, “Vice President's Remarks on the War on Terror at the American Enterprise Institute,” 
November 21, 2005, The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051121-
2.html (accessed March 3, 2006).   
136 Hart, 366-370. 
137 Ibid., 348. 
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balance by suggesting that “the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in 
equilibrium,” and that this effort is the “constant preoccupation” of leaders.  Lippmann 
offers a slightly different view of this relationship however.  He suggests that “foreign 
commitments” should be the basis for the level of power that is required.  It is the 
responsibility of the government to then develop sufficient power to secure these 
commitments.138  Lippmann’s analysis of a possible post World War II environment 
determined that the U.S. required a strong air and naval capability, a strong alliance with 
Great Britain, and close relationships with Europe.  These features were required to 
establish the level of power that would be required to fulfill security commitments if 
Russia attempted to act aggressively in Europe or Asia.139   
The relationship between objectives and resources shapes the strategic options 
available to national decision makers.  Returning for a moment to General Beaufre’s 
strategic patterns, discussed in Chapter I, illustrates the interdependent nature of 
objectives and resources.  Beaufre asserts that strategy is dictated by the importance of 
objectives, the military resources available, and a nation’s freedom to employ them.140   
He outlined five strategic patterns which are summarized in Table 6.  It is interesting to 
note` that in only one of his five patterns is military action the primary decisive 
instrument of foreign policy.  This may be recognition of the very limited utility of 
military force in resolving conflict, or of the many factors that limit a nation’s freedom to 
employ the forces that are available.   
                                                 
138 Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1943), 3-10. 
139 Lippmann, 119-154. 
140 Beaufre, 25-30. 
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Importance of 
Objective 
Military 
Resources 
Associated Strategic Pattern Freedom of Action 
Moderate Large Direct Threat of military action (DT) Undefined 
Moderate Inadequate 
Indirect Pressure (IP)   
(Diplomatic or Economic) 
Limited 
High Limited 
Successive use of DT and IP 
combined with limited force  
Restricted 
High 
(Imbalance) 
Inadequate 
Protracted low intensity conflict 
(Unconventional Warfare) 
Large 
Undefined Sufficient Violent & Rapid Military Action 
Undefined  
(presumably unlimited) 
Table 6. Beaufre’s Strategic Patterns141 
 
Beaufre makes no attempt to restrict objectives according to available means, as 
Osgood argued may be necessary; rather, he stresses their relative importance.  This is 
central for grand strategy because of the variety of instruments available to a nation such 
as the United States.  The capability, suitability, and availability of the various 
instruments should guide the decision maker’s choice and commitment to a particular 
unified strategy.  Balance does not mean that each instrument is employed equally, or 
even at all, in a conflict.  It means that instruments are applied where appropriate, and 
when they can contribute to achieving strategic objectives.  The interplay between 
conflict, environment, capabilities, and limitations shapes the employment of the various 
instruments of power.  Thus the policies and programs that put grand strategy into 
execution are not the same for all conflicts in all environments; what works against Abu 
Sayyaf in the Philippines will not work against Hamas on the West Bank or al-Qaeda in 
Saudi Arabia. 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 26-28.  The author’s exact terms are used whenever possible to ensure the best understanding 
of concepts summarized by this table.  The focus of these patterns is on military resources and military 
strategy to achieve national objectives. 
61 
6. Vertical and Horizontal Synchronization 
Grand strategy is most effective when it strives to synchronize actions vertically 
and horizontally across the instruments of national power.  The depth and complexity of 
effort to achieve this synchronization demands a mechanism to plan, direct, and 
deconflict the actions of the various governmental departments involved in the fight.   
In Strategy, Edward Luttwak describes the five levels (technical, tactical, 
operational, theater strategic and grand strategic) and two dimensions (vertical and 
horizontal) of grand strategy.  He argues that effective actions create an advantage, or at 
least no disadvantage, vertically within an instrument of power and horizontally across 
the other instruments.142  The true power of an action lies in its ability to have wide 
ranging effects on multiple instruments.  The interaction of levels and dimensions is 
easily understood when examined the ongoing controversy over detainee operations in 
the GWOT.  These policies that regulate detainees and interrogation techniques represent 
a change at the technical level of the military instrument.  They caused some negative 
effects at the tactical level when pictures of the activities at Abu Ghraib became public 
and allegations of instutionalized torture began to spread.  These effects were vertical; 
troops on the ground faced increased opposition, officials were forced to revise and 
explain their guidance on interrogation.  The horizontal effect of these actions was much 
more significant.  Gerard Fogarty asserts in his article entitled “Is Guantanamo Bay 
Undermining the Global War on Terror?” that these techniques have seriously damaged 
America’s ability to maintain the critical coalition of nations supporting the war on 
terror.143 
The effect of the detainee controversy on diplomatic and informational power is 
an example of the horizontal effects of one action taken at the technical level of the 
                                                 
142 Luttwak, 69-71 & 208-230.   
143 Gerard P. Fogarty, “Is Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror?,” Parameters 35, 
no. 3 (Autumn 2005), http://proquest.umi.com (accessed February 23, 2006). 
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military instrument of power.144  The most effective grand strategy achieves “harmony” 
by synchronizing actions vertically and horizontally to ensure that positive effects in one 
realm are not negated, nor do they negatively impact, another realm.  Grand strategy 
requires more of an action than this however; actions should maximize their value by 
reinforcing and building upon the effects of others. 
Luttwak offers two reasons to question the application of synchronization theory 
to grand strategy.  First, he argues that it may be impossible to apply his theory because 
of the level of detailed planning required to synchronize priorities, policies, and decisions 
at every level across a large bureaucracy.  Luttwak argues that every single action, 
innovation, and decision would have to be coordinated throughout every agency involved 
in the fight, clearly this is not realistic; but neither is this level of synchronization a 
necessary condition for success.145  Efforts can be made to coordinate significant policy 
initiatives and sensitize decision makers to the potential horizontal and vertical impacts of 
their actions.  Boundary spanning organizations must be empowered to force this 
coordination.  Second, Luttwak states that there is no guarantee that, even with all this 
detailed planning and coordination, policy decisions will be any better than if they were 
made in haste with little coordination.146  This point cannot be argued, but goes against 
common sense.  Actions that are well thought out and coordinated to maximize their 
positive impact, while at the same time minimizing their negatives, cannot fail to be 
better than those made in the heat of a crisis with limited information and conflicting 
biases.   
                                                 
144 Luttwak, 219-225. Luttwak asserts that WWII Germany illustrates the effects of vertical and 
horizontal disharmony.  Although the Nazi government was able to conduct effective military operations, it 
was unable to conduct effective diplomacy to fracture the alliance forming against it.  Additionally, the 
German propaganda instruments could not persuade international audiences, nor could economic power 
keep up with Allied wartime production.  Luttwak characterizes this as horizontal disharmony, or the 
inability to act effectively across multiple instruments of power.  In contrast, Luttwak presents Vietnam as 
an example of the effect of horizontal harmony.  North Vietnamese and Vietminh military actions maintain 
a high enough level of success to sustain a protracted conflict.  These military actions complimented 
diplomatic and informational activities directed against the U.S. population and its international support.  
These diplomatic and informational activities that ultimately degraded support for the war enough to result 
in a withdrawal of American forces.  Without American support the South Vietnamese forces were easily 
defeated. 
145 Ibid., 231-233. 
146 Ibid., 233-236. 
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Harmony in programs and policies is enormously important in the GWOT, not 
just because it increases effectiveness, but because of the shear numbers of governmental 
agencies involved in the fight.  During the Clinton administration a group within the 
National Security Council known as the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) was 
responsible for coordinating counterterrorism policy and activities.  The Bush 
administration has reduced the authority of the CSG, and adopted a more decentralized 
style that places the responsibility for coordinating policies and programs on individual 
departments.147  This approach has not proven to be effective in managing the GWOT 
because the dynamics of American politics will not allow the various departments to 
accomplish these tasks on their own.  Organizations like the Departments of Defense and 
State have divergent cultures, agendas, priorities, and worldviews.  National leaders have 
different biases, opinions, personal agendas, and may tend to reflect their agency’s 
perspective.  A mechanism such as the CSG, positioned in the bureaucracy above the 
departmental system, must actively deconflict competing perspectives, prioritize 
resources, and synchronize the actions of all entities in the fight.148   
In 2004 Congress recognized this problem and mandated the establishment of a 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) within the office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.  This was not a new organization, having existed previously within the CIA, 
but its responsibilities were; the NCTC was given the responsibility to plan and direct 
                                                 
147 Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2004).  Government Accounting Office, GAO-03-165 Report to Congressional Requesters 
entitled Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas 
Threat (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2003), 
http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/gao/d03165.pdf (accessed August 11, 2005).  Government 
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Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 
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E. Davis, Gregory Treverton, Danial Byman, Sara Daly and William Rosenau, Coordinating the War on 
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148 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 2d 
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64 
counterterrorism policy and programs across the federal government.149  While the roles 
of the CSG, the new NCTC and the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland 
Security Council are still a bit unclear, there is recognition of the need for an organization 
empowered to force synchronization, set priorities, and arbitrate disagreements among 
agencies.  
7. Hybrid Nature 
Admiral Joseph Wylie proposes two patterns of military strategy, in his book 
Military Strategy, that apply to grand strategy: cumulative and sequential. The sequential 
strategic pattern is relatively easy to understand.  It is strategy that emphasized a logical 
progression through a “series of actions growing naturally out of, and dependent on, the 
one that preceded it.” Wylie argues that Allied island hopping strategy in the Pacific 
during WWII was an example of a sequential military strategy.  Cumulative strategic 
patterns emphasize the combined effects of divergent actions which overwhelm an 
adversary, and bring about collapse.  Wylie cites the Allied submarine campaigns to deny 
Axis forces critical wartime resources as an example of a military cumulative strategy.  
Wylie goes on to argue that effective military strategy is rarely solely sequential or 
cumulative; in fact the two compliment each other, and are interdependent.150  
Al-Qaeda is clearly executing a hybrid strategy in its war for a Muslim Caliphate.  
The group’s efforts to force western nations out of the Middle East through sustained acts 
of terrorism in a variety of geographic regions, and propaganda directed against a variety 
of target audiences are part of a cumulative strategy.  The planned shift from far enemy 
(the US) to the near one (apostate governments in the Middle East) after the west has 
been forced out of the region is a sequential one.151  Given the nature of the enemy and 
the global environment America must meet al-Qaeda’s hybrid strategy with a hybrid of 
                                                 
149 108th Congress of the United States, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
Report of Conference Committee (Washington, DA: Congress of the United States, 2004), section 1021, 
http://www.c-span.org/pdf/s2845confrept.pdf (accessed September 18, 2005). This legislation will be 
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150 Joseph Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1967), 24-27. 
151 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), 
51-70.  Daniel Byman, “Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do we Understand our Enemy?” World Politics 
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its own to exploit the opportunities that the environment presents.  Opportunities for 
cumulative effects exist in the economic and informational realm.  Efforts to cut off 
terrorist financing and strengthen emerging nations in Africa are cumulative in that they 
seek to deny terrorist organizations resources and operating room in general.  Efforts to 
develop better intelligence and a more refined picture of the terrorist organization are 
clearly cumulative; intelligence agencies weave together many small unconnected details 
to develop overall estimates.  The struggle to win the “battle of ideas” is another 
cumulative effort.  There are no intermediate objectives to be gained in the effort to 
change public opinion; one cannot start in a specific city, or with a specific concept and 
work through progressively the Muslim world.  Opportunities for sequential actions exist 
in the military, diplomatic, and judicial realms.  Iraq and Afghanistan are the easiest 
examples to consider.  The US must begin by securing basic needs like clean water and 
electricity, before progressing to higher order needs by developing effective 
governments, internal security forces, and industry.  Sequential objectives are important 
for another reason; they are quantifiable markers that indicate the strategy’s effectiveness 
to the American public.  Progress in the GWOT is important to maintaining the national 
morale which is a key resource in this conflict.  
One danger of overemphasizing sequential strategies is that they may tend to lead 
to a focus on the dominant instrument of power to the exclusion of all others.  Grand 
strategy cannot be limited to one instrument of power or line of approach because of its 
scope and influence.  Four pairs of strategic options, each with a contribution to make to 
a GWOT grand strategy, illustrate the complicated nature of this subject.  Wylie's 
cumulative and sequential strategies, and Beaufre's direct and indirect strategies, have 
already been discussed.  Collins includes two additional pairs that bear mentioning: 
deterrence and combative strategies, and countervalue and counterforce strategies 
Deterrence strategies are "designed to prevent or limit the scope of wars," and contrast 
with combative strategies that are designed to fight wars using military forces and 
massive firepower.  This pair is easily adapted to a conflict between nation states or 
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between a state and sub-state actor like a transnational terrorist organization.152  
Deterrence is difficult strategy to execute against a clandestine group because they have 
few tangible resources to threaten, and those that they do have are difficult to identify; it 
is generally accomplished by hardening possible targets.  The combative approach is a 
major portion of US counterterrorism policy; however, difficulties in identifying 
acceptable targets make it impossible to focus solely on combative strategies.  The 
Counterforce/Countervalue strategic pair is described by Collins as primarily a nuclear 
targeting strategy, but it too applies to the GWOT.  Counterforce nuclear strategies target 
adversary forces, while countervalue strategies target things which will produce 
unacceptable losses for the adversary nation such as cities.153  Counterforce 
counterterrorism actions could focus on military direct action against members of 
terrorist organizations or their or psychological warfare programs to reduce their pool of 
potential recruits.  Winning the “battle of ideas” is an example of counterforce targeting.  
Efforts to seize terrorist bank accounts or deny their ability to use hawalla systems to 
move money are countervalue actions that target al-Qaeda’s financial support.  The point 
here is to emphasize that grand strategies must be hybrid in nature in order to take 
advantage of the opportunities of the global environment, and minimize the strengths of 
the enemy’s organizational structure. 
C. INTERRELATED AND REINFORCING NATURE OF ELEMENTS 
We will turn briefly to a discussion of the interrelated and reinforcing nature of 
the components of an effective Grand Strategy before closing this chapter.  The triangle 
between interests, objectives and threats is fairly obvious but needs some amplification.  
Four rules apply to the interaction between these three key elements. 
                                                 
152 Collins, 16.  Collins' list of four strategic pairs includes Wylie's sequential and cumulative as well 
as Beaufre's direct and indirect pair.  Beaufre contrasts military force (direct) against "psychology and 
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a variety of directions simultaneously.   
153 Ibid., 16-17. 
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First, at the start of a conflict, threats to national interests shape objectives.  As 
interests become more narrowly defined, the adversary’s ability to affect them increases.  
In 1982 Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon to defeat the nascent Palestinian Liberation 
Organization and secure Israel’s borders.  Almost twenty years later, after a protracted 
Hezbollah terror campaign that the IDF could not defeat, Israel no longer considered 
occupying Lebanon a vital national interest and retreated from the country.  Hezbollah 
changed Israel’s understanding of vital national interests by inflicting unacceptable 
casualties on the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), and demonstrating a willingness to refrain 
from striking against civilian targets.154  Israeli national interests evolved from securing 
its borders to defeating Hezbollah during the conflict. This evolution empowered 
Hezbollah to affect Israel’s calculation of the costs and benefits associated with the 
struggle to achieve these interests.   
Second, narrowly defined national interests result in more quantifiable objectives 
and better synchronization of powers.  This seems intuitive, but a brief example may 
clarify this rule.  If America’s national interest is the defeat of al-Qaeda, then objectives 
can be developed that focus on each group in the network, nations at risk of al-Qaeda 
influence, and the systems providing support for the network.  Country teams or 
interagency coordination groups can then develop integrated plans to achieve these 
objectives.  If America’s national interest is the defeat of terrorism then how do you 
prioritize between al-Qaeda and Columbian narco-terrorists. 
Third, political objectives are multidimensional, and no one instrument or action 
is sufficient to achieve the total goal.  Well defined objectives enable leaders to identify 
their part of the greater effort, increase the positive effects of synchronize, and reduce 
wasted resources.  Leaders must make hard decisions about scarce resources to maintain 
a protracted effort, objectives focus these decisions. 
Finally, national interests, threats, and objectives are not static things; they are 
dynamic, time sensitive, and often change during a conflict.  This evolutionary nature 
may create pressure to reallocate resources or redefine the threat in the middle of the 
struggle.  With the fall of the Taliban, the threat in the Middle East shifted from al-
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Qaeda’s core group in Afghanistan to Saddam Hussein.  Al-Qaeda’s core leadership is 
still a threat, but it is no longer as important as defeating the insurgent forces in Iraq.  
National interests, threats, and objectives are critical tools to focus strategy, but they are 
not static tools.  They must be continually reevaluated, decision makers must be flexible 
enough change in mid conflict, and the American public must be educated to understand 
and accept these changes.  
A few general rules are important to guide the strategic thinker attempting to craft 
a grand strategy that effectively combines the instruments of power.  First, the 
instruments are interrelated, and the indirect effects of actions in one realm often manifest 
themselves in another.  Robert Pape argues that military operations degrade soft power, 
and hinder American diplomatic efforts in his article entitled “Soft Balancing Against the 
United States.”  The unpopularity of American military action in the Middle East makes 
the US in general less appealing throughout the world.  This status in turn makes it more 
difficult for American diplomats to secure cooperation (diplomatic power), American 
ideas to sway international publics (information power), and America’s allies to support 
her initiatives.155  Using military force does not automatically trigger counter-balancing, 
it is using it in a manner that other nation’s find threatening that is important.  During 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, President Bush stopped the ground war after meeting 
the coalition objectives of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  America’s use of military 
forces in the Middle East did not trigger counter-balancing because they threatened only 
Iraq.  A push to Baghdad would have indirectly threatened many governments in the 
region and beyond.  It could have been seen as a unilateral move to use force to change 
the global environment to suit American interests, rather than a justifiable use of force to 
counter aggression.156     
Second, unless used skillfully, hard power (military and economic) drains 
resources that are critical to soft power (diplomatic, informational, and judicial).  Military 
forces cost a great deal to train, equip, deploy, and sustain.  Military operations overseas 
often negatively impact national morale and tarnish America’s image overseas.  
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Economic power generally consumes financial resources, and, as the debt begins to pile 
up, its use may degrade national morale. 
Finally, soft power enables and facilitates the use of hard power, but it may also 
obviate the need to employ hard power.  Diplomatic agreements can create alliances that 
bring other nations into the fight, thus lowering the requirements for US troops and 
financial resources.  Judicial power works through diplomatic agreements and is 
dependent upon the good will of host nations to apprehend and prosecute terrorists 
throughout the world.  Actions to engage the moderate Muslim world can reduce hostility 
to America and reduce the support for terrorist organizations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
America’s grand strategy in an age of terrorism must exploit the global 
environment and make use of all the varied instruments of power America possesses to 
win this conflict.  To accomplish these tasks it must be more than just a set of policy 
initiatives that make use of all available power that this nation possesses.  It must be an 
integrated plan that is capable of sustaining a protracted conflict.  It must include 
mechanisms to focus and constrain the power of this nation while simultaneously being 
flexible enough to take advantage rapidly of the opportunities that our enemies offer.   
Grand strategy is the highest level of strategic planning, and is focused solely on 
threats to national security.  The ideal strategy consists of seven fundamental 
components: well defined interests and objectives; an identified threat; a plan to employ 
all the instruments of national power; a plan to maintain the sources of national power; a 
balance between ends and means; horizontal and vertical synchronization, and it should 
be hybrid in nature.  These components are not unique to the GWOT, although the 
particular blend of instruments of power may be.  This study argues that five instruments 
of power are particularly applicable to this struggle: military, informational, diplomatic, 
economic, and judicial.  Each instrument is mutually exclusive, commonly accepted, and 
identifies unique a set of options to political leaders. 
Grand strategy is founded upon a real or anticipated adversary that has the 
potential to threaten vital national interests of the nation.  Adversary and interests are 
intertwined: both evolve over time and each affects the other.  National objectives should 
evolve out of interests and map how a nation will achieve overall goals in light of the 
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defined adversaries.  These three factors shape the integration of the instruments of 
national power, affect the maintenance of the sources of a nation's power, and guide the 
balance and synchronization of powers. 
Grand strategy should balance a nation's objectives and its means of achieving 
those objectives.  This is no simple matter due to the vast scope of options and the 
intangible nature of some instruments.  Ends should not generally be limited by means, 
but leaders must be cognizant of the limits of particular instruments of power.  Some 
strategic objectives may not be achievable with available resources within the desired 
timeframe; in this case either the objective or the time frame must be changed.  The grand 
strategist must not employ one instrument beyond its limits, lest they risk exhausting that 
instrument.  Strategic objectives are cannot be achieved by one instrument of power, 
rather they require the cumulative effort of a number of instruments. 
Sources of national power must be deliberately maintained and replenished during 
the conflict.  Balancing ends and means is not enough to maintain sources of power such 
as financial resources or national will.  National leaders must make difficult decisions 
about policies and programs to develop resources, mechanisms, and infrastructure for the 
protracted conflict.  Financial resources support every instrument's objectives; military 
forces engage in nation building, FBI training academies train foreign police forces.  
Each leg of the instrumental triad must be carefully managed because none are unique to 
only one instrument.   
Horizontal and vertical synchronization maximizes the positive effects of actions, 
while simultaneously minimizing inevitable negative impact on overall outcomes.  
Actions resonate vertically within instruments of power.  Tactical advances in 
counterterrorism drive changes in terrorist weapons, tactics and strategy.  The 
interconnected nature of the instruments of power enables actions to resonate across the 
instruments as well.  Aid to tsunami victims in Indonesia increases American soft power 
and may make it easier for diplomats in Jordan.  Significant policies and programs must 
be deliberately synchronized by an extra-departmental organization to avoid the obstacles 
presented by personal and organizational biases that are prevalent in American 
government. 
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Hybrid strategies effectively take advantage of the opportunities in the global 
environment.  Economic and diplomatic efforts to deny terrorist organizations safe 
havens and resources are likely to be cumulative.  Military and judicial efforts to defeat 
individual terrorist organizations are likely to be sequential.  Targeting efforts are 
counterforce and counter-value depending on the engagement mechanism and the 
objective.  Defensive activities act as a deterrent, while offensive operations in Iraq are 
combative.  Grand strategy in general, and GWOT grand strategy in specific, employs 
diverse tools and techniques against a variety of adversary vulnerabilities.  Grand strategy 
political objectives focus on shaping an environment, rather than solely on the defeat of 
the enemy. 
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III. SUPPORTING FEATURES OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY 
This chapter conducts a review of national strategy documents to determine how 
well or poorly they reflect the features of grand strategy identified in Chapter II.  The 
features that we will focus on are: defined interests and objectives, identified threat, 
maintenance of national power, balance of ends and means, and vertical and horizontal 
integration.  In general the strategy documents include a wide range of plans and 
programs to target terrorist organizations, their support infrastructure, and the underlying 
conditions that encourage terrorism.  The strategy does not prioritize these plans and 
programs, nor does it focus them on critical groups or regions to maximize the 
effectiveness of resources.  In effect they attempt to address terrorism everywhere 
simultaneously, at the risk of addressing nothing adequately.  The strategy documents do 
not include the mechanisms that could improve the allocation of resources or the 
synchronization of programs.  Finally, the most glaring deficiency is the lack of planning 
to sustain efforts over a protracted conflict; this would include plans to sustain national 
power and balance efforts across powers. 
A. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES 
The most significant deficiency in this grand strategy is the lack of a common set 
of interests and objectives to focus the planning effort.  The NSS describes many goals, 
but never explicitly defines US national interests as they relate to any region or conflict.  
National interests are broad statements of a desired end state that can stand alone and still 
describe the goal in enough detail to facilitate planning. While they are not bound by 
specific nations, issues, or adversaries, national interests must be specific enough to 
enable strategists to conceive of a way to achieve the aims.  National interests allow 
policy makers to form the supporting strategic objectives that map a path from the current 
situation to the endstate.    
The NSS seems to identify only one national interest when it states that “aim of 
this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.”  It further states that the 
path to safety is “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, 
and respect for human dignity.”  These goals could be construed as national interests, but 
they do not define an attainable endstate.  The strategy makes strong statements of 
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national interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the India-Pakistan conflict, Indonesia, 
in Latin America and finally in Africa.  In each of these regions, national interests seem 
to revolve around the resolution of ongoing conflict and the growth of democracy, but 
here again it is open to interpretation.  In issues directly relating to the GWOT the NSS is 
less clear.  The strategy states that one of the nation’s highest goals is to prevent its 
adversaries from developing the ability to employ weapons of mass destruction.  This is a 
clear statement of interests that should facilitate setting strategic planning.  The strategy 
is more vague on the subject of terrorism because it fails to differentiate the variety of 
terrorist threats.  Middle Eastern Islamic terrorists appear to have the same priority as 
Latin American narco-terrorists.  The document does narrow the focus somewhat by 
identifying “terrorist organizations of global reach” as the highest priority, but does not 
name specific networks or organizations.157 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) is particularly weak in 
its identification of national interests.  Reading the document may lead one to believe that 
American strategy is shaped by the goal that “civilized people around the world can [sic] 
lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks.”158  The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (NSHS) does a significantly better job describing interests.  While 
also failing to identify any specific national interests it is clear that the document is 
guided by four concepts: deterring and preventing terrorist attacks in the US, reducing 
America’s vulnerability, limiting damage from attacks, and consequence management.  
These four interests enabled planners to develop six strategic objectives that require the 
integration of all instruments of national power.159 
The supporting strategy documents vary in their descriptions of interests.  Most 
prefer to identify a set of goals and objectives particular to their focus area, rather than 
craft their policies and programs in support of common objectives.  The Department of 
State and US Agency for International Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan 
contains a comprehensive listing of thirteen “key priorities” that could fit the definition of 
                                                 
157 The NSS includes eight broad concepts that could be construed as national interests, and are 
intended to guide policy and program planning.  However, these concepts are not stand alone definitions of 
national interest and require additional explanation to facilitate planning. 
158 NSCT, 1. 
159 NSHS, vii-x.  
75 
national interests.  These priorities range from Arab-Israeli peace to “drug eradication 
and democracy in the Andean region.”  Rather than using these priorities to focus policy 
initiatives however, the strategy establishes four “strategic objectives” to focus planning: 
peace and security, sustainable development, international understanding, and 
strengthening departmental capabilities.160  These objectives allow the strategy to 
develop policy initiatives to cover a host of issues, but they weaken the focus of the 
document and do not provide any priority for planning.   
National strategic objectives are as poorly defined and understood as national 
interests.  Rather than crafting policy and programs to support national objectives, each 
strategy document defines its own set of “strategic objectives,” and outlines policy 
initiatives to support them.  The NSS’ eight broad initiatives are supplemented by a 
variety of objectives that range from the specific, “prevent ‘rouge states’ from gaining 
WMD” to the very general, “promote economic growth & economic freedom beyond 
America's shores.”161  Many objectives, such as improving protections for workers and 
the environment, have only tenuous links to defeating the terrorist threat.162  This lack of 
defined strategic objectives facilitates a lack of continuity in supporting plans.  An 
example of this lack of continuity can be seen in the area of information sharing.  The 
NSHS clearly focuses on improving the dissemination of intelligence and improving 
communications among all the organizations engaged in counterterrorism.  The 
Department of Defense is also concerned with intelligence, but there is no real focus on  
information sharing or improving dissemination outside the military community.  The 
NDS’ focus is on “fuse [sic] operations and intelligence” and building a “network-centric 
force.”163   
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) 
are particularly weak in their description of national interests and objectives.  Both 
documents discuss refer to the NSS’ goals of fostering the growth of democracy and 
building a “better world.”  The NDS identifies four “strategic objectives,” but again these 
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are military-centric objectives not national strategic objectives.164  The NMS recognizes 
the NDS objectives, and identifies three military supporting objectives.  This is a good 
example of the objective nesting that should be going on throughout the supporting 
documents.  It is interesting to note that neither military strategy identifies defeating 
terrorism or the al-Qaeda network as an objective, although the NMS does list “winning 
the war on terrorism” as its highest priority.165   
Overall, American grand strategy for the GWOT lacks a clearly defined endstate 
for the conflict.  This deficiency has led to a lack of commonly understood national 
strategic objectives that outline specific goals for regions, conflicts, or even relationships 
with other nations.  The various agencies responsible for the implementation plans have 
designed a variety of supporting strategic objectives that are not common across all 
instruments of power.  This lack of continuity has created confusion over priorities.  This 
confusion is evidenced by the lack of interoperability among first responders in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some three years after the NSHS made “seamless 
communications among all responders” major initiative in its strategy to prepare for a 
terrorist attack.166   
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE THREAT 
The core strategy documents attempt to identify the threat in a deductive manner.  
In other words they attempt to provide a single definition of terrorism that applies to a 
wide variety of acts and agendas.167  NSS states that the “enemy is terrorism” and goes 
on to define terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
innocents.”168  In contrast, the NSCT includes a lengthy discussion of terrorism that 
incorporates and expands on the NSS definition.  The NSCT describes terrorists as those 
individuals and organizations who “strive to subvert the rule of law and effect change 
through violence or fear.”  This strategy categorizes terrorism according to the nature of 
the perpetrator and the geographic span of activity: “state level, operate within a single 
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country; regional, operating across at least 1 international border; and global, operating 
across several regions or more.”  The structure of the transnational networked terrorist 
organization is important to the NSCT.  Finally, in a theme that reoccurs in other 
documents, the strategy highlights those terrorist organizations attempting to develop 
WMD as the highest threat.169   
The NDS seems to understand the definition of threat contained in the NSCT, but 
that understanding is not reflected in the NMS.  The NDS states that “today’s war is 
against terrorist extremist networks, including their state & non-state supporters.”  It goes 
on to describe enemies of the US as those who attempt affect the American way of life 
and limit the nation’s freedom of action.170  Unlike the NDS, the NMS states that the 
country faces threats from a wide range of actors including traditional and rouge states, 
state-sponsored terrorism, a variety of non-state actors that includes transnational terrorist 
networks, & some individuals.  Terrorist organizations are a lesser included threat, rather 
than the prime threat facing the nation.171 
One important element of any counterterrorism strategy is the fight to deny 
terrorist organizations the resources to carry out their activities, and the National Money 
Laundering Strategy (NMLS) is part of this effort.  It is important to examine how the 
NMLS defines terrorism because the majority of fund raising for these organizations is 
conducted overseas where there are a variety of opinions regarding the nature and 
legitimacy of terrorist organizations.  This strategy clearly identifies terrorism as its 
primary focus, and demonstrates an understanding of the complexity of attacking 
terrorism financing.172  However, it makes no attempt to define who the US considers a 
terrorist or what it considers a terrorist organization.  It reflects the deductive approach to 
defining terrorism by discussing the “non-financial” goals of terrorist organizations: 
“publicity, political legitimacy, political influence, and dissemination of an ideology.”173  
The definition may not facilitate the efforts of the Department of State to gain 
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cooperation in efforts to attack terrorist financing because it is so vague.  It may be 
impossible for nations such as Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt to participate in 
this effort for internal political reasons.  Nevertheless, there are signs that many countries 
in the Middle East are beginning to cooperate in the effort to affect terrorist 
organizations’ financial resources.  Fourteen Middle Eastern Nations formed Middle East 
and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) to develop regional actions 
and work to implement international anti-money laundering standards.  To date the group 
has had two planning meetings and made little significant progress, but it is a start.174 
Deductive definitions of terrorism form the core of America’s strategy 
documents.  Unfortunately, these definitions do not address the problem that not all 
societies agree on a common definition of terrorists or their innocent victims.  Hezbollah 
is considered a national resistance organization in much of the Arab world.  Israel felt its 
actions against Lebanese civilians were legitimate during the invasion of 1982.175  
America’s preference for a deductive definition of terrorism is not a serious problem 
when considering unilateral US efforts.  There is a general understanding that the al-
Qaeda network is the greatest threat that the nation faces, and that any organization that 
targets civilians is a terrorist organization.  There is a small degree of confusion among 
some of the strategy documents that could be cleared up with a more definitive definition 
of the threat.  For example, The NMS seems to consider other nation states as a threat on 
par with al-Qaeda.  This confusion could make it difficult to prioritize resources and 
operations.  It is in the area of diplomacy and military or judicial operations overseas that 
this lack of clarity will have the greatest negative impact.  Without a clear and acceptable 
definition of the enemy America will face resistance to bilateral initiatives that may run 
counter to other nation’s interests. 
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This study focuses on America’s response to the threat posed by transnational 
terrorist organizations, but a grand strategy must address the full range of threats facing a 
nation.  With this in mind it is important to recognize some of these threats and 
acknowledge their affects on this analysis.  The National Military Strategy (NMS) 
discusses the threat posed by states, rouge states, non-state actors, and some individuals 
to the United States.  This strategy is generally focused on hostile adversaries.176  Few if 
any state entities pose an immediate direct threat to the United States; however, that 
could change if China continues to expand its military capability or Russia continues its 
decline.  Non-State entities like the European Union have the potential to present an 
economic threat to the U.S., if they do not already.  Certainly groups such as the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have the ability to negatively 
affect national interests.  The Department of State/U.S. Agency for International 
Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan includes additional things like regional 
instability, poverty, and disease in its understanding of the threat.177  These features may 
not rise to the level of a threat to national interests, but given that a significant portion of 
grand strategy is focused on countering these environmental conditions they need to be 
taken into consideration. 
Any criticism of contemporary American grand strategy must be tempered by an 
acknowledgement of the effects of such a broad consideration of threat.  Future threats 
require the commitment of current resources to ensure that the nation is prepared to meet 
them.  This commitment may skew that balance of resources in favor of one instrument 
of power over another.  For example, if the U.S. faces a modern conventional threat in the 
next 20 years from a hostile state actor, then additional resources must be diverted from 
the current low-intensity conflict to develop and procure advanced weapons for that 
future fight.  This dynamic does not change the features of a grand strategy however; it 
only makes them more important.  In an environment of limited resources, it is absolutely 
critical that grand strategy includes a solid understanding of the threat in order to 
correctly allocate these resources.  Grand strategy must constrain strategic objectives to 
ensure that these resources are not exhausted or risk failure in other areas.   
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C. PLAN TO MAINTAIN INSTRUMENTS OF POWER 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism (NSCT) do not include plans to maintain the instruments of national power.  
This is a significant deficiency given that there is no one office responsible for the entire 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and that many of the resources that go into national 
power are shared by multiple instruments.  In contrast, the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (NSHS) does recognize the need to take some actions to conserve 
resources.  The strategy includes a call to “mobilize the entire society” and encourages 
the private sector to sacrifice for the nation’s defense.  The strategy also includes multiple 
initiatives to include state and local governments as well as the private sector in defense 
of critical infrastructure and crisis management.  This is a recognition that the federal 
government is limited in its ability to fund all the initiatives and that available resources 
must be husbanded to some extent.178  The fact that capabilities and resources are limited 
necessitates strategic planning and deliberate efforts to prioritize activities.    
The national military strategies also recognize the need to maintain the sources of 
power.  Both documents stress continuing to transform the military to build a lighter, 
faster, and more lethal force capable of dealing effectively with the terrorist threat, while 
maintaining conventional preeminence.  The National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
recognizes the need to weigh the costs and benefits of achieving its objectives, and states 
that the Department of Defense (DOD) will make “deliberate choices” to balance risk.179  
The National Military Strategy (NMS) discusses “recapitalizing critical capabilities” to 
ensure that they are maintained throughout the fight.180  Taken together these documents 
acknowledge the need to maintain the force, and provide basic guidance to accomplish 
this requirement. 
Like the military strategies, the US Department of State and US Agency for 
International Development (DOS/USAID) Strategic Plan contains the beginnings of a 
plan to maintain diplomatic power.  One could argue that the way to build diplomatic 
power is to conduct diplomacy in support of objectives that benefit partner nations.  
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American diplomacy clearly focuses on developing our allies.  Hans Morgenthau 
suggested, in his book Politics Among Nations, that America has an inconsistent record 
of foreign policy success because it lacks the institutions and traditions to conduct 
diplomacy effectively.181  The DOS/USAID Strategic Plan includes initiatives to improve 
the training of professional diplomats and USAID personnel, as well as to increase the 
size of both organizations.  These changes begin to correct the systemic deficiency that 
Morgenthau describes.  One diplomatic strategic objective that has the potential to 
significantly enhance American diplomatic strength is that of Promoting International 
Understanding.  The policy initiatives supporting this objective focus on conducting 
aggressive public diplomacy to explain American actions and motivations.  Antony 
Blinken argues, in his article “Winning the War of Ideas,” that effective public diplomacy 
is critical because it enables a nation to act by reducing the resistance of foreign publics.  
The US has global interests and faces global threats.  The environment has changed and 
the US stands without a significant ideological rival.  The US cannot rely on 
overwhelming military strength in an environment characterized by problems with no 
military solution.182  Diplomatic power must be allowed to solve these challenges, and 
effective public diplomacy is a way to strengthen that power. 
One of the most significant deficiencies in American grand strategy is the lack of 
a plan to maintain economic power.  Without entering into a debate about the 
effectiveness of tax or spending cuts, and the strength of the economy, it is important to 
note that the national focus is not on maintaining the economic resources to fight.  In 
2002 the federal debt was approximately $6 trillion; in 2005 it is projected to be over $8 
trillion.183  It is impossible to relate this increase solely to the GWOT or the ongoing war 
in Iraq; however, it is important to realize that they have contributed to this growth.  
American grand strategy is not husbanding economic resources; it is expending them 
without any constraint. 
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The national strategy for the GWOT does not include a plan to maintain the 
instruments of national power.  There are a few notable exceptions such as the NDS, but 
theses exceptions do not constitute a plan.  The impact of this deficiency may or may not 
be significant.  If the war in Iraq is concluded quickly, the overall costs of offensive 
actions will rapidly decline.  This will free up a great deal of resources for foreign aid and 
homeland defense initiatives, as well as reduce the growing federal debt.  However, if the 
war continues, or if the GWOT escalates in another region, then the long term ability of 
this nation to absorb additional costs may become an issue.   
D. BALANCED ENDS AND MEANS 
The core national strategy documents make little mention of balancing ends and 
means to conserve resources and achieve objectives; the NSHS is a notable exception.  
This strategy includes a major initiative to develop a comprehensive threat and 
vulnerability assessment (TVA) so that future efforts to improve the protection of key 
assets can be prioritized.  The document recognizes that assets are not unlimited and that 
budgeting decisions will have to be made.  It refers to the infrastructure protection plan as 
a means to “inform” the planning, programming, and budgeting process.  The 
infrastructure plan picks up this theme and states that it will use the TVA to set protection 
priorities and establish baseline standards.  This plan continually refers to the need to 
spread the costs of protection programs, and study problems before launching programs 
to ensure that the resources are well spent. 
The national military and diplomatic strategies are not as concerned with 
balancing ends and means as the strategies which focus on homeland defense.  While the 
NDS recognizes the importance of operating within fiscal constraints, the NMS does not 
mention any constraints.  The fiscal 2006 budget requests $407.6 billion for the 
Department of Defense.184  On the surface it seems that the DOD has few limits to its 
means.  However, a deeper look at the military shows that the services are having serious 
recruiting problems and their fleet of vehicles is aging faster than anticipated.  Much of  
                                                 
184 “FY 2006 Budget: Summary Tables,” The White House, Office of Management and Budget, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/budget/2006/toc.html (accessed December 11, 2005).   
83 
this is due to the ongoing conflict in Iraq, but that does not change the fact that the 
military does in fact face some limitations on its resources that the strategy has not 
reflected. 
The 2006 federal budget tells us a great deal about balance.  Admittedly this is not 
a perfect metric; it does not reflect the disproportionately high returns that some policies 
and programs have the potential to provide.  It may distort the allocations because foreign 
military assistance is included with the aid allocations as opposed to military 
expenditures.185  However, almost 50% of federal discretionary spending is allocated to 
the DOD, while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of 
State each receive less that 4%.  The FY 2006 budget requests only $49.9 billion, or 
5.9%, for homeland security related programs; this includes $9.5 billion for DOD 
programs and the $27.3 billion for DHS.186  In light of the fact that diminishing the 
underlying causes of terrorism and protecting the homeland is so important to the grand 
strategy, these figures seem to indicate that the strategy execution is out of balance. 
It is difficult to assess the balance in American grand strategy with out a common 
set of strategic objectives.  One cannot lay out the variety of initiatives and look for gaps 
or redundancies.  It is difficult to examine one country or region to gain an understanding 
of all the programs that apply.  The dual nature of this grand strategy, overseas offensive 
activities coupled with domestic defensive initiatives, makes evaluation even more 
difficult.  There is clearly a focus on getting every instrument of power into the fight, but 
are the effects of these forces being maximized?   
E. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL SYNCHRONIZATION 
Core and supporting strategy documents do not adequately address the subject of 
vertical and horizontal synchronization.  Lead agencies are often not clearly identified, 
coordinating mechanisms do not appear to be a significant feature, and the lack of 
priorities makes synchronization problematic.  Supporting strategy documents frequently 
appear to have been written in a vacuum with little focus on other instruments of power 
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or governmental departments.  There are some notable exceptions.  The NSHS 
emphasizes the role of the Department of Homeland Security as the single point of 
contact for state and local governments for terrorist prevention and emergency response.  
The aforementioned ISAC initiative exemplifies efforts to synchronize governmental and 
private sector activities.  This strategy also makes an effort to designate lead agencies in 
areas such as information analysis, vulnerability assessment, and counterterrorism 
policy.187  Other efforts to intuitionalize synchronization include the NMS’ interagency 
Joint Operational Concepts Counter-Terrorist (CT) Joint Interagency Coordination 
Groups (JIACGs).188 
There are indications that, while it may be planned for, synchronization is not 
well supported during operations.  The most notable of these indicators is the disconnect 
between efforts to conduct public and traditional diplomacy in light of the controversy 
over the CIA’s covert detention centers.  This is an example of a policy that may have 
been very effective vertically within the intelligence or military realms, but highly 
problematic in others.189  
F. HYBRID NATURE OF THE STRATEGY 
American grand strategy for the GWOT heavily favors cumulative actions to 
defeat terrorism.  Defensive initiatives contained in the NSHS and efforts to deny safe 
havens to terrorist organizations contained in the NSCT are examples of cumulative 
strategies.  Offensive concepts contained in the national military strategies, and National 
Money Laundering Strategy are intended to defeat terrorist organizations through attrition 
while simultaneously denying them the resources they require to maintain their strength.  
These initiatives will work over time to reduce viable targets and increase the pressure on 
terrorist organizations.  There is little evidence of a sequential aspect to this grand 
strategy.   
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The strategy clearly includes a combative military element, with conventional and 
unconventional forces deployed worldwide to locate and engage terrorist elements.  
However, the strategy also emphasizes deterrence, with active and passive initiatives in 
the NSCT and infrastructure protection plan.  Direct and indirect strategies are employed 
to attack terrorist organizations from every possible angle.  The efforts of the nation’s 
military and law enforcement forces represent the direct approach.  The initiatives of the 
Department of State and the US Agency for International Development represent the 
indirect approach.  Admiral Beaufre noted in his book, An Introduction to Strategy, that 
this mix was essential when a nation faced an imbalance of force and/or freedom of 
action.190  The US faces just such an imbalance.  America has significantly greater 
military force, but the enemy has an informational advantage that more than 
compensates.  Both sides possess a degree of freedom of action that is tempered by 
environmental constraints.  The US cannot take decisive violent action whenever and 
wherever it might locate an enemy; this is evident along the Afghan Pakistan border.  
Transnational terrorist organizations, perhaps because of the difficulties of covert 
operations, cannot strike at will; this is evidenced by the lack of attacks in the US during 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a perfect time to strike.   
The question becomes, have we chosen the right hybrid mix of strategies?  One 
strategic pattern that is missing from this mix is that of engagement.  There are no 
initiatives to engage the radical terrorist organizations in any way.  This is peculiar given 
that the country did not hesitate to engage the Soviet Union which, a much larger threat 
than al-Qaeda, during the Cold War.  There may be enormous gains to be made through 
some form of interaction with the terrorist organizations.  In this the lessons from 
Israeli’s interaction with Hezbollah may be important.  Hezbollah was one of the world’s 
most dangerous terrorist organizations in the 80s and 90s, now the group is largely quiet, 
although still threatening.  This transformation was brought about through a combination 
of diplomacy, military force and environmental changes that encouraged the group to  
participate in the political system of Lebanon.  Israel may regret “giving in” to the 
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demands of the terrorists, but they have had significantly less violence on their Lebanese 
border since withdrawing from that country.191 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
It would be tempting to try to label American grand strategy for the Global War 
on Terrorism with a quick, media friendly catchphrase, but that would not do it justice.  It 
could be described as constructive engagement, active deterrence, or coercive diplomacy, 
but as we have seen, these would fail to capture its preemptive qualities.  The truth is that 
this is a dynamic strategy that does not fit neatly into a 30 second synopsis.   
The nation’s grand strategy is strong on plans and initiatives to employ the 
instruments of national power, but it is weak on mechanisms to synchronize and integrate 
these instruments in planning and resource allocation.  The military, diplomatic, and 
judicial instruments are the most extensively developed portions of the strategy.  
America’s information and economic instruments suffer from a lack of supporting 
strategic plans.  The lack of a clearly defined national interests and national strategic 
objectives makes it extremely difficult to understand how the instruments interrelate and 
reinforce each other.  Thus, is virtually impossible to understand in any detail how this 
grand strategy will move the nation from status quo to a better end state.   
The nation’s grand strategy does not include a comprehensive plan to maintain the 
instruments of power, and shows little evidence of balance among the powers.  This is 
particularly concerning given that the war in Iraq is in its fourth year and there are signs 
that American national will is waning.192  Horizontal and vertical synchronization across 
this grand strategy is more difficult to judge.  Select themes are consistent across the 
strategy documents, there is some recognition of lead agency designations, and a number 
of interagency coordinating bodies have been established.  Synchronization is about 
ensuring that actions by one instrument of power do not negatively impact on another.  
With this in mind, the execution of policy and programs by the various agencies of the 
US government, even with the mechanisms just mentioned, frequently seem to be out of 
harmony. 
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American grand strategy is clearly a hybrid form that defies easy description.  It is 
primarily cumulative, indirect, and deterrent, although it has significant direct and 
combative elements.  The strategy, when taken as a whole, seems to be advocating every 
action that could have positive results, rather than focusing on a deliberate path to a 
defined end state.  The strategy seems to be motivated in many ways by admirable ideals, 
rather than realist aims.  These characteristics may be a function of the management style 
of the administration, the bureaucratic process, or the environment.  Regardless of the 
reason, this hybrid strategy is difficult to grasp, measure, and refine.   
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IV. GRAND STRATEGIES AGAINST TERROR 
This chapter examines grand strategic responses to terrorist threats from the IRA 
in Northern Ireland, Sikh separatists in India, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.  These cases 
were selected for five reasons.  First, each of these conflicts is relatively recent and pitted 
a transnational covert movement, motivated at least in part by religion, against an 
established legitimate government.  Second, these cases offer examples of the range of 
force that may be employed by a government, from overwhelming to minimal.  India’s 
grand strategy against Sikh separatists offers an example of a strategy that successfully 
employed overwhelming law enforcement and military force.  Great Britain’s strategy 
was also successful but with significantly less force.  Third, these cases illustrate the 
positive and negative effects of integrated instruments of national power on the outcome 
of a counterterrorist campaign.  Fourth, the outcome of these cases reflects the range of 
possible resolutions to a terrorist conflict.  In Northern Ireland, the IRA was not defeated 
but a negotiated ceasefire has led to disarmament by the group.  In India, Sikh terrorist 
groups were defeated by combined police and military force.  In Lebanon, Hezbollah has 
begun to participate in the legitimate government after Israel’s failure to defeat the 
organization.  Finally, these cases involve legitimate governments that cover the 
spectrum from developing to developed world.  This spectrum is important in the current 
conflict because America’s allies are not solely developed western nation-states; they 
include some of the poorest underdeveloped countries in the world. 
This chapter will not attempt to present full blown case studies of each conflict.  It 
will examine selected features of the British and Indian grand strategies to determine 
lessons that could be applied to the GWOT.  The chapter will also examine a series of 
influences that have combined to moderate the policies and actions of Hezbollah.  This 
vignette differs in form and content because of the features of the Lebanese environment.  
It is included because it may offer a model for engagement with future terrorist groups 
such as Hamas, and Israeli actions may offer valuable lessons for the GWOT.  The 
conflicts in Northern Ireland and India are primarily internal domestic matters.  
Negotiation and engagement in these conflicts often occurred between government 
representatives and domestic political parties.  This chapter will consider the negotiations 
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and diplomatic methods used in order to gain a better and more complete appreciation of 
the grand strategies employed against terror. 
A. BRITISH STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRA VIOLENCE 
British grand strategy has evolved from 1968, the start of what this paper will 
term the “modern phase” of the conflict in Northern Ireland, to today.  It includes three 
periods of intense negotiation to resolve the conflict.  The vignette illustrates the 
importance of three features of grand strategy: the importance of national interests and 
objectives; the grand strategy itself must employ all the instruments of national power in 
a manner consistent with existing opportunities and constraints; and the effect of a 
particular balance on the success of the effort. 
1. Roots of the Conflict 
The situation faced by Great Britain in the modern phase of the conflict in 
Northern Ireland is not unlike that faced by the U.S. in the GWOT.  In the early 1970s 
Great Britain found itself allied with an oppressive and largely Protestant government in 
Northern Ireland that was reluctant to allow needed political reform in the province.  The 
Catholic minority felt threatened, persecuted and was beginning to demand civil rights 
reform.193  Neither of these communities should be thought of as homogeneous entities.  
Political, cultural, and even religious schisms exist in each society.  One valid 
generalization can be made; the population was generally segmented along religious lines 
on the issue of national identity.  The Catholic minority generally favored eliminating the 
1920 partition and unifying the country as one independent Irish Republic.  The 
Protestant majority generally favored remaining part of Great Britain, and was more than 
willing to fight for this ideal.194  This environment was ripe for the sectarian violence that 
erupted in the late 1960s. 
The current phase of the conflict is rooted in the 1920 partition that created the 
predominantly Catholic Irish Republic, and the smaller, predominantly Protestant British 
province of Northern Ireland.  Sporadic violence in the province continued from partition 
to the late 1960s as Catholic groups demonstrated for one united Ireland, but could not 
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gain enough support to create significant problems.195  A number of organizations on 
both sides of the conflict eventually turned to terrorism to advance their political agendas.  
The Catholic Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) is arguably the best known of 
these groups, but Protestant groups such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), and the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR).  These groups had 
widespread support in their geographic regions, and in the case of the IRA, even 
controlled some parts of major urban areas.196  Other nations and foreign groups 
frequently provided active and tacit support to the conflict.  The most significant of these 
foreign actors was the Irish Republic, where Catholic militants often found sanctuary 
after terrorist actions.197   
Northern Irish Catholics began a series of civil rights marches in 1968 calling for, 
among other things, equal voting rights.  The Protestant majority felt threatened by this 
new attempt to gain power and influence in the region.  Sectarian violence increased as 
the semi-autonomous government dragged it feet on political reform and attempted to 
crush what quickly turned into a violent resistance movement.  Catholic ghettos in many 
of the major cities became barricaded enclaves where government security forces did not 
go.198  This conflict came to a head in August of 1969 in the Catholic neighborhood of 
Bogside when local youths responded to a Protestant march with bottles and stones.  The 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) could not restore order in the area and lead units of the 
conventional British army were deployed to separate the sides and restore order.199  Great 
Britain quickly assumed responsibility for the conflict in the eyes of Catholic groups by 
way of its natural tendency to favor supporting the local government’s security forces    
It is important to understand the IRA threat that emerged from these early years: 
the IRA is really two organizations, aligned in purpose, separated by tactics.  The Official 
IRA is the descendant of the group that operated from 1921 to 1969.  They favor less 
violent methods that even included participation in the Northern Irish Parliament in 1969.  
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This group was unable to protect Catholic ghettos from the violence of 1968-1969.  The 
Provisional IRA, also known as Provos or PIRA, is the hard line violent faction that split 
from the Official IRA in December 1969 over the issue of participating in the Northern 
Irish government.  This group dedicated itself to protecting the Catholic minority first and 
foremost, and is not hesitant to use violent means to achieve its goals.200 
2. Lessons of British Grand Strategy 
In March 1972, Great Britain assumed direct authority for Northern Ireland’s 
security and judicial systems, allowing the Northern Irish government to retain some 
limited authority.  Prior to 1972 the problems in Northern Ireland were the responsibility 
of the Northern Irish government, England was involved, but not in a leadership role.  
After 1972, this situation changed dramatically; the central government and Prime 
Minister was now responsible for resolving the conflict.  The British Army quickly 
realized that it was impossible to follow their standard counterinsurgency doctrine that 
proved so successful in areas such as Malaysia; the political situation in Northern Ireland 
demanded more drastic measures.201   
 One simple national interest guided British policy and actions in Northern Ireland 
almost from the start of the modern period of the conflict.  It was not clearly expressed 
until the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, but simply stated it was a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict between Protestant Loyalists and Catholic Nationalists.  Objectives 
supporting this interest were not as clearly expressed but they seemed to include: 
engaging the Irish Republic in Northern Irish affairs; securing and upholding majority 
consensus on the political status of the province; guaranteeing defined civil rights for all 
citizens; reforming the political system; and defeating the terrorist organizations.202 
 This interest, when combined with determined British diplomats, resulted in  
almost immediate negotiations with the Irish Republic and eventually a wide variety of 
actors in Northern Ireland, including the IRA represented by Sinn Fein.  The initial phase 
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of negotiations worked out a power sharing deal in December 1973 that addressed many 
of the issues on both sides of the conflict.203  British objectives, particularly in the area of 
civil rights and political reform, addressed a major issue for the Catholic community 
without the appearance of “giving in to terrorist’s demands.”  The objective of engaging 
the Irish Republic allowed Great Britain to work with and through a highly influential 
third party to affect some of the changes demanded by the IRA.  Great Britain has used 
these objectives to guide negotiations, implement reform in the government of Northern 
Ireland, and control the use of force against terrorist organizations throughout the modern 
conflict.  This initial agreement was unsuccessful in stopping the violence because the 
parties to the agreement could not control the radicals in the streets.  The Irish Republic 
could not control the IRA, nor could the British government control loyalist terror 
groups.204 
 British diplomacy was pragmatic, issue oriented and virtually continuous 
throughout the modern conflict.  It was not limited to engagement with the Irish 
Republic, although that was a consistent and major feature of the strategy.  The 
governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major negotiated three different agreements 
in an attempt to marginalize the terrorists and end the violence in the province.205  
Negotiations over the nature and form of the future government took place with a variety 
of unionist and loyalist parties.  When one agreement fell apart the government began a 
new round of talks with a different blend of actors.  For example, when the 1985 Anglo-
Irish Agreement did not solve the problems of the region, talks began as early as 1988 
with a broader range of parties that included Sinn Fein.206  The lesson of British efforts is 
that effective diplomacy requires continual engagement with influential actors, not just                                                  
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state entities, and a focus on an achievable goal.  Sinn Fein was and still is an important 
actor because it provides the British government a way to talk to the IRA without 
violating their policy of not negotiating with terrorist organizations. 
British military strategy evolved from one of direct engagement at the start of the 
modern conflict, to one that emphasized restraint and the civilian control of military 
force.  Operations in Northern Ireland ranged from conventional security patrols to 
unilateral direct action missions.  As we will see the combination of special forces and 
conventional actions were insufficient to stop the violence; however, the pressure they 
put on the radical group was critical to enabling diplomatic actions in the late 1990s to 
secure a cease fire.  Tony Geraghty describes conventional military operations in his 
book The Irish War, as “ham fisted” and an effective recruiting tool for the IRA.  He 
makes these accusations because conventional military operations in the 1970s focused 
on cordon-and-search missions, riot control, and patrolling.  All these operations were 
conducted without adequate intelligence and disproportionately targeted Catholics or 
Catholic neighborhoods.  Geraghty argues that the British leaders had forgotten the 
lessons of Malaysia and Oman, that the population was an important resource to be 
deliberately developed and protected.  Instead the conventional military adopted a 
confrontational strategy that alienated the public and legitimized terrorist propaganda.  
The author notes that a shift began in the early 1980s away from confrontation to a more 
sophisticated strategy that emphasized intelligence gathering and police leadership.  This 
shift was important in changing the momentum of the conflict, but it would take more 
than 20 years to come to fruition.207   
Two features of this military strategy merit discussion because of their importance 
to the overall effort: the efforts to develop quality intelligence and Special Forces’ 
operations in association with local police.  Military units such as the Mobile 
Reconnaissance Force (MRF), the 14th Intelligence Company, and the Field 
Reconnaissance Unit (FRU) were specially developed by the British Army to support 
operations in Northern Ireland.  They provided detailed information through covert 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and penetration of suspected terrorists groups and 
operations.  These units were characterized by meticulously selected and highly trained 
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operatives selectively employed on critical missions.  Intelligence collection was tightly 
integrated with the operations of both the police and military forces, with these military 
forces often coming under some form of police control.208  Although the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) eventually developed its own reconnaissance and special direct 
action capabilities, this relationship would continue throughout the modern conflict. 
These British special forces did not confine their actions solely to reconnaissance 
and surveillance however.  Mark Bowlin describes the organization’s deception and 
psychological operations in his thesis entitled British Intelligence and the IRA: The Secret 
War in Northern Ireland, 1969-1988.  The “Embezzlement Sting,” was a deception 
operation conducted by the MFR using a double agent named Louis Hammond.  The 
operation attempted to degrade the IRA’s popular support, by portraying the group as 
“racketeers and gangsters.”  While the long term outcome of this operation could not be 
measured, it seemed to have the desired immediate effect of threatening popular support 
for the group.  The IRA certainly felt it did as they further damaged their own reputation 
by picking up Hammond and attempting to kill him for his part in the fictitious plot.209   
The Special Air Service (SAS) operations in Northern Ireland illustrate the other 
significant feature of British military strategy, that of finding and destroying terrorists.  
Deployed to Northern Ireland for the modern conflict officially in 1976, the SAS differed 
from regular army units in its skills, tactics, and equipment.  The unit brought another 
dynamic to the fight as well; unlike the regulars, who were always at risk when they 
moved, the SAS was “licensed to take the war to the enemy.”  They were a clandestine 
offensive force that hit hard, fast, and unexpectedly and then melted away.  This dynamic 
changed the battlefield calculus in the conflict considerably.210  Special Air Service 
operations took two forms.  The first were surveillance and apprehension missions with a 
high likelihood for violence or a high degree of difficulty.  These missions frequently 
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included tight integration with RUC units.211    The second were politically sensitive 
clandestine missions that did not allow for mistakes.  Missions such as cross border 
snatches exemplify politically sensitive operations.212  This focus on special forces does 
not lessen the contribution of a large number of conventional forces.  However, the 
conventional forces’ operations differed greatly in type and effectiveness. 
Great Britain devoted significant economic resources to diminishing the 
conditions of poverty and inequality that generated a great deal of discontent in Northern 
Ireland.  This could be described as a developmental strategy, but it would be a mistake 
to equate this to American efforts to undermine the causes of terrorism.  Great Britain 
enacted many economic development programs, such as social security reform and urban 
renewal, not within the framework of counterterrorism activities, but as part of the 
Thatcher administration’s nationwide efforts to improve the society as a whole.  
Developmental projects in Belfast illustrate the mixed results of this economic strategy.  
Belfast was designated as an Enterprise Zone and significant money was committed 
through programs such as Making Belfast Work.  Community based Action Teams 
attempted to create jobs, improve job skills through continuing adult education, and 
improve health care.  These programs came at a time when governmental benefits were 
revised downward, tax laws rewritten, and Belfast’s levels of poverty and unemployment 
were higher than other areas of the country.  The net effect of these programs was very 
little improvement to the life of the average person.213  One of the reasons for these poor 
results was the disparity between the Protestant and Catholic societies.  Some of these 
divisions were unavoidable in a population wracked by internecine violence; for example, 
the development of Catholic ghettos in cities like Belfast and Derry was inevitable given 
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the threat these communities faced.  The government attempted to target these divisions 
through programs such as “Education for Mutual Understanding” and the reorganization 
of public housing.  But these programs were insufficient to address the needs of the 
Catholic community and did not degrade support for the terrorists.214   
Great Britain was at a serious information disadvantage in the 1970s, and 
information was power in this conflict.  This paper has already noted the activities of 
highly specialized military forces to gather detailed information; however, surveillance 
was only one element of the effort.  Interrogation of captured PIRA soldiers was an 
important part of the effort to gain actionable and time sensitive intelligence.  While it 
yielded some good information, the program was poorly managed and created significant 
problems for the British forces.  The interrogation methods used by the British Army 
included a number of questionable techniques that frequently crossed the line between 
legitimate interrogation and torture.  This created international pressure and became a 
propaganda weapon for the IRA.215  In addition to interrogation, British forces developed 
and ran a small network of informers and agents within various terrorist organizations.  
This network was relatively effective at disrupting these organizations by creating doubt 
and mistrust within the groups.  It is credited with forcing the PIRA to shift from a 
military style brigade based structure to a cellular one.  This in turn made operations 
more difficult, while simultaneously making the group harder to penetrate, track, and 
defeat.216 
The British information war was not limited to intelligence gathering.  Public 
diplomacy and domestic psychological operations were also practiced by the Army in the 
conflict.  Although little is written about these efforts, David Charters briefly outlines 
British psychological operations in his article “Intelligence and Psychological Operations 
in Northern Ireland.”  Charters notes six features of the Army’s “psychological 
‘offensive,’” and describes the difficulties with conducting such an operation against a 
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domestic target.  Of note, Charters states that the offensive recognized the importance of 
winning over the public and attempted to employ civil affairs personnel to accomplish 
this task.  The Army also deliberately worked to counter terrorist propaganda and 
establish a public relation’s plan.217  Little is written about the government’s overall 
effort to win the battle of ideas in both the international and domestic arena.  There 
seemed to be a deliberate effort to reassure all sides in the conflict that their rights would 
be respected and that their opinions mattered.  The meticulous language in the 1985 and 
1993 agreements illustrates that great care was taken not to alarm loyalists while at the 
same time not alienating nationalists.218 
The judicial element of British grand strategy included reforms within the RUC to 
make it more effective and less partisan, but also incorporated a number of other 
interesting features.  Internment was the early policy of holding suspected terrorists for 
extended periods without charges or trial.  This policy was highly unpopular and was 
eventually discontinued.219  To address difficulties with trying terror suspects, Great 
Britain introduced Diplock courts, a system of special courts with lower evidentiary 
standards, no jury, and wider latitude on testimony and confession.  These courts were 
the subject of much debate over their legality, but their decisions generally survived 
appeal and contributed to a decrease in violence in the 1970s.220  The policy of 
criminalization of terrorism began in the mid 1970s.  This policy included initiatives to 
portray terrorists as common criminals in an effort to isolate them from their nonviolent 
supporters.  It also removed the special status afforded terrorists within the criminal  
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justice system and allowed supergrasses witnesses at trial.  These policies contributed to 
the extremely effective prison protests which culminated in the hunger strikes of the early 
1980s.221    
 British grand strategy reflected a mix of measures that favored diplomatic and law 
enforcement activities, while eventually maintaining lower, more specialized, level of 
military force.  It included significant informational elements, but employed insufficient 
economic power.  It would have been very easy for Great Britain to attack the terrorist 
threat in Northern Ireland from a purely combative military strategy, or even a hybrid 
military-judicial strategy.  While it is impossible to predict the effect of rejected options, 
it is unlikely that such strategies could have resolved the conflict any sooner.  British 
strategy attempted to balance law enforcement and military actions with aggressive and 
substantive diplomatic engagements.  The limited success of economic aid may indicate 
that insufficient economic resources were devoted to the effort, but it may also indicate 
that the aid provided was poorly administered, incorrectly targeted, or that economic 
issues were not central to the conflict.  Either way, economic power failed to contribute 
to the efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the conflict.  This particular mix of 
national power did not achieve immediate results, changes in the domestic and global 
environment were needed to make continued terrorism counterproductive for all parties 
involved. 
 Some significant factors worked in favor of the British effort.  First among these 
was the establishment of direct rule in the province.  This action allowed Westminster to 
impose governmental reforms in Northern Ireland and directly involve the Irish Republic 
in the conflict.222  Without direct rule it would have been almost impossible to begin the 
series of treaties that ultimately culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Accord, almost 30 
years after Great Britain took the lead in the conflict.  Second, resolving the root of 
Catholic unrest, generally a lack of civil rights in the province, was not antithetical to 
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British interests.  This allowed the government to enact reforms without appearing to give 
in to terrorists, an important feature in any counterterrorist strategy.  Finally, between 
1972 and 2005, the environment changed in Northern Ireland.  Voting rights reform and 
open elections allowed the Catholic minority to have input into the policies and programs 
of their government.  The IRA was encouraged to adopt peaceful tactics through “the 
movement’s inclusion into a systematic process of dialogue, and the negative response 
from one’s political constituency which delegitimised the use of armed force.”223  
Jonathan Stevenson argues in his article “Peace in Northern Ireland: Why Now?” that the 
European Union (EU) has changed the environment as well.  The Irish Republic is in a 
better position within the EU structure than Great Britain, thus the nationalist position is 
less threatening to the northern Protestants.  Unity with the Irish Republic would mean 
access to the greater economic opportunities that this position affords.  The Good Friday 
Agreement takes advantage of these relative strengths and provides a much greater role 
for the Republic in the affairs of Northern Ireland.224 
Balance in grand strategy is more than just employing instruments of power to the 
maximum of a nation’s capacity, it is the art of blending the application of those 
instruments so that actions are reinforcing and scarce resources are maximized.  Great 
Britain eventually achieved a good balance of diplomatic, military force, and law 
enforcement power.  Constant and determined diplomatic efforts brought key actors 
together to work out their differences.  Ideology did not hinder needed governmental 
reforms that were designed to diminish the underlying conditions that empowered radical 
elements in the Catholic community.  Military and law enforcement actions were so 
successful in preventing terrorists’ operations that groups like the IRA chose to 
participate in the political process in order to continue the struggle.225  Not all policies 
and programs were well synchronized.  Interrogation tactics, for example, resulted in 
global condemnation and “damage to Britain’s international reputation.”226  Judicial 
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power has been over-employed in this conflict to the extent that it was often out of synch 
with other strategies.  Internment and criminalization programs, for example, added to 
support for the IRA within the province and may have done more harm than good.  
Overall however, this grand strategy was well balanced and has shown positive results in 
the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland.   
3. Conclusion 
The British grand strategy in Northern Ireland has managed the conflict between 
Protestants and Catholics for over 30 years with a mixed record of success and failure.  It 
is not a strategy that emerged full blown in 1972 from an official policy document; rather, 
it is one that evolved over the decades of conflict.  The strategy contains many of the 
features of an effective grand strategy, and clearly attempts to employ all the instruments 
of national power available to Great Britain in the struggle.  However, it is also a strategy 
that has yet to completely resolve the conflict, despite the recent positive steps.  This 
strategy illustrates the value of clearly stated national interests and objectives in focusing 
and enabling the instruments of national power.  It attempts to employ all the instruments 
of national power, and does so in a manner that is generally well balanced.  Diplomatic 
and military force has been sufficient, economic force insufficient, and law enforcement 
efforts at times excessive; Table 7 summarizes this evaluation.  The outcome of this 
conflict remains less than settled.  The cease-fire in Northern Ireland has led to 
disarmament by the IRA, and militant groups are involved in the legitimate government 
of the province, but the issues or sovereignty and governance remain unresolved.227 
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Instrument of Power Strategy for Employment Effectiveness 
Diplomatic Negotiation ++ 
Informational Persuasion & Situational Understanding + 
Military Selective Engagement & Support for L.E.  + 
Economic Development – 
Law Enforcement Prosecution + 
Outcome Disarmament 
Table 7. British Grand Strategy in Northern Ireland 
 
Narrowly defined and limited national interests provided flexibility to British 
grand strategy that allowed the nation to capitalize on certain environmental changes in 
the province.  Changes in voting laws and recognition for groups such as Sinn Fein gave 
radical organizations an opportunity to peacefully affect reform.  The European Union 
has made nationalist goals less threatening to the Protestant population.  Both of these 
changes were easily used by grand strategists who were focused on the national interest 
of achieving a peaceful settlement to the conflict.  If America defines her national 
interests in the Middle East as achieving a secure, stable, and peaceful region, the U.S. 
will have a great deal of flexibility in designing pragmatic and tailored policy and 
programs.228  Encouraging the development of representative governments might be a 
strategic objective in Egypt, Kuwait, or a number of other nations where it is appropriate.  
In other nations, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran this objective may be entirely 
inappropriate, or a long term one that is not discussed. 
Instruments of power must be balanced according to the threat and objectives.  
British law enforcement and military activities worked in concert with her diplomatic 
efforts.  Great Britain began at an information disadvantage, but efforts to improve 
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intelligence collection and persuade the Northern Irish public to support political efforts 
to resolve the conflict turned this deficit around to where intelligence was enabling 
operations.  Had British economic policy been successful in the region, it is entirely 
possible that the conflict might have been resolved sooner.  In the Middle East, America 
is reluctant to engage nations such as Iran and Syria as consistent partners in the war on 
terrorism.  While there are many good reasons for this reluctance, these are the very 
nations that may be able to affect the groups that threaten the United States.  One of the 
lessons of British diplomacy in Northern Ireland is that all legitimate actors with any sort 
of influence in a conflict, except of course the terrorist group themselves, should be 
engaged in diplomatic negotiations.  British military activities were notably restrained 
after the early 1980s, law enforcement operations were in the lead, because it was 
important to exercise restraint when combating an enemy that hid among the population.  
Information is critical to these conflicts.  Great Britain put its collection effort into 
avenues where it could reap the greatest rewards, human intelligence.  The U.S. must 
critically evaluate the balance in its current grand strategy to determine if the blend of 
policies and programs that has evolved in the last since September 11, 2001 is 
appropriate to the threat, objectives and global environment faced today. 
B. INDIAN STRATEGY TO COUNTER SIKH VIOLENCE 
One of the most violent periods of terrorist activity took place in the Indian state 
of Punjab from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s.   During this period Sikh militants, Hindu 
militias, and sectarian mobs accounted for over 20,000 dead and countless other 
casualties.  The violence was rooted in a Sikh separatist movement that developed in the 
late 1970s around the issue of control over the style and content of worship at Sikh 
temples.  This movement featured religious fundamentalism and political nationalism in 
equal and complementary parts.   
The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC), an elected body, 
controlled Sikh all temples within Punjab, as well a number of significant ones outside 
the state.  The moderate Akali Dal party controlled the SGPC through the party’s success 
in popular elections.  This control gave Akali Dal access to enormous resources, and 
significant influence over the practice of religion in what is traditionally non-hierarchical 
faith.  Sikh militants groups initially developed as a fundamentalist counter to the 
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influence of Akali Dal.229  The Sikh culture had strong nationalist traditions that stem 
from a long and proud history of ethnic identity, success in battle, and status as an 
independent nation in the 1700s.  These nationalist traditions were used by the religious 
fundamentalists in an attempt to rally a broader audience of Sikhs against the Hindu 
dominated Indian government.  It would be a mistake to suggest that the separatist 
movement represented the majority of Sikhs; in fact it represented a minority, but it was a 
powerful minority.230   
The Indian province of Punjab, located on the country’s western border with 
Pakistan, is shown in Figure 3.  Two critical cities in the province, Amritsar and  
Chandigarh, are located in the northwest and centereast respectively.  Punjab is bordered 
by the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and Rajasthan.  
New Delhi, located in the southeast of the province of Haryana, is relatively nearby.   
 
Figure 3.   Map of Indian Conflict Area231 
 
                                                 
229 Rajiv A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), xv-xvi. 
230 Cyntia Keppley Mahmood, Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues With Sikh Militants 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 18-20, 33-49, & 107-120.  Carl H. Yaeger “Sikh 
Terrorism in the Struggle for Khalistan,” Terrorism 14, no. 4 (October 1991): 221-223.  
231 Map of Punjab province from Google images and available at 
http://punjabgovt.nic.in/ECONOMY/districts/punjab.htm (accessed February 21, 2006).   
“Maps & Geographic Information Systems,” Agriculture Gateway to India, 
http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/aim/diglib/india/images/INDIAMAP_NEW.jpg (accessed February 21, 2006). 
105 
1. Roots of the Conflict 
The modern phase of the conflict, ongoing since the mid 1970s, had its origins in 
political intrigue and power struggles within the Indian government.  In 1978 Indira 
Gandhi’s son, Sanjay, and her Home Minister, Zail Singh, created a Sikh political 
organization to splinter the growing power of the Akali Dal party.  This new party, 
known as the Dal Khalsa, was led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a fundamentalist 
religious leader who did not eschew violence in the name of his cause.  Almost 
immediately upon inception the group began to violently oppose Akali Dal policies and 
eventually running afoul of the government that created it.232  From 1980 to 1984 the 
protection of Gandhi’s government allowed Bhindranwale to grow his organization and 
reach a point where he no longer needed external support.  Beholden to none, the Dal 
Khalsa became increasingly violent in an effort to drive the Hindu population from 
Punjab and “force” Sikhs from outside the state to return home.   
In 1984, after six years of escalating violence, Bhindranwale and his followers 
took refuge from the police in the holiest of Sikh temples the Golden Temple in the city 
of Amritsar.  Prime Minister Indira Gandhi eventually sent in the Indian army to 
apprehend Bhindranwale and end the standoff.  The militants, armed with machine guns 
and anti-tank rockets, held off the troops for much of the night until tanks were 
committed effectively ending the fight.  Casualty figures in this engagement are a subject 
of much dispute.  Up to 79 Indian soldiers and 493 militants, including Bhindranwale 
were killed in the fighting.  A number of religiously significant parts of the temple were 
heavily damaged as well.  It should be noted that Sikhs were well represented in the 
military at all levels and many were involved in the raid on the temple.  Also of note, in 
response to the raid two Sikh military units totaling more than 2000 troops mutinied, and 
a number of officers were killed during the actions.233 
This event galvanized Sikh separatists and motivated many other groups.  Within 
the year Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, and anti-Sikh riots 
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throughout the country killed as many as 2500 Sikhs.234  Over the next 15 years as many 
as 25,000 people were killed and another 20,000 to 40,000 disappeared or were illegally 
detained by Sikh extremists, Hindu militias, or the police.  Sikh terrorists groups 
massacred Hindus in bus hijackings, targeted assassinations, and bombings in the name 
of their “armed struggle.” The overwhelming majority of their targets were Indian; 
although some attacks were carried out outside of India, even these were generally 
against Indian targets.235  Sikh terrorists groups had a great deal of active and tacit 
support from the larger Sikh community within India, as well as the international Sikh 
diaspora.  As with Islamic extremists however, Sikh militants and their supporters 
represented only a small fraction of the world’s Sikh population.  This is one of the few 
terrorist movements that have been successfully defeated.  The question of how India 
achieved this feat is one that this paper will now attempt to briefly address. 
2. Lessons of Indian Grand Strategy 
Indian grand strategy was markedly different from the British efforts in Northern 
Ireland even though both dealt with sectarian separatist movements.  Diplomacy was an 
important feature of the Indian program, but it did not play the leading role that it did in 
Northern Ireland.  This grand strategy made an initial effort to resolve the central issues 
diplomatically, but quickly turned to a strategy the emphasized overwhelming police and 
military power to crush the terrorist organizations.  This vignette illustrates the 
importance of synchronization in a grand strategy more than anything else.  The Indian 
response to Sikh violence is one that was initially desynchronized and ineffective.  It is 
only after police and military forces took the lead that the conditions changed and efforts 
were ultimately successful.  
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The central governments of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi unsuccessfully attempted to 
engage the Sikh leadership in an effort to resolve the issues surrounding the conflict.  In 
1982-1983 Indira Gandhi’s government began talks with Sikh leaders of the Akali Dal 
party, the leading Sikh political organization.  In late 1982 the Akali Dal and the more 
militant Dal Khalsa parties combined to put greater pressure on Gandhi’s government, 
resulting in negotiations and significant concessions by Gandhi over religious and 
territorial issues.236  These concessions were based on the 1973 Anandpur Sahib 
resolution of the Akali party.  In that resolution, the party, on behalf of the greater Sikh 
community, expressed a series of 45 demands which included greater control of temples 
outside Punjab, greater control of water rights, and territorial changes that would put 
Punjab in sole control of the city of Chandigarh.  Gandhi’s concessions met or made 
progress on most of the religious demands in the Anandpur Sahib resolution, but few if 
any of the territorial ones.  This agreement fell apart in part because Gandhi’s 
government could not convince the chief minister of the state of Haryana, which included 
Chandigarh, to agree to territorial changes that would turn the city over to Punjab.237   
Indira Gandhi’s initial attempts to use diplomatic power to resolve the crisis failed 
for two reasons.  First, her government could not deliver on all the promises it made.  The 
disposition of Chandigarh was critical to Sikh notions of statehood and identity.  Failure 
to turn it over to Punjab became a long standing source of contention.  Second, Gandhi’s 
government was not dealing with the right actor.  Akali Dal was aligned in purpose with 
Bhindranwale’s Dal Khalsa, but it did not control the militant group.  In fact 
Bhindranwale worked throughout the negotiations to undermine Akali Dal in an effort to 
assume the leadership of Sikh society.  Bhindranwale’s terrorists went on a rampage of 
violence immediately after the agreement was signed.  This violence was directed against 
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leaders in the government, Sikh society, and the Hindu community, but also at ordinary 
individuals solely on the basis of their religious orientation.  Akali Dal was effectively 
marginalized by the violence; the party began to adopt more hardline position in an effort 
to halt its slipping support.  The government likewise became more aggressive and 
violent in its attempt to stop the violence.  In the end, relations between the Sikh 
community and the government were more polarized than before the 1983 concessions, 
and the stage was set for the 1984 raid on the Golden Temple.238 
Rajiv Gandhi’s government also tried to employ diplomacy to resolve the 
problem which had grown to nationwide proportions by early 1985.  The Rajiv-Longowal 
Accord, signed in mid 1985 between the central government and the President of Akali 
Dal, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, came after Gandhi released key Akali leaders from 
prison and appointed a trusted ally as governor of Punjab.  The agreement gave the city 
of Chandigarh to Punjab and agreed to further negotiations or arbitration to resolve the 
more contentious issues such as water rights, autonomy, and control of “extra-territorial” 
temples.  Maya Chadda argues in her book, Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India, 
that these moves were part of a deliberate effort by Gandhi to isolate Sikh militants from 
the more moderate population which Akali Dal represented.  Gandhi went on to allow 
elections to take place in Punjab as a further attempt to reinforce moderate elements 
within the population.  Scholars differ in their explanations of why this agreement fell 
apart; what is clear is that neither side could adhere to the promises it made.  The city of 
Chandigarh was not transferred to Punjab, the recommendations of the water commission 
were delayed, and the Akali government in Punjab was eventually dismissed in May 
1987.  The Akali leaders, like their predecessors in 1982, could not prevent the militant 
separatist groups from continued acts of terrorism.239  This series of interrelated events 
fueled militant violence and increased the separation between the Indian central 
government and common Sikhs.  The Indian government shifted to a strategy that favored 
strong police action to target and defeat terrorist organizations at any cost after the 
collapse of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord in 1987. 
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Little is written about Indian information strategy.  Most of the details must be 
interpreted from the tactics and results of police and military forces.  However, it seems 
that there was a deliberate attempt to use the power of information in two ways.  First, 
Indian forces attempted to discredit terrorist leaders by publicizing their apostasy, graft, 
and self indulgence.  This was part of an effort to isolate the militants by destroying their 
reputation as devout and pure Sikhs.  The government, for example, during the second 
siege of the Golden Temple publicized the terrorists’ desecration of the holy site, and 
highlighted that terrorists routinized rape of Sikh women on the grounds of the holy 
site.240  Second, Indian forces attempted to reassure the population that it could be secure 
from terrorist violence.  The military’s heavy presence and constant night patrolling 
during Operation Raksack II was an effort to achieve this goal.  These efforts are 
generally credited with vastly improving the flow of critical information to security 
forces as the population began to resist the militants.241 
Military force played a supporting role in the Indian government’s grand strategy 
to defeat Sikh terrorist groups.  The 1984 raid on the Golden Temple marked the most 
direct employment of military forces against Sikh militants.  Military strategy began to 
change in the late 1980s as a result of popular opposition to the temple raid.  Mano Joshi, 
in his research entitled Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis for 
the Conflict Studies series, discusses these changes and the pivotal roles played by the 
military in the 1990s.  In 1991-1992 approximately 120,000 troops were deployed in 
Punjab to participate in Operation Rakshak II, the extended joint police-military action 
that he credits with changing the momentum of the conflict.  Joshi describes three 
primary roles for conventional Indian military forces during this period.  First and 
foremost, the overwhelming Army presence allowed police forces to concentrate on 
tracking down and killing or capturing terrorist leaders.  Prior to the deployments of 
1991-1992, police forces were tied up with security missions or afraid to leave their 
defensive positions; the military created maneuver room for the police.  Second, as 
previously mentioned, the presence and activity of military forces encouraged “grass 
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roots” resistance to the terrorist groups.  Finally, the military supported the police with 
training, planning, and quick reaction forces when needed.  This support was critical to 
creating an effective and active police force.242  The effectiveness of diplomatic power 
was very different from that of law enforcement and military powers.  Diplomacy 
consistently failed to resolve the issue, and was largely abandoned after 1985.  Military 
power initially inflamed the conflict in 1984, but was redirected to a supporting role 
when law enforcement moved to the front. 
The imposition of “President’s Rule” in Punjab changed the complexion of the 
conflict.  The central government turned away from a negotiated settlement that 
addressed Sikh issues, and moved to defeat the terrorist organizations through expanded 
police powers and increased use of paramilitary forces.  The Punjabi police force was 
reorganized, expanded and reinforced with elements of “the Central Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), and the regular use of the Army.”  A package of 
anti-terrorism legislation, passed between 1980 and 1985, implemented what has been 
called a “counter terror” strategy.  Police and other governmental organizations 
commonly employed hit squads, routinized torture, and targeted the families of suspected 
terrorists.243  India’s central government took over control of local government in the 
conflict zone in order to impose change.  Unlike Northern Ireland, the structure of 
Punjab’s government was not a problem; Sikh’s controlled the local government when 
Gandhi imposed “President’s Rule” in 1987.  The problem was that the state government 
could not stop the violence and political pressure to assume control overwhelmed 
Gandhi.  The conflict in India became one between the central government and Sikh 
separatists, the local government was either unwilling or unable to act effectively against 
the militants. 
The extreme measures taken by state security forces began to wear down Indians’ 
national will in 1989 until a number of events occurred to reinforce the nation’s 
commitment to the strategy.  In 1991 the Congress party, the party of both Gandhis, 
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retook control of the central government in general elections.  The party followed this up 
in 1992 with a victory in the Punjab elections.  These election victories put the hardline 
Congress party in control at every level involved in the fight; a consistent, five year 
strategy to fight Sikh terrorism was possible.  In 1991 a number of terrorist actions by 
Sikh militants, including the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, combined to make violence 
in the name of religion no longer acceptable to the population.  What followed was a 
massive deployment of conventional and paramilitary troops to Punjab to support police 
forces.  The combined security forces began the tit-for-tat action that decimated the 
terrorist organizations.  This was, in effect, a military strategy executed led by the police.  
In 1992 the security forces began to gain control of the conflict.  Police casualties 
dropped, a number of terrorist leaders were captured or killed, approximately 800 
militants surrendered and the general population began to show signs that they were no 
longer intimidated by the terrorists.244   
Authors generally credit the Indian “counter-terror” campaign with defeating the 
Sikh terrorism.  However,  K.P.S. Gill argues in his book, Punjab: The Knights of 
Falsehood, that the turnaround came as a result of a change within the Sikh population 
that enabled the police to be successful.  The relatively peaceful resolution of a second  
siege of the Golden Temple in 1988 marked the turning point for the militants.  The 
groups lost their “ideological moorings” according to Gill, and their atrocities began to 
alienate them from the population.  Militant groups effectively lost the information war 
for the support of the population because of their excessive violence and immoral 
behavior.  The Sikh population responded by joining the Punjab police force in large 
numbers in an effort to resist the terrorists at the risk of their own life and that of their 
families.  Key to this effort was the local support which slowly began to deny the militant 
groups access to critical resources, and provide the police with critical information to 
identify the fighters.245  Gill states that the average Sikh never accepted the extremist 
ideology espoused by the terrorist groups, and they paid for this refusal with their lives; 
                                                 
244 Singh, 413-414. Hamish. 
245 Gill, 99-108. Sanjoy Hazarika, “Sikhs Surrender to Troops at Temple,” The New York Times, May 
19, 1988: A3, http://proquest.umi.com (accessed February 10, 2006). 
112 
according to Gill’s figures, 61% of the victims of Sikh terrorism were Sikhs.246  It was 
their shift from passive to active resistance that changed the momentum of this conflict 
and ultimately defeated the terrorist groups. 
The actions of the Indian central government against Sikh terrorists illustrate the 
danger of poorly synchronized grand strategy.  The government’s actions in three realms 
of power created significant problems and had the potential to seriously compound the 
conflict.  Diplomatically, the governments of both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi made 
agreements that they could not keep.  The issues of Chandigarh and water rights were 
central to the militant’s cause and the central governments failure to deliver on promises 
concessions legitimized the terrorist’s fight.  It is entirely possible that Indira Gandhi 
could have prevented the entire conflict in the early 1980s if her government had not 
supported the actions of Bhindranwale or had they delivered on their 1983 agreement 
with leaders of Akali Dal.  Militarily, the storming of the Golden Temple in 1984 created 
the impression that the Indian Army was targeting Sikhs.  This created a barrier between 
the military and the population in Punjab, a significant problem in counterinsurgency 
operations.   
The effect of excessive police force is the most interesting question when 
considering the issue of synchronization in Indian grand strategy.  Government 
sanctioned use of torture, execution, and targeting the families of suspects is not 
considered an acceptable practice in democratic nations.  Gurharpal Singh states, in his 
article “Punjab Since 1984: Disorder, Order, and Legitimacy,” that “a liberal democratic 
system that replicates the methods of terrorists in its anti-terrorist policies threatens to 
undermine its own foundations.”  Caleb Carr takes a more consequentialist approach 
when he argues that terrorism is always unsuccessful in achieving its objectives, and 
nations that resort to it ultimately risk defeat.247  On the surface it would seem that the 
police “counter-terror” tactics were desynchronized from diplomatic and even military 
actions.  The extreme tactics employed by security forces should have driven a wedge 
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between the greater Sikh population and the central government.  This wedge should 
have encouraged Sikh terrorism to spread to other states in India.  Domestic and 
international outrage should have created diplomatic problems for India.  The reasons 
why these expected negative effects did not develop to the extent that they created a 
problem for India are important. 
Three features of the Punjab conflict enabled the central government to 
systematically employ “counter-terror” tactics.  The first we have already discussed, it is 
Gill’s argument that the overwhelming majority of Sikhs opposed the terrorists.  The 
government actions to publicize the militant’s atrocities in fact drove a wedge between 
the Sikh population and the militants.  Second, for a variety of reasons the idea of an 
independent Sikh state did not appeal to the larger Sikh population.248  These two reasons 
suggest that a legitimate government has a great deal of latitude when facing a domestic 
enemy lacking in popular support.  The government’s actions never created international 
outrage in part because they never created domestic outrage.  Finally, it is important to 
note that this strategy produced a measurable decrease in violence and visible successes 
in terms of dead, captured or surrendered terrorists.249  A unique convergence of public 
opinion, governmental leadership, and a self destructing adversary enabled India’s 
“counter-terror” strategy.  While these features are unlikely to be reproduced in the 
conflict that the U.S. now faces, this vignette illustrates the power of the war of ideas in 
the war on terrorism. 
It is possible to argue that the activities of police and paramilitary forces in the 
early 1990s were not out of synch at all.  Military operations were planned and executed 
to isolate areas for police action or gather intelligence.  Diplomatic activity ensured that 
the 1992 Punjabi elections were conducted and the outcome put a supportive state 
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government in place for a five year term.  Informational activity decreased support for 
terrorists and may have deflected international opposition.250  The Indian “counter-terror” 
strategy is an example of effective synchronization and integration of elements of 
national power, but not one that the U.S. should attempt to emulate. 
3. Conclusion 
India’s strategy from 1980 to the mid 1990s to combat the threat of Sikh terrorism 
was a grand strategy executed at the local level.  It was a strategy that applied a variety of 
instruments of national power in concert to defeat a violent terrorist movement that could 
have threatened vital national interests had it grown unchecked.  The Indian government 
faced a movement that claimed the legitimacy of religious fundamentalism, and used 
nationalist rhetoric to maintain, for a time, significant popular support.  Indian grand 
strategy employed insufficient diplomatic power and little direct economic power, 
sufficient informational power, but used overwhelming military and law enforcement 
power; Table 8 summarizes this evaluation.  This conflict was resolved after Sikh 
separatist groups collapsed under the cumulative pressure of police and military actions. 
 
Instrument of Power Strategy for Employment Effectiveness 
Diplomatic Negotiation – – 
Informational Persuasion & Situational Understanding + 
Military Counter-Terror & Support for L.E. ++ 
Economic Not Applied – 
Law Enforcement Counter-Terror ++ 
Outcome Success 
Table 8. Indian Grand Strategy in Punjab 
 
Indian diplomacy was ineffective from the start of the conflict, so much so that it 
was virtually abandoned in the 1990s in favor of the “counter-terror” strategy.  As we 
have discussed, diplomacy failed because neither side could really live up to promises 
made in negotiations.  Governmental representatives did not have the power to compel 
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Hayana to give up its interests in Chandigarh, nor could it settle the issue of water rights.  
Although central to militant’s demands, the issue of an independent Sikh nation was 
never addressed by the government.  The Akali Dal party, the legitimate political 
organization that represented militant organizations in negotiations, could not control the 
militant groups who often worked to derail negotiations.  
Indian military and law enforcement strategies throughout the 1980s were 
ineffective at curbing the violence.  However, the 1988 Golden Temple siege began to 
change this dynamic.  The military assumed a supporting role to the police in 
counterterrorism operations.  The law enforcement units in Punjab were reorganized, 
trained, and vastly expanded to improve their performance in the field.  Finally, a 
package of special legislation and police powers provided the mechanisms to rapidly 
change the environment.  Militant organizations could not adapt to these changes and 
never regained the initiative. 
The information campaign waged by governmental forces was an important factor 
in the defeat of Sikh militants.  This campaign again focused on persuasion and 
developing better situational understanding.  Sikh militant groups lost the war for public 
support through their immoral behavior and employment of indiscriminate excessive 
violence.  By the end of the conflict the public clearly saw these groups more as criminals 
than as freedom fighters.  Indian efforts to improve situational understanding focused on 
developing intelligence from the population by securing it from militant reprisals.  When 
the Indian Army began effectively separate the population from the terrorists, valuable 
information began to flow. 
This vignette illustrates the effect of synchronization in grand strategy.  Indian 
strategy in the 1980s was poorly synchronized; instruments of national power were 
working at cross purposes and their actions were counterproductive.  In contrast, the 
central government’s strategy in the 1990s was well synchronized; actions that had the 
potential to negatively impact the overall effort were mitigated by success in other areas.  
All instruments of national power worked in concert to support the nation’s law 
enforcement organizations.  These organizations used an unusual degree of force to 
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rapidly defeat the terrorists, but that level of force was not unacceptable to the larger 
population or the international community. 
C. ISRAELI STRATEGY TO COUNTER HEZBOLLAH VIOLENCE 
Hezbollah, one of the most dangerous and effective transnational terrorist 
organizations of the late twentieth century, was not defeated by Israeli grand strategy.  
Unlike the previous terrorist groups, Hezbollah remains to this day a viable military force 
and an influential actor in the Middle East.  However, in the wake of Israeli concessions, 
the group has voluntarily moved away from direct terrorist action as a means to achieve 
its goals.  Lebanon occupied a key place in Israeli grand strategy in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s: it provided the country an opportunity to secure a key border and break the 
tightening circle of hostile Arab states.  This vignette will examine the use of Israeli 
diplomatic, informational, and military power to counter the threat of terrorist violence 
from Hezbollah.  Democratization is likely to produce additional terrorist organizations 
attempting maintain viability by participating in the legitimate government; Hamas may 
be only the first of many.  This examination is intended to identify lessons for dealing 
with current groups attempting to assume a measure of legitimacy through their 
participation in the political process.   
1. Roots of the Conflict 
Hezbollah had its earliest roots in two 1970s groups, Harakat al-Mahroumeen 
(the Movement of the Deprived) and Afwaj al-Muqawamah (the Lebanese Resistance 
Detachments), also known as Amal.  These groups were founded by Musa al-Sadr, a 
Shi’a cleric born in Iran and educated in Najaf, to gain political recognition and improve 
the standard of living of Lebanese Shi’ites.  This highly unstable population was the least 
privileged of the 18 different religious sects inhabiting Lebanon.251  Al-Sadr’s groups did 
not achieve any significant gains in the 1970’s, and were in danger of losing popular 
support until three events in 1978 gave the organization a much needed boost.252  First, 
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the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, while on a trip to Lybia rallied Amal’s supporters and 
gave new life to the group.  Second, the success of Iranian Shi’ites in overthrowing the 
Shah and installing an Islamic government provided the Amal its inspiration.  Finally, in 
August, Israel invaded Lebanon to drive out the PLO fighters using the country as a base 
of operations.  Hezbollah evolved from disagreements that began to appear within Amal 
regarding general tactics and the group’s response to Israel.253   
Islamic Amal, under the leadership of  Sayyid Husayn Musawi split in 1982 from 
the more conservative and secular Amal, and formed the nucleus of Hezbollah.  The new 
group interpreted Shi’a Islam in a more “doctrinaire” and less popular way than its 
predecessor.254  The two groups were at war with each other throughout much of the 
1980s until Syria imposed a peace agreement in 1989 that became known as The 
Damascus Agreement.255  The animosity between them is not as apparent today, as 
evidenced by the groups’ combined electoral tickets in the 2005 national election.256     
Hezbollah’s violence ran the gamut of terrorist operations, and evolved over time 
in response to changes in the global environment and the group’s organizational needs.  
In 1983 Hezbollah, through a front organization called Islamic Jihad, conducted a series 
of spectacular bombings to affect the behavior of the United States (US), France and 
Kuwait.  In April, a suicide car bomb destroyed the US embassy in Beirut, and in October 
two additional bombings destroyed the US Marine and French paratrooper’s barracks.  
The immediate death toll from these three actions was 362 people, but the secondary 
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effects were much greater; they set in motion a process that eventually resulted in the 
U.S. withdrawal of military forces from Lebanon.257   
Hezbollah turned to kidnapping in 1984 to provide Iran, during its long war with 
Iraq, much needed money, arms, and to secure the release of Iranian fighters from foreign 
jails.  The most spectacular example of the success of these operations was the French 
repayment of $330 million in back debt to Iran in return for two hostages.  This tactic did 
not always pay off, as the seven year ordeal of Terry Anderson illustrated.258  Hezbollah 
changed tactics again in June 1985 when the group hijacked TWA Flight 847 from 
Athens and eventually diverted it to Lebanon.  The ordeal ended seventeen days later 
when Israel released 31 jailed Shi’ite prisoners.  Ultimately this hijacking was a success 
for Hezbollah; the group received enormous press coverage, and appeared to force both 
Israel and the U.S. to capitulate to its demands.259       
As the Lebanese civil war drew to a close and civil society began to rebuild 
Hezbollah was at a crossroads.  It was a group with an impressive terrorist pedigree and a 
natural constituency.  It was also a group that faced increasing isolation from both its 
constituency and the society at large.  Hezbollah developed a pragmatic and flexible 
strategy that employed terrorism to affect the behavior of both Western and Israeli 
governments.  When this strategy became counterproductive, the group deliberately 
limited its attacks and increased participation in legitimate institutions.260  Hezbollah 
demonstrated a value maximizing rational actor style that has positive implications.  It 
may be possible to negotiate a resolution to the issues that motivate emerging militant 
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groups before they reach a point compromise is no longer possible.  Interests were critical 
in this equation.   Israel’s vital interest was border security; the nation invaded Lebanon 
to stop Palestinian attacks on Jewish settlements.  The conflict with Hezbollah developed 
as a result of actions during this invasion.  Hezbollah’s vital interest was to end the Israeli 
occupation.  These interests were not in direct conflict, and thus there was room for 
negotiation.    
In an effort to establish conditions when negotiation might be productive in a 
counterterrorist operation, Giandomenico Picco distinguishes between groups such as 
Hezbollah, which engage “tactical terrorism,” and al-Qaeda, which engages in “strategic 
terrorism.”  Tactical terrorism is characterized by a substantive goal and a willingness to 
negotiate an end to terrorism in return for the satisfaction of that goal.  Strategic terrorism 
is characterized by goals that will change if ever realized because the struggle is more 
important than the goal itself.  Picco argues that some terrorist organizations will 
negotiate when their investment in society reaches a level at which further terrorism is 
counterproductive.  Groups such as al-Qaeda do not develop this level of investment in 
society, in part because their structure and goals do not allow it.  Pico makes the point 
that these groups are fundamentally different and should not be fought in the same way.  
Modern American grand strategy must address a number of different terrorist 
organizations.  The danger of ignoring this distinction, of conflating all terrorist groups 
under the label of strategic terrorists, is to miss opportunities to conserve resources and 
secure a peaceful resolution to conflicts.261   
2. Lessons of Israeli Grand Strategy 
Israeli diplomacy can be characterized by two themes: negotiation and 
intervention.  Terrorism can be constrained by diplomatic activity under certain 
circumstances.  Diplomatic pressure in 1996 from the US, France, Syria, and Iran, on 
Hezbollah and Israel forced both sides to agree to a historic pact that defined a set of 
rules for the fight.  These rules, referred to as the April Understanding, restricted Israel 
from targeting Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure; in return Hezbollah 
refrained from conducting attacks within Israel and agreed to only target Israeli military 
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forces within Lebanon.  This internationally recognized and monitored agreement 
legitimized the group’s actions against the Israeli military and provided de-facto 
recognition of the group’s status as a resistance organization.262  American and French 
diplomacy, and presumably economic power, influenced Syria and Iran to pressure  
Hezbollah to agree to the deal with Israel.  Syria and Iran were important actors in the 
equation because they had the ability to cut off the flow of weapons and money to the 
terrorist group.   
It is important to note that Israel and Syria were involved in negotiations over the 
disposition of the Golan Heights during much of the 1990s as well.  These talks centered 
on the amount of land Israel was willing to give up in return for peace with its Arab 
neighbor.  Syria demanded a full pull-back from the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 
borders.  Yitzak Rabin always insisted on including “normalization, security 
arrangements, and a timetable for the implementation of the various measures,” with any 
discussion of withdrawal.  The various “security arrangements” demanded by Israeli 
negotiators were often unacceptable to Syria.263  These negotiations led to little 
significant progress in Israeli-Syrian relations, and may have set the stage for Israel’s 
1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath.  
Israel’s interventionist policy began with its efforts to create allies in Lebanon as 
a counter to the influence of first the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and later 
Syria.  Throughout the conflict Israel developed and supported the Christian Phalangist 
militia of Bashir Gemayel that won the Lebanese Presidential elections of 1983.  
Beginning in the mid 1970s, the Israeli intelligence service known as the Mossad, began 
funneling arms and support to Christian groups in southern Lebanon.  These groups 
coalesced into the Phalange under the leadership of Gamayel by 1980, and were intended 
to counterbalance anti-Israeli forces in Lebanon.  This was a strategic move that 
ultimately backfired on Isreal; in April 1981 Gamayel successfully manipulated an 
engagement with Syria into a crisis that Israel was forced to resolve.  Israel shot down 
two Syrian helicopters while defending Phalangist forces in the Bekaa Valley.  The 
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shoot-down resulted in an increased Syrian presence in the country and cemented Israeli 
support for Gamayel’s group.264  Indirect Israeli intervention gave way to direct 
intervention in 1982 when the IDF invaded Southern Lebanon and began military 
operations against PLO forces in the country. 
Isreal’s experience in Lebanon existed within the larger paradigm of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict that began soon after Israel’s proclamation of statehood in 
1948.  During Israel’s direct involvement in Lebanon the larger conflict was marked by 
an intense period of negotiations.  Two of the highlites of this dialog were the 1978 peace 
agreement with Egypt and the 1985 negotiations with Jordan on the Palestinian issues.  
Israel developed a negotiating strategy during the 1980s that became characteristic of its 
later efforts from 1992-1995; the nation refused to be drawn into large scale international 
conferences and insisted on individual negotiations with one or two Arab states.  This 
tactic allowed Israel to negotiate from a stronger position and frequently control the 
process.265  The effectiveness of Israeli diplomacy was very much subject to the 
preferences of its Prime Minister however.  Avi Shlaim implies in his book, The Iron 
Wall, that Peres’ efforts to negotiate a resolution to the Palestinian conflict in 1985 had a 
good chance of being successful; however, when Yitzhak Shamir, and the Likud party, 
assumed the premiership in 1986 these negotiations fell apart.266  This is a pattern that 
was repeated in 1996 when Benjamin Netanyahu and the Likud party regained the 
leadership of the Israeli government and immediately began working to delay and 
degrade the Oslo Accords.267  
Israel’s efforts to develop situational understanding began in 1976 with the 
Mossad’s support to Gamayel’s group.  Military intelligence units of the IDF also worked 
with and through other Maronite Christian groups some of whom would eventually form 
the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA).  These relationships were initiated to provide Israel 
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information about the activities and disposition of PLO fighters.268  The Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF) maintained good tactical and operational intelligence throughout the conflict; 
this intelligence was sufficient to conduct a number of raids to kill various Hezbollah 
leaders in the early 1990s.269  The 1993 shift from targeted attacks to large scale 
offensives did not require significant intelligence support, and what they had seems to 
have been ignored.  In 1996 the IDF conducted an artillery attack against a well known  
UN refugee camp at Qana killing over a hundred civilians.270   
Israel relied on its position as the victim of Palestinian and Hezbollah terrorism to 
lend its actions legitimacy in the domestic and international media.  The nation made 
little effort to engage or persuade audiences to degrade support for the terrorist 
organizations attacking Israel and the IDF in Lebanon.  This may have been the result of 
a combination of factors.  First, Israel had a long tradition of practicing realpolitik, and 
with few exceptions her leaders in the early 1980s supported a straightforward offensive 
philosophy.271  Second, in 1983 Israel lost any claim it had to the moral high ground 
when it allowed Phalangist militiamen to massacre defenseless civilians at the Sabra and 
Shatila refugee camps in Beirut.272  Finally, Israel had the strong support of the U.S. 
throughout the period.  Israel made no excuses for its actions against Lebanese civilians 
and treated the various operations in the 1990s as justifiable uses of military force to 
secure their border region.273  This attitude was extremely damaging to Israel’s grand 
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strategy because it undermined the government’s domestic and international support.  
The Israeli government had no effective response to Hezbollah’s increasingly 
professional propaganda effort to demonstrate the effects of Israeli military operations 
against non-combatants.  This deficiency eventually contributed to the Clinton 
administration’s actions to pressure Israel to cease Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, 
and domestic pressure to withdrawal completely from Lebanon in 2000.274 
Israel responded to Hezbollah’s violence by applying overwhelming military 
force against the Lebanese civilian population to indirectly affect the group’s actions.  
The Iron Fist policy, begun in 1985, was the first in a series of offensives intended to 
drive the population of southern Lebanon out of their homes and destroyed the country’s 
infrastructure.  Similar Israeli campaigns in 1993, and 1996 could be termed part of a 
“counter-terror” strategy by the IDF.  In each action the IDF directed overwhelming 
military force against the Lebanese civilian population in an effort to stop Hezbollah’s 
attacks.  These actions created hundreds of thousands of refugees and terrific damage to 
the infrastructure of the country.275  However, this strategy was unsuccessful in achieving 
its goals.  Hezbollah responded in 1993, and again in 1996, by targeting settlements in 
northern Israel with Katyusha rockets.  Hezbollah reportedly “fired [sic] more than 600 
Katyushas into Israel, while Israel fired an estimated 25,000 shells at Lebanese targets 
and flew 600 combat air sorties” during the 1996 offensive.276   
   This strategy had a number of secondary effects.  First, as has already been 
discussed, it degraded domestic and international support for Israel’s operations in 
Lebanon.  Israel’s efforts to justify them by claiming that they were a response to 
Hezbollah’s terror operations did not work.277  Second, the attacks taught Hezbollah that 
the civilian population would be harmed, valuable infrastructure destroyed, and much of 
the group’s good work reversed if it struck Israel too hard.  While there was significant 
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support for operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon, there was little support for them 
after these forces withdrew in 2000.278   
Israeli military strategy included sponsoring a number of militias that we have 
already mentioned, most notably the SLA and the Phalangists.  These groups were 
provided massive quantities of arms, ammunition and other supplies in an effort to build 
a counterbalance to Palestinian, Syrian and eventually the Hezbollah threat from the 
country.  These groups were vicious and not entirely under the control of the IDF; in 
1980 Gemayel’s forces killed the leadership of a rival militia, also an Israeli ally, in a bid 
to unify Christian leadership.279  In other instances, such as the massacre at Sabra and 
Shatila the militias carried out tasks too dirty for the IDF.  On September 15, 1982 the 
IDF moved to secure West Beirut and encircle the two Palestinian refugee camps known 
as Sabra and Shatila; Israel maintained that PLO fighters were hiding in the camps.  
Without entering into a debate about the degree of control exercised by the IDF, what is 
clear is that the Israeli military allowed Christian militias to enter these camps and 
massacre hundreds of unarmed Palestinian civilians.  This episode galvanized anti-Israeli 
sentiment both within Lebanon and in many foreign populations.280 
Ironically, Israel’s diplomatic failures combined with their military operations 
against the Lebanese population opened the door for Hezbollah to assume a larger and 
more legitimate role in Lebanese society.  This larger role has led in part to a general 
reduction in violence and greater security along Israel’s border.  The group made the 
most of this opportunity by beginning the transformation that eventually led to its success 
in various elections.  Hezbollah began providing critical social services to the Lebanese 
population as a way to ensure that the population remained in their homes and continued 
to shelter the group’s fighters.  Organizational motivations gave way to instrumental ones 
as the group’s commitment to the population grew.  The most important of the social 
services Hezbollah provided was medical care.  Communities in Beirut’s suburbs and 
throughout southern Lebanon depended on a network of more than forty Hezbollah built 
and maintained health care facilities for low cost, high quality medical, dental and 
                                                 
278  Norton, “Hizballah and Israeli Withdrawal…,” 27, 29-30, & 34. 
279 Schulze, 107-108. 
280 Shahid. 
125 
pharmaceutical care.281  The public came to depend on services which the government of 
Lebanon could not provide.  Thus, Hezbollah developed a loyal following in stabilized 
communities, which translated into cover for their fighters and political power in the 
emerging Lebanese government.282  Medical services were just one of the many social 
services provided by Hezbollah, others included: repairing and improving schools and 
public housing; building and repairing the electrical infrastructure in a variety of areas; 
providing emergency water supplies to Beirut and making long term improvements to the 
water supply infrastructure.283 
The 1989 Ta’if Accords had a profound effect on Hezbollah because it allowed 
the group to participate in the government, and raised the cost of nonparticipation to an 
unacceptable level.  Hezbollah violently resisted Lebanese governments prior to 1989 
because they were generally extremely repressive and demonstrated a willingness to 
negotiate with the occupying Israeli forces.  Ta’if altered these realities.  Hezbollah 
positioned itself as a “constructive opposition” and worked from within the system to 
build a better government.284   
The popular support developed through these social services once translated into 
greater freedom of action in the fight against Israel, but today it means greater political 
power for Hezbollah.  For its part, the population has an interest in supporting the 
organization that significantly improved their standard of living.285  The results of this 
relationship are striking.  In the 2005 national elections the combined Hezbollah/Amal 
ticket won 35 of the 128 seats up for election, the second largest block of seats in 
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parliament.286  The group maintained, and improved slightly, its political representation 
in traditional strongholds.  Hezbollah has tremendous value as a coalition partner in this 
new government; giving it a greater ability to influence a wide spectrum of political 
actors.  This influence was apparent in the very unlikely alliance between Hezbollah and 
Michael Aoun during the campaign season.287  The social services that Hezbollah 
provided created a constituency that needed political representation, was vulnerable to 
reprisals by Israel, and consumed social services that were expensive to maintain.  These 
three realities drove Hezbollah’s decision to enter politics and tempered its actions 
against Israel.288  As Norton recounts, Hezbollah even refused to respond to the 2000 
destruction of Lebanese power plants in order to deny Israel an excuse to conduct further 
operations against the Lebanese population.289   
The very act of participating in the political process was a moderating influence 
on Hezbollah.  The sectarian nature of Lebanese politics and the confessional structure of 
the government make it impossible for the group to gain and maintain an overwhelming 
or even a narrow majority.290  Compromise and coalition building are the keys to 
progress in this system, and Hezbollah has learned to work effectively within it.  Norton 
argues that because these requirements are not going to change any time in the 
foreseeable future, Hezbollah effectively abandoned its goal of an Islamic republic and 
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fully embraced democracy as a way to achieve its ends.291  While there are disagreements 
regarding Hezbollah’s long term goals, Norton’s argument, that participation and 
compromise are strong mainstreaming influences, is a sound one.  Actions would have 
been unthinkable to Hezbollah leaders in the 1980s, were possible after the successes of 
elections in 1992.292   
Hezbollah looked to Iran for inspiration and direction, but asked Syria for 
permission to act because of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon.293  The group’s 
leaders studied in the same Najaf seminaries as the Ayatollah Khomeini, maintained 
constant contact with Iran’s senior clerics, and recognized the authority of the Iranian 
ayatollahs.294  Hezbollah received money from direct Iranian government programs and 
through unofficial religious channels (institutionalized Islamic religious taxes and 
informal donations).  However, this money supply, especially the official funding, is at 
the mercy of changes in the political environment.  The Iranian government of Hashemi 
Rafsanjani’s reduced official support to Hezbollah in the early 1990s as part of an effort 
to appear more moderate and attractive to foreign investors.  This reduction caused 
Hezbollah to diversify its fund raising activities; some experts believe that today 
Hezbollah could continue operations at current levels even if Iran significantly curtailed 
its support.295   
Hezbollah was critical to Syria’s strategy to bring Israel to the negotiating table 
and eventually secure the return of the Golan Heights because the group maintained the 
military pressure on Israel that Syria cold not.  Syria forced Lebanon to insist that peace 
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negotiations with Israel include Syria, and by extension the return of all lands seized from 
both countries.296  Although Hezbollah was critical to Syrian strategy, the nation 
established early in the relationship that it would not hesitate to use military force to 
ensure that Hezbollah did not stray outside the boundaries of acceptable action.297  Syria 
controlled the flow of resources from Iran to Hezbollah, and Syrian troops provided the 
coercive pressure that effectively made Hezbollah a proxy in the struggle against Israel.  
The Ta’if Accords threatened Syria’s overall strategy in Lebanon because they 
threatened the existence of Hezbollah; as a militia the group would have to disarm under 
the accords.  Syria “encouraged” Hezbollah to drop its objections to the accords and 
participate in the government in order to provide Hezbollah enough legitimacy to 
maintain its weapons and continue the fight against Israel.298  Recent events on the 
ground in Lebanon present a challenging environment for Syria in the future.  Israel 
undercut Syrian strategy by unilaterally pulling out of Lebanon in 2000 and generally 
acting with restraint toward the country ever since.  The uproar surrounding the 
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri forced Syria to pull its 
conventional ground forces out of Lebanon.  The Hezbollah/Amal coalition had a great 
deal of success in the recent Lebanese elections, even though an anti-Syrian coalition 
known as Tayyar al-Mustaqbal (Future Tide) won the largest block of seats.  These 
elections will create a parliament in Lebanon that is decidedly anti-Syrian, reducing the 
threat to Israel.299  The fact that pro- and anti-Syrian sentiments mean little as political 
players build coalitions in opposition to the status quo, may indicate that Syrian influence 
is not that important a factor anymore.   
3. Conclusions 
Lebanon occupied a key position in Israeli grand strategy because it offered the 
country an opportunity to breach the encirclement of hostile Arab nations.  The 1982 
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invasions of Lebanon was intended to defeat PLO forces based throughout the country 
and set the conditions for Christian leaders to assume control.  The actions of the IDF 
during and after this campaign generated tremendous animosity among the Lebanese 
population, and provided Hezbollah’s foundation issue.  Israeli strategy from 1982 to 
2000 was ineffective and in many cases counterproductive to national interests.  The 
strategy, summarized in Table 9, ultimately led to Israel’s expulsion from Lebanon and 
Hezbollah elevation to a position of influence within the society; in short a failure of 
Israeli grand strategy. 
 
Instrument of Power Strategy for Employment Effectiveness 
Diplomatic Negotiation & Intervention – 
Informational Realpolitik & Situational Understanding --/+ 
Military Counter-Terror – – – 
Economic Direct Support for Allied Militias – 
Law Enforcement Not Applied  
Outcome Failure 
Table 9. Israeli Grand Strategy in Lebanon 
 
Israeli diplomacy emphasized the importance of negotiation and intervention 
throughout the conflict in Lebanon.  Although negotiations were ongoing with Syria, the 
Lebanese government, and even with Hezbollah through third parties, the record of 
success of these efforts was mixed.  Negotiations with Hezbollah to constrain the conflict 
were successful, but talks with Syria regarding the disposition of the Golan Heights and 
Israeli security were failures.  Israel intervened directly and indirectly in Lebanon to 
create an ally in the region and later to engage and destroy threats to Israeli settlements.  
This intervention was also a decided failure.  The Christian militias and South Lebanese 
Army could not gain and maintain control of the country.  The IDF did defeat the PLO, 
but could not defeat Hezbollah and was eventually forced to withdraw.  One of the 
reasons for the failure of intervention may have been a poor understanding or the realities 
of Lebanese society: the Christians were not in the majority, nor did the militias represent  
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all Christians; the Lebanese President was not supremely powerful and could not 
guarantee Israel’s security; and finally that military gains did not always translate into 
political ones.300 
Information power was not deliberately employed by Israel in this conflict.  This 
was a serious deficiency that ceded valuable ground to Hezbollah, and created significant 
domestic and international pressure.  Israel attempted to justify their repeated actions 
against the Lebanese population as a legitimate response to the terrorist violence of 
Hezbollah.  This was a realpolitik response to terrorism that emphasized an unapologetic 
use of extremely violent conventional military action to defeat an clandestine 
unconventional enemy; it was doomed to failure.  In contrast, Israeli intelligence agencies 
seemed very capable of providing high quality intelligence on the movements of terrorist 
leaders.  This information resulted in the death of a number of high ranking Hezbollah 
leaders. 
Overwhelming military force was applied in this conflict, but it was applied 
against the wrong target.  Israeli actions against Lebanese civilians and infrastructure 
damaged its legitimacy in the international community, provided legitimacy to 
Hezbollah’s terrorism, and did not achieve their aims.  Ultimately Israel was unable to 
put enough pressure on either the Lebanese or Syrian governments to stop Hezbollah’s 
activities.  These actions worked against the IDF by engendering support for Hezbollah 
and providing the group significant opportunities to increase its influence in the country. 
Hezbollah adopted a more moderate position after Israel’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 2000.  The combined effects of political participation and the demands of 
providing social services to the population created an investment in the system that 
Hezbollah could not risk.  Iran and Syria exercised significant authority over the group’s 
activities during the conflict, but that may be changing.  Iran’s financial support to the 
group is not be as important as it once was, and the absence of Syrian troops in the 
country limits that nation’s ability to coerce Hezbollah’s obedience.   
Israeli grand strategy was out of balance and desynchronized in this conflict.  
Diplomatic power was applied ineffectively and informational power was not applied at 
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all.  Military force was overwhelmingly applied, but against targets that damaged Israel’s 
ability to conduct the fight and maintain the sources of national power.  Ultimately this 
blend of supporting strategies was unsuccessful; Israel was forced out of Lebanon and 
Hezbollah remains a significant force in being. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has briefly examined three very different terrorist movements and 
three national responses.  Only one of these conflicts was completely resolved, the other 
two remain in transition.  Table 10 summarizes these national responses and the outcome 
of each conflict. 
Instrument of Power Great Britain India Israel 
Diplomatic ++ – – – – 
Informational + + – /+ 
Military + ++ – – – 
Economic – – – 
Law Enforcement + ++ NA 
Outcome Disarmament Success Failure 
Table 10. Comparison of Strategic Responses 
 
Great Britain was challenged during the latter half of the 20th century by sectarian 
terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.  The national interests and the objectives that 
developed provided British leaders the ability to negotiate with a wide variety of actors, 
and compromise on the central issues of the conflict.  The British instruments of national 
power did not start out well balanced, but they evolved over time to become an effective 
blend of political negotiation and police force.  The efforts of a variety of organizations to 
collect information and portray terrorists in a negative light facilitated these actions in a 
way that was essential to the struggle.  Northern Ireland clearly illustrated the 
effectiveness of law enforcement and military power in forcing terrorist organizations to 
negotiate an end to the violence.  This assumes that diplomatic initiatives exist to engage 
the organizations and negotiate that settlement, without diplomacy one could argue hard 
power would be much less effective. 
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India's actions to defeat Sikh separatist terrorism illustrate the importance of 
synchronization and integration of the instruments of power.  Initially diplomatic and 
military actions were ineffective and desynchronized.  It was only after 1990 that 
diplomacy, military actions, and information power were organized in support of law 
enforcement's efforts to destroy the terrorist organizations.  Without debating the 
morality and efficacy of "counter-terror," the point is that the strategy was only 
successful because it was supported effectively.  India seems to present a counterpoint to 
the idea that diplomatic avenues to negotiation must be present for military and law 
enforcement power to be successful.  In fact this case illustrates that a terrorist movement 
can be defeated, but at what cost?  The “counter-terror” strategy employed by India is not 
an acceptable or practical option for the United States in the current environment.  The 
unique conditions that were discussed in this vignette are unlikely to be duplicated 
elsewhere, and the extreme measures taken are unacceptable in this country.   
Israel’s strategy illustrates the importance of the particular policies and programs 
included in supporting strategies for securing national interests.  This vignette 
demonstrated the danger of ignoring the information content of military and diplomatic 
activities.  It also showed the problems that may develop from an over reliance on one 
instrument of power; in this case the military instrument.  Finally, this vignette provided 
some valuable insights about the moderating effects of political participation and social 
services on a militant terrorist organization.  This may suggest areas of opportunity for 
relations with future groups. 
The most common theme running through each of these vignettes was that of 
negotiation and engagement.  Each national government made significant efforts to 
negotiate a resolution to the conflict.  What distinguished these efforts were the choices 
of negotiating partners each nation made.  British diplomacy was the most successful of 
the three because of continual commitment to negotiations even as different actors proved 
valuable to the effort.  Israel was the least successful because it was attempting to 
negotiate issues that were not central to the conflict, such as the disposition of the Golan 
Heights.   
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One interesting feature of these vignettes is that there was generally little if any 
focus on maintaining instruments of power.  Actions were taken by one instrument to 
enhance the effectiveness of another, but the governments involved did not deliberately 
attempt to regenerate or develop additional capabilities.  The notable exception to this 
tendency is in the area of information collection.  Both Great Britain and India clearly 
worked to develop better intelligence on terrorist organizations, and use this intelligence 
to enable targeted operations.  While Israel may have worked to develop similar 
information, it was not translated into effective action.  This does not suggest that it is not 
important to maintain the capability to act across the spectrum of national power; rather, 
it is indicative of the relatively low cost of counterterrorist operations.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. US Grand Strategy 
a. Diplomacy 
America’s diplomatic strategy attempts to develop democratic traditions 
and institutions in order to create a safer environment for U.S. citizens and interests.  In 
theory, not only will democratic nations be less likely to resort to violence to resolve 
disputes, but they will be more likely to cooperate against violent organizations.  Political 
leaders continually stress that representative governments abroad create a safer 
environment for U.S. citizens and interests.  Documents such as the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) recognize the 
importance of building democracy, but focus the majority of their initiatives on building 
alliances against terrorism.301  Diplomatic strategy is not completely synchronized with 
execution.  The U.S. supports many nations with weak democratic traditions and 
practices, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  That these are critical allies in the fight 
against transnational terror, does not change the fact that this dichotomy creates problems 
for other instruments of power.302   
The vignettes presented in Chapter IV suggest that American diplomatic 
strategy needs to be refined to focus on developing democratic traditions that provide 
mechanisms for substantive participation by a broad spectrum of groups in a society.  The 
IRA did not agree to a cease fire solely because the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
was successful, it agreed because Sinn Fein offered a peaceful opportunity to pursue its 
goals.  Similarly, Hezbollah began to moderate its activity when it entered the Lebanese 
government.  Participation in government encourages investment in the legitimate 
systems for change, and commitment to the official policies and programs.   
The recent election success by Hamas in the Palestinian territories presents 
a challenge for American diplomatic strategy.  The U.S. has decided that it cannot deal 
directly with terrorist organizations.  The Palestinian people, reacting to fraud in the 
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Palestinian Authority (PA) elected representatives of Hamas to clean up the 
corruption.303  The challenge to American leaders is how to recognize a democratic 
success story, while simultaneously maintaining a consistent stance against terrorist 
groups.  The lesson of Northern Ireland is that American decision makers must find some 
way to engage Hamas through a third party or front organization.  The Israeli experience 
in Lebanon illustrates that just such engagement may be the best way to moderate a 
terrorist organization and enhance overall security in the region. 
The vignettes presented in Chapter IV offer a second lesson for diplomatic 
strategists: engagement and negotiation are crucial to maximizing the gains created by 
military and police forces.  The British never stopped negotiating to stop the violence in 
Northern Ireland, even as the IRA was bombing London.  The key to these negotiations 
was that the British found partners that could speak for the IRA or put pressure on the 
group, Sinn Fein and the Irish Republic.  Indian efforts at negotiation with Sikh 
separatists were not successful because neither side in the process could deliver on its 
promises.   
In addition to democratization the U.S. should adopt a policy of 
engagement with influential actors, not just partner nations.  This means that diplomats 
must figure out who can influence groups like al-Qaeda and begin substantive dialog with 
these actors.  This initiative may mean normalizing relations with Iran, negotiating with 
Syria, as both the Clinton and early Bush administration have done, or talking to tribal 
leaders in the Pakistani border regions.  The important thing is that American diplomats 
cannot be limited by biases against traditional adversaries or unfriendly governments.  
This is not to suggest that the U.S. accede to the demands of radical Islamist leaders in an 
effort to indirectly influence Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism.  It is an effort to 
recognize that avenues of influence exist that the nation has not yet exploited to put 
pressure on al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations.  
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b. Information 
The nation’s core strategy documents employ informational power along 
two tracts: enhancing situational understanding and persuading foreign audiences.    
Situational understanding requires a vastly improved ability to collect, process, and share 
information among U.S. and international partners.  As hard as it will be to improve 
situational understanding, the effort to persuade foreign audiences will be even harder.  
This “battle of ideas” is being waged daily by virtually every organization in the U.S. 
government, and various supporting strategy documents emphasize the importance of this 
effort.304   The focus of these efforts is to persuade audiences throughout the world that 
American policy and actions are just and beneficial to all.   
The efforts of agencies such as the Department of Defense (DOD), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the intelligence community to improve the nation’s 
situational understanding are essential steps in combating transnational terrorism.  All 
three vignettes discussed the importance of timely and accurate intelligence in defeating 
terrorist organizations.  As the 9/11 Commission’s follow-up report indicated, this nation 
may not be doing enough in these areas, but information collection, processing, analysis, 
and dissemination must remain a major part of any emerging information strategy. 
Efforts to persuade foreign audiences are more difficult to analyze because 
they are not defined in any substantive way.  The confirmation of Karen Hughes as 
Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, and the increase in funds budgeted for 
public diplomacy indicate that the administration is serious about this effort.  The 
message that American public diplomacy organizations will send to the world is still 
unclear however.  Previous efforts to ignore public diplomacy immediately after 
September 11th, or to “sell” America under Charlotte Beers, were ineffective if not 
counterproductive because they failed to include substantive issues.  This is not an effort 
that is going to be won or lost by one section of the Department of State (DOS).  Public 
diplomacy is conducted by virtually every governmental organization involved in the 
GWOT.  The lack of a national information strategy makes it difficult for this diverse 
group to project a unified message and avoid desynchronous action.305   
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In his book The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror, Robert Satloff 
argues that U.S. information strategy should focus on more than broadcasting values and 
explaining policy.  Satloff explains that the “battle of ideas” can only be won by engaging 
the Muslim world on serious issues, identifying and promoting our allies in the Muslim 
world, advocating for American policies and interests, and aggressively countering 
Islamist propaganda.  Publicly discussing values with moderate Muslim politicians is 
important, but supporting anti-Islamist leaders or reformist education initiatives is more 
important.  Radio Sawa style broadcasts are useful only if they include substantive 
messages designed to influence the youth of the Middle East.306  Satloff notes that some 
policy might be objectionable in the Muslim world but does not focus any serious 
discussion on how to address this dilemma.  Issues such as U.S. support to Israel and 
treatment of detainees create a significant barrier and provide a huge advantage to radical 
Islamist propaganda.  They cannot be addressed solely through programs that attack 
radical ideology or teach American values better.  This problem is central to American 
efforts to conduct noopolitik in the current environment because it is an obstacle to all 
other dialogue.  American policy cannot and should not be changed simply because a 
portion of the Muslim population objects to it, but the effects of policy should be 
carefully considered for its impact on this nation’s ability to influence adversaries and 
allies alike.   
c. Military 
 American military strategy is not well defined in overarching national 
strategy documents like the NSS or NSCT.  The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 
National Military Strategy (NMS) do a better job establishing goals, and describing broad 
military activities.  However, both the NDS and NMS are still unclear about military 
priorities, specific objectives, or measures of effectiveness.  American military strategy is 
generally combative, seeking to identify and destroy terrorist organizations in order to 
prevent attacks on U.S. citizens or interests.  The focus is on direct military action to 
defeat terrorist organizations, and indirect actions to support and develop allies.  Other 
missions, such as humanitarian assistance or foreign military training, are secondary to 
the effort.   
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Contemporary military strategy is complicated by the fact that the nation 
is really fighting two wars; a counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a global war 
against terrorist organizations.  The former is low intensity conflict led predominantly led 
by conventional forces.  The latter is low intensity conflict led by special forces and other 
government organizations.  These two struggles frequently overlap, and often demand 
many of the same scarce resources.  The use of the British military in Northern Ireland 
suggests that the strategy of employing U.S. special forces in small teams to work with  
and through indigenous forces to combat terrorist organizations is sound.  When 
necessary, small highly trained units can act directly to destroy select terrorist targets, but 
that should not be the norm.   
The role for conventional forces is more complicated.  The British regular 
Army in Northern Ireland had a limited role in counterterrorism operations, as did the 
Indian Army in Punjab.  Both forces enabled police or special operations units by 
conducting static security missions or area denial patrols.  The Israeli Army in Lebanon is 
a notable example of conventional military forces being employed to counter terrorist 
organizations, and it was generally a failure.  This would seem to suggest two points.  
First, the role of the U.S. military in Iraq should be to enable Iraqi police.  Second, that if 
the conventional military is to be widely used to fight transnational terrorists, then 
significant training and organizational issues must be addressed. 
d. Economic 
 National economic strategy revolves around two core ideas: the expansion 
of free markets to strengthen foreign partners in the war on terrorism, and the provision 
of developmental aid to undermine the root causes of terrorism.  The U.S. has 
increasingly focused on establishing Free Trade Agreements (FTA) or Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with a host of Middle Eastern, Asian, and 
Central American countries in an effort to create partners with an investment in opposing 
terrorist organizations.  This effort has the added benefit of creating interdependencies 
among these nations and the U.S. that will serve the nation well in times of crisis.  
American developmental aid attempts to strengthen foreign nation’s ability to resist the 
influence of terrorist organizations.  Aid packages generally focus on improving the 
recipient’s ability to conduct counterterrorism operations and deny terrorist organizations 
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much needed resources.  These packages are also designed to reduce poverty, 
unemployment, and improve health care in an effort to eliminate the reasons individuals 
turn to terrorism.  Much of U.S. aid is not tied to counterterrorism activity at all, but even 
these packages are still intended to produce a more stable and secure environment. 
e. Law Enforcement 
 This paper characterized U.S. law enforcement strategy as cooperative 
prosecution: the employment of federal law enforcement agencies to work with and 
through foreign security forces to prosecute terrorists.  This strategy pursues terrorists 
directly and indirectly though their financial support.  The nation’s law enforcement 
elements are pursuing this strategy aggressively with expanded operations at home and 
overseas in an effort to collapse terrorist organizations from the cumulative weight of 
many individual actions.  This strategy attempts to prosecute terrorists and their 
organizations wherever there is sufficient legal infrastructure and political will.  In the 
absence of one or both of these critical features, law enforcement organizations are 
working with their foreign counterparts to develop them.   
Law enforcement strategy is an area where few if any refinements are 
required.  Cooperative prosecution attacks terrorism as a criminal act, just as military 
strategy attacks it as an act of war.  This allows the nation to pursue opportunities 
wherever they develop in the conflict. 
2. Supporting Features 
The most significant deficiency in American grand strategy is the lack of a 
common set of interests and objectives to focus the planning effort.  Core and supporting 
national strategy documents do not reflect a common understanding of the reason that 
this nation is at war.  This glaring deficiency makes it virtually impossible to integrate 
programs of disparate agencies across the federal government.  It is extremely difficult to 
allocate scarce resources in the conflict in this environment because there is no clear link  
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between a program and an objective.  A secondary effect of this deficiency may be the 
administration’s inability to clearly articulate the plan in a way that encourages 
confidence and understanding.307   
The debate over the definition of terrorism and who exactly is America’s enemy 
in the GWOT is not as insignificant as it would seem to be.  The recent electoral victory 
of Hamas created great difficulty for America in part because the group clearly advocates 
what the NSS defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against innocents” in their campaign against Israel.308  This puts the U.S. in 
the position of refusing to support a democratically elected government before they even 
take office.  The problem for grand strategists is not the definition of terrorism, but their 
understanding of the threat to the United States.  In part this problem is created by the 
evolving nature of this nation’s adversary.  The definition of terrorism is difficult enough 
to get a wide coalition of nations to agree upon.  When one begins to question just what 
public diplomacy professionals are supposed to aggressively counter the confusion grows 
significantly.  Is the threat a specific terrorist organization, the hate filled speech coming 
from Islamist clerics, or is it perhaps the mob threatening to burn an embassy in 
retaliation for an offensive newspaper cartoon?  The question has not been answered in 
enough detail yet to focus all the instruments of national power.309 
The NSS and the NSCT do not include plans to maintain the instruments of 
national power.  This is a significant deficiency given that many of the sources of 
national power are shared by multiple instruments, and few mechanisms exist to 
prioritize demands.  A few supporting strategies do attempt to transform their practices 
and organizations to generate more power within available resources.  The efforts of the 
DOD to transform the Army into a smaller, lighter force will increase combat power and 
effectiveness.  The DOS’ efforts to improve the training and experience of Foreign 
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Service Officers, and revise many organizational practices to improve efficiency will 
improve the nation’s ability to conduct diplomacy.  What is missing is a deliberate plan to 
maintain the sources of national power, such as national will or financial wealth.  
National will, for example, is critical in the fight against transnational terrorists because it 
is the very target of their operations.  Israel learned this very lesson when Hezbollah 
forced the nation to eventually withdraw from Lebanon. 
American grand strategy also makes little effort to balance ends with available 
means in the fight against terrorism.  Admittedly, this is difficult to judge because of the 
vast quantity of resources required for continued operations in Iraq, but a couple of points 
are important.  Grand strategy should guide a nation through a conflict to create a better 
peace.  In order to do this grand strategy should limit its objectives according to available 
resources.  American grand strategy however does not appear to make any effort to 
prioritize or constrain the initiatives of various departments through any mechanism other 
than the budgeting process.  Again some supporting strategies have begun to recognize 
that resources are not unlimited and are making an attempt to focus their efforts.  The 
best example of this is the National Strategy for Homeland Security’s initiative to 
complete a comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment.  The nation now faces 
rising federal debt, difficulties in military recruiting, and a lack of confidence in its chief 
executive that could indicate the beginning of a crisis of national will.310 
American grand strategy may also not have the correct balance of resources 
allocated to the respective instruments of power.  The Fiscal 2006 budget analysis in 
Chapter III indicates that the financial resources of the nation are predominantly devoted 
to the DOD.  It could be argued that greater funds should be allocated for foreign 
developmental aid or homeland defense initiatives.  This is a difficult issue to judge 
quantitatively because many of these programs provide high returns for relatively little 
investment.  The fact remains that little progress has been made undermining the causes 
of terrorism in the last four years, and most of the programs to accomplish this task are 
not located in the DOD. 
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American grand strategy does not adequately address the subject of vertical and 
horizontal synchronization.  The interagency process of coordination and staffing that is 
supposed to be coordinated by the NSC has proven too cumbersome to effectively 
manage the GWOT.  Lead agencies for policy and programs are not clear, and 
coordinating mechanisms do not facilitate synchronization.  This problem has manifested 
itself most starkly in the issue of detainee operations and interrogation techniques.  The 
activities of military and civilian authorities in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and 
elsewhere damaged the nation’s ability to conduct traditional diplomacy and degraded the 
effectiveness of public diplomacy.311 
One of the strengths of American grand strategy is its hybrid nature.   Cumulative 
actions to defeat individual terrorist organizations through many small victories is the 
prevailing strategic pattern; there are few if any examples of clearly sequential strategic 
operations.  Military, economic, and law enforcement strategies are all cumulative in 
nature.  American grand strategy is combative, and includes direct and indirect attacks 
against terrorist organizations, combative elements.  However, it is also developmental, 
focusing significant effort on attempts to undermine the issues and conditions which 
drive groups to employ terrorism.  This hybrid nature is essential to take advantage of the 
unique power dynamics in the GWOT. 
B. STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Plan for Strategic Action 
American grand strategy in this age of terrorism includes initiatives for a broad 
range of programs, from preventing the spread of AIDS to countering the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction.312  The National Security Strategy (NSS) is too far 
reaching to focus the instruments of national power or provide clear linkages between 
strategy and programs.  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) focuses 
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clearly on the issue of terrorism but it lacks important mechanisms to integrate and 
synchronize power, mechanisms such as stated national interests and objectives.313  This 
section recommends a framework for planning grand strategy that deliberately integrates 
the instruments of power to affect the environment in a variety of ways.    
Military planners have long studied how to integrate and synchronize disparate 
elements of military combat power; infantry, artillery, intelligence, and logistics must 
support each other if the unit is to be successful.  The interagency process that produced 
the constellation of national strategy documents does not demonstrate a similar tradition.  
The framework outlined in Table 11 attempts to apply basic military planning techniques 
to the interagency system in order to facilitate grand strategic planning.  This framework 
blends policies and programs to shape the environment for long term progress, sustain 
current gains, and secure strategic objectives.  Decisive actions directly contribute to 
achieving the strategic objective; rarely will one decisive action be sufficient.  Shaping 
actions set the conditions for decisive actions to achieve the strategic objective.  
Sustaining actions are policies and programs that preserve existing gains and create 
additional power for future actions.  At the level of grand strategy no one action is likely 
to completely secure a strategic objective, and in fact the decisive actions may need to be 
maintained for a protracted period of time to be effective.314  
In the simplified example below, a possible strategic framework to stabilize the 
Middle East is examined as part of a larger effort to defeat the transnational terrorist 
organizations that threaten the United States.  Grand strategic planning below begins by 
enumerating national interests and strategic objectives; these objectives are then 
prioritized to aid in resource allocation.  Decisive actions are identified to achieve the 
each stated objective.  In this simplified example we have identified six decisive actions 
to stabilize the Middle East.  Clearly this is not an all inclusive set, and does not 
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necessarily reflect the decisions of U.S. political leaders.  It is meant to illustrate a way to 
conduct strategic planning that integrates and synchronizes instruments of power.   
 
National Interest:  Defeat transnational terrorist organizations that threaten the U.S. 
National Strategic Objective:  Stabilize Middle Eastern nations 
 Shaping Sustaining Decisive 
Diplomatic 
- Normalize relations w/ Iran & 
Syria 
- Engage Hamas leaders 
- Negotiate with terror groups that 
have not become transnational 
- Secure the U.S. military access to 
Pakistan border regions 
- Work with & through 
established NGOs like NATO 
and UN rather than “ad-hoc 
coalitions. 
- Negotiate a settlement of 
the  Palestinian issue to the 
satisfaction of both parties 
 
Information 
- Encourage democracy in Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt 
- Energize Public Diplomacy 
activities 
- Improve intelligence collection to 
support military and legal activities 
- Develop democratic tradition in 
Middle East through 
commitment to cross media 
programming 
- Tell GWOT success story 
better to US population and 
world 
- Counter radical Islamic 
propaganda 
 
Military 
- Infiltrate Pakistani tribal regions  
- Reorganize conventional forces 
in the Middle East 
- Complete transformation 
- Defeat Iraqi insurgency 
- Develop effective Iraqi military  
- Defeat Al Qaeda core  
Economic 
- Establish FTAs Saudi Arabia & 
Egypt 
- End dependence on oil in western 
world 
- Maintain support for Pakistan 
- Ensure success of Afghanistan 
and Iraq 
- Restructure aid 
relationships in the region to 
reflect GWOT 
Legal 
- Expand activities of Legal 
Attaches in Middle East 
- Prosecute or release detainees 
- Develop effective Iraqi police 
- Prosecute al-Qaeda network 
- Deny funding to Middle 
Eastern terrorist 
organizations 
Table 11. Framework for Strategic Planning 
 
a. Decisive Actions 
Six actions are identified in this simplified framework to secure the 
strategic objective of stabilizing the Middle East; clearly there are more but these are 
sufficient for the purpose of this section.  American diplomatic efforts concentrate on 
solving the Palestinian issue to the satisfaction of all sides.  This issue is at the center of 
much of the Muslim rage and anger toward America; settling it will seriously undermine 
the terrorist’s cause and immediately degrade their “national” will to fight.  The death of 
Yasser Arafat, the public’s dissatisfaction with Fatah, and the rise of Hamas as a political 
force created an instability within the Palestinian authority that America could exploit.315   
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 Informational elements focus on countering radical Islamic propaganda to 
enhance America’s role in the world and degrade the legitimacy of terrorist 
organizations.  If successful, this effort would decrease the overall tension in the region 
and allow legitimate governments to reform without the threat of revolution.  The nation 
must devote significant effort to degrading the effectiveness of al-Qaeda’s propaganda 
machine and exposing the reality of terrorist violence.316  The vignettes presented in 
Chapter IV demonstrated the impact of these efforts in terms of reduced support for the 
terrorists, improved intelligence gathering, and freedom of action.   
 Military and legal decisive actions are inseparable and focus solely on 
defeating the core member’s of the al-Qaeda network operating in the Middle East.  The 
major nodes in the network must be penetrated and defeated to ensure the group cannot 
effectively act against governments in the region.  This effort has both a military and 
legal nature, and new relationships must be built to facilitate interaction.   
 The system of U.S. aid and alliances in the Middle East needs to be 
reexamined in light of the transnational terrorist threat.  Massive American foreign aid 
flows to the region through a variety of programs designed to provide humanitarian 
assistance and ensure security.  However, many of these programs were designed and 
implemented during the Cold War when strategic partnerships were built to contain the 
threat of Communism.  This reexamination might result in changes to the aid currently 
allocated to Israel and Egypt or new programs such as the $3 billion aid package that was 
promised to Pakistan in 2003.317  These changes provide the administration a more 
proactive way to use the foreign aid resources to stabilize the region.  
Al-Qaeda’s financial resources and systems are among the group’s most 
important strategic assets.  This is a decisive action that requires the input of multiple 
instruments of power with law enforcement organizations in the lead.  America has a 
functioning law enforcement system in place; however, more could be done to formal and 
informal financial institutions.  Punitive actions against international banks, for example, 
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could be increased and made more immediate.  These actions might range from 
immediate fines, official embargos, unofficial boycotts, or media campaigns organized to 
force these institutions to police themselves.318  This sort of a sanction regiment might 
employ a number of instruments of power; current law enforcement efforts might be 
joined by information resources attempting to create negative publicity, and economic 
sanctions against the institutions that enable terrorist operations.319  Restrictions on the 
terrorist’s ability to move money through international banking systems will force 
increased reliance on the hawala systems already in use.  The U.S. and a number of 
Middle Eastern states have begun to bring hawala systems under official regulation thus 
increasing the pressure on terrorist organizations.320    
b. Shaping Actions 
In this example shaping activities should focus on reducing American 
isolation, undermining support for al-Qaeda, and setting the conditions for decisive 
action.  Diplomatic activity is central to shaping operations, but significant informational 
and economic elements are also required.  There is a massive anti-American sentiment in 
the world that must be countered before any significant progress can be made to stabilize 
the Middle East.  This sentiment makes it difficult for our friends and allies to publicly 
agree with American positions and follow America’s lead.321     
In this strategic framework, American diplomats are focused on engaging 
the actors that are influential in the region.  Iran, Syria, and the Hamas government in the 
Palestinian territories represent three opportunities that the U.S. cannot afford to ignore.  
As the example of Northern Ireland demonstrates, any group that is not directly engaged 
in overt terrorist actions should be considered a potential partner in resolving the conflict.  
The U.S. maintained an embassy in Moscow during the Cold War; it should do so in 
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Tehran during the GWOT.  As the Hezbollah vignette pointed out, as radical groups 
develop an investment in peace they naturally moderate their activities if not their 
rhetoric.  Hamas may be at a “tipping point” in the group’s history that has the potential 
to positively affect decisive actions.322  Diplomatic shaping operations engage influential 
Middle Eastern actors to ensure the settlement between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority is not immediately undermined by other nations with conflicting agendas.  This 
activity also facilitates the decisive actions to defeat al-Qaeda by engaging actors that 
may be able to influence the group. 
Traditional diplomatic efforts should coincide with public diplomacy 
activities to counter the influence of radical Islam, and begin to lay the foundations of 
democracy in the Middle East.  There are indicators that gaps in the Islamic world exist 
and can be exploited.  Moderate Sunni and Shi’ite leaders are not taking a leading role in 
the Middle East, or the militant movements, because of religious and governmental 
obstacles.323  Information activities must also attempt to develop democracy in the region 
gradually.  Saudi Arabia, for example, is one of the most autocratic and repressive 
regimes in the region, yet there are opportunities for reform.  The internal struggle to 
determine a successor to King Fahd coupled with nascent democratic institutions creates 
an opportunity to encourage continued democratic reform.324  Public diplomacy efforts in 
Brazil in the 1970’s required a similar balance between the need to maintain good 
relations with a strategically important military dictatorship and the need to foster 
democracy in the country.  United States Information Service (USIS) programs 
emphasized educational exchanges, binational centers, and cultural programs.325  This 
effort was ultimately successful, and while it is not a template for Saudi Arabia, it does 
show that America can execute delicate influence operations. 
Military shaping actions focus on setting the conditions to defeat al-
Qaeda’s core organization.  This might include efforts to infiltrate Special Forces troops 
into the Pakistani tribal regions or other areas where al-Qaeda is continuing to operate.  It                                                  
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also may include reorganizing conventional forces to fight on a non-contiguous 
battlefield where platoons and companies are the primary unit of action, not the battalions 
and brigades of today’s Army.  The successes of U.S. Special Forces in the Philippines 
indicate that this significantly smaller scale operational paradigm is appropriate for a war 
against a clandestine terrorist group.326  
Economic power might shape the environment by focusing on increasing 
free trade agreements with the nations in the region.  This would provide additional 
revenue and job opportunity in the region in an effort to reduce the pool of recruits al-
Qaeda draws upon.  The validity of this tactic is frequently debated, but there is evidence 
that aid and increased trade actually reduces transnational terrorism within a country.  A 
Pennsylvania State University study has found that “to the extent that trade and FDI 
[Foreign Direct Investment] promote economic development, economic globalization has 
an indirect negative effect on transnational terrorism.”327  Ending the western world’s 
dependence on oil would not contribute to stabilizing the region, in fact it would likely 
destabilize it further.  However, it would increase the Administration’s freedom of action 
in the Middle East, thus enabling many other actions.  The President identified ending 
America’s dependence on oil as a priority in the 2006 State of the Union, but shaping 
actions must go farther than that.328  The economic ties that are developed through FTAs 
and other economic policies create interdependent relationships.  If the rest of the world 
remains dependent on Middle Eastern oil, U.S. policy will continue to be constrained by 
these relationships.   
Law enforcement’s ongoing efforts to attack terrorist organizations should 
be supplemented by an initiative to resolve the issue of detainees in the war on terrorism.  
This action would eliminate another point of contention between the U.S. and much of 
the Muslim world, thus strengthening the position of American diplomats.  It would also 
increase the effectiveness of persuasion efforts to counter Islamic radical propaganda.   
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c. Sustaining Actions 
Sustaining actions focus on maintaining successes and allies in the Middle 
East.  Diplomats might focus on working through established and recognized quasi-
governmental organizations to conserve American power.  The employment of NATO in 
Afghanistan is a prime example of a trend that should continue.  Information power will 
play a critical role in sustaining gains made in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The Islamic populations of many countries in the Middle East have been socialized to 
know only protest at the point of a gun; there was no other productive outlet for dissent.  
Information activities that demonstrate the positive side of democracy and encourage 
democratic participation are important to solidify change.  Information power must also 
sustain national will in the United States.  This paper has already discussed the 
importance of planning to maintain sources of power, and the danger of a crisis of will.  
Efforts to maintain national will are important to ensure that the U.S. maintains sufficient 
support for the commitment of additional financial and manpower resources in the 
region. 
Other sustaining actions demonstrate a similar focus on solidifying gains 
and generating future power.  Military efforts to defeat the Iraqi insurgency and train 
Iraqi security forces sustain the nascent democracy that is being built.  The Army’s 
transformation initiatives are critical to fielding a future force that can deploy more 
rapidly and act in smaller size units on a noncontiguous battlefield.  This transformation 
will enable the Army to fight terrorist groups with more than special operations forces 
once the fight in Iraq is finished.  Economic sustaining efforts should focus on supporting 
countries that are critical to this strategic objective and where gains have already begun to 
affect the environment: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  The recent agreement to forgive 
80% of Iraqi debt is an example of effective use of economic power to consolidate and 
support gains.329  Law enforcement sustaining actions might focus on solidifying the 
gains made in Afghanistan and Iraq by developing effective internal security structures in 
these countries.  A great deal more work must be done before the criminal justice systems 
in Afghanistan and Iraq can effectively support their governments. 
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The framework described above to achieve the strategic objective of 
stabilizing the Middle East will not defeat transnational terrorism.  It was presented to 
demonstrate a way to integrate the policies and programs of American grand strategy in 
pursuit of a single focused goal.  In a fully developed grand strategy a number of national 
interests with their supporting strategic objectives would compete for scarce resources.  
This framework would facilitate prioritizing the allocation of those resources.  A 
secondary benefit of this planning framework is that it makes it much easier to 
understand “the plan.”  National powers are interdependent and reinforcing; this 
framework allows one to visualize these relationships understand their importance.  This 
ability is critical to appreciating the second and third order effects of any changes.  The 
sequence of nested strategic objectives can be understood by the average American, 
making it easier to demonstrate success and improves the government’s ability to keep 
the American public informed.   
2. Organize for Strategic Action
A variety of studies and reports have identified the need to reorganize the federal 
government’s system for planning and managing national security affairs.  In 2004 the 
Rand Corporation produced an Occasional Paper entitled Coordinating the War on 
Terrorism.  This paper looked at a variety of questions related to terrorism, and 
recommended consolidating all counterterrorism responsibilities, to include authority for 
a government wide counterterrorism budget, under the NSC.  These recommendations 
generally represent a return to, and formalization of, the structure that existed under the 
Clinton administration.330  The 9/11 Commission focused in on the interagency problems 
that contributed to the success of the al-Qaeda attacks.  The report’s recommendations 
regarding intelligence reorganization and counterterrorism planning were adopted almost 
verbatim by the Congress in the Intelligence Reform Act.331   Each report attempted to 
address the basic problem of how to plan and execute grand strategy in an interagency  
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environment.  However, little focus was put on the dynamics of individual and 
organizational behavior that can combine to degrade governmental decision making 
systems.332     
Prior to and after September 11, 2001 counterterrorism strategy was designed, 
coordinated, and to some degree controlled by the National Security Council’s 
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG).  Various national level agencies were 
designated as “lead agencies” for different portions of the fight, but synchronization 
among these entities was inconsistent.  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 redesigned the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and 
moved it from the CIA to the newly created Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in an 
effort to improve this system.333  One of the key points to understand is that government 
is a competitive environment and each actor represents their own department’s interests.  
These actors understand new organizations such as the NCTC in terms of the threat to 
existing power and authority structures.   
Three groups currently plan and coordinate U.S. grand strategy: the NSC’s 
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), the DNI’s NCTC, and the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Council (HSC).  The HSC will not be discussed 
in this paper.  While it is a part of the planning structure, the HSC’s focus is largely 
defensive departmental strategy.  Under President Clinton’s NSC this group was called 
the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) and possessed a great deal of direct and 
symbolic power within the interagency system.334  President Bush made significant 
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changes to the NSC in general and the CSG in particular.  These changes drastically 
reduced the group’s power to design and direct counterterrorism policy.335   
Modern grand strategy operates in a highly complex and dynamic environment, 
necessitating an organization that is capable of coordinating adjustments to strategy 
rapidly and effectively across the government.  The CSG’s structure and authority 
facilitated just such coordination.  However, the organization had a natural tendency to 
drift from strategy formulation and policy coordination to operational direction.  This 
drift threatened the domains and powerbases of other agencies.336   
Under President Bush the CSG is more closely aligned to its core process of 
coordinating between national security agencies.  The Bush Administration, through 
various national security strategies and taskings, structured the U.S. government in a 
divisional configuration; each department is a division with roles and responsibilities for 
a portion of the GWOT.337  Over 40 different federal agencies are involved in 
counterterrorist programs domestically and abroad; and these programs are seldom solely 
domestic or foreign.   State and local agencies are additional critical actors in domestic 
programs.338  This broad spectrum of agencies and actors creates an environment that is 
ill suited to a divisional structure because divisions are not boundary spanning 
organizations.  The CSG is intended to be a boundary spanning organization.  The group 
integrates the array of agencies through the use of functionally organized formal working 
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groups.339  Agency representatives in these working groups are supposed to develop 
options that integrate the activities of their departments.  As the report of the 9/11 
Commission illustrated, this process is not as smooth as it sounds.  The divisional 
structure of the current government vests a great deal of power in individual departments.  
Competition between these agencies, or disagreements among Secretaries, can lead to 
delays and missed opportunities in the dynamic environment that is the GWOT.340    
The National Counterterrorism Center is a relatively unique type of governmental 
entity because it is by definition boundary spanning.  The original Presidential 
implementation order tasked the center with integrating intelligence from across the 
government, performing strategic planning, and assigning “operational responsibilities to 
lead agencies for counterterrorism activities.”341  Congress revised and vastly improved 
the organizational design of the NCTC by formalizing the strategic and operational duties 
of the center and its director.  The Intelligence Reform Act created a direct link between 
the President and the director of the NCTC; this link provides the director the ability to 
bypass the time consuming and agency dominated process of the NSC’s committees.  
While the statute says that the DNI will resolve interagency objections to the NCTC’s 
taskings, one could imagine that an NCTC director with the President’s ear will seldom 
need to have issues resolved.342 
The NCTC, and its director have a statutory responsibility to conduct “strategic 
operational planning,” and “to assign roles and responsibilities as part of its strategic 
operational planning duties to lead Departments or agencies… .”343  To accomplish these 
tasks the center is to establish a standing directorate called the Directorate of Strategic 
Operational Planning.  This directorate is tasked to conduct planning for the entire US 
government; thus, active support for this organization is in the best interest of virtually all 
                                                 
339 Bolman and Deal, 49-50.  GAO-03-165, 62.  The CSG’s working groups are: the Exercise and 
Readiness Subgroup, the Terrorism Financing Working Group, the Training and Assistance Subgroup, the 
CT Finance Training and Technical Assistance Working Group, the Hostage Crisis Working Group, and 
the Technical Support Working Group. 
340 9/11 Commission Report, 189. 
341 George W. Bush, Executive Order National Counterterrorism Center, The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html, (accessed August 16, 2005). 
342 Intelligence Reform Act, Sect 1021. The director reports to the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) on intelligence issues and directly to the President on “the planning and progress of joint 
counterterrorism operations.” 
343 Ibid., revision to Sect 119 (d) (2) and (3) [of National Security Act of 1947]. 
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national security agencies.  The directorate is also tasked with monitoring the execution 
of operations across the government.  This provides an external monitor on interagency 
cooperation and execution of all GWOT related programs.344  In contrast to this system, 
the CSG was limited to oversight of overseas counterterrorist operations, while the 
Homeland Security Council monitors domestic operations.345   
The Intelligence Reform Act outlines six missions for the center, but the Congress 
clearly considers the center’s core practices to be twofold: first, to integrate intelligence 
to support the entire government; second, to conduct strategic operational planning and 
tasking for the GWOT.346  The Strategic Operational Planning directorate focuses on the 
latter mission.  It should produce plans that incorporate all elements of national power, 
but also ones that reflect the realities, capabilities, and limitations of these powers.  Plans 
must balance ends and means while at the same time achieving an acceptable level of 
security from terrorist threats.347 
The organization should adopt a customer focus to encourage other agencies to 
commit their experts to the center’s planning team.  This in turn would encourage agency 
buy-in and partial ownership of the eventual plan.348  The danger of a customer focus is 
that the NCTC’s position in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) may cause it to 
tailor products to the President rather than the entire community of agencies involved in 
CT activities; a condition that various commission reports attribute to the NSC.   
A number of the NCTC’s structural features create formal and informal power for 
the organization.  The center’s position within the EOP should keep it above agency 
struggles, and lend it a great deal of authority.  The appointment and confirmation 
process for the center’s director invests the position with the confidence of both the 
President and Congress.  Finally, the director’s dual reporting responsibilities, to the DNI 
and the President, enables the director to bypass the NSC’s bureaucracy and take matters 
directly to the highest authority for decision.  Two aspects of this system are critical.  
                                                 
344 Intelligence Reform Act, revision to Sect 119 (j). 
345 Davis et al, Coordinating the War on Terrorism, 4. 
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347 Kennedy, 4-5. 
348 Jay Galbraith, Diane Downey, and Amy Kates, Designing Dynamic Organizations: A Hands-On 
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First Presidental preference and style; the President may not want to invest as much 
power in the center’s director as the act allows.  Second, the personality of the center’s 
director will greatly affect the amount of power that the position develops.  One need 
only imagine how much power the position might develop if Donald Rumsfeld filled the 
role as opposed to a less dynamic individual. 
The NCTC’s challenge is to achieve effective lateral capability throughout the 
organization as well as the community of agencies it serves.  To accomplish this goal the 
Strategic Operational Planning directorate must leverage human and virtual technology.  
One of the benefits of interagency participation is that parent agencies will not refuse 
their representatives access to proprietary databases; by ensuring broad participation the 
directorate avoids a potential roadblock.  The directorate must also be supported by 
advanced virtual networking and knowledge management tools that facilitate and enable 
rapid collaboration.349 
The Intelligence Reform Act restructured the National Counterterrorism Center to 
create an organization with the potential to effectively plan and monitor grand strategy.  
The center is not alone in this effort; it is joined by the CSG, HSC, and various 
departmental actors.  There is a danger that the interagency system may become 
overwhelmed by intergovernmental power struggles and organizational politics with this 
many committees involved in planning and integrating competing departments.  It is 
critical that roles and responsibilities of each organization be agreed upon in a way that 
encourages integration and does not further paralyze the system. 
3. Develop a National Information Strategy 
The nation must develop a formal information strategy to integrate the 
instruments of power in support of this strategy.  Public diplomacy must focus on shared 
values such as justice and representative democracy but it also must do more than just 
present American versions of these to the world; it must engage target audiences in 
debate over substantive issues relating to these values.  Efforts already underway to 
expand traditional public diplomacy programs should continue, but these need to be 
prioritized to focus the majority of resources on select societies.  The “battle of ideas” is 
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the responsibility of a variety of organizations, and each must actively support the effort.  
This final point sounds simple, but in fact may be the most difficult one to achieve.  
Organizations like the Department of Defense are well versed on telling the press about 
their operations, they are not experienced at appreciating the affect of their actions or 
tempering their actions to get a desired effect.   
4. Define National Interests and Strategic Objectives 
American grand strategy does not have an explicitly stated set of national 
interests.  The lack of commonly understood interests is mirrored by a lack of explicitly 
stated national strategic objectives.  In the absence of these two critical focusing elements 
the federal departments and committees charged with drafting the supporting strategy 
identified their own goals and objectives.  In many cases there is no common priority or 
focus to these.  It is virtually impossible to gain a full understanding of the total effort in 
any one area because of this condition.  Without a full understanding of the effort it is 
difficult to make nuanced adjustments to any part of the strategy without risking 
unforeseen effects.350 
The NSC should immediately develop a set of prioritized national interests and 
national strategic objectives.  This set must address the total set of US interests, not just 
the GWOT, to enable strategists to allocate resources with the entire effort in mind.  
Objectives should be directly linked to interests and describe how the nation will achieve 
each goal.  Objectives should not be specific to any one instrument of power; rather, 
federal departments should develop supporting objectives to explain how they will 
contribute to achieving the stated end-state. 
5. Align National Strategy Documents 
Upon completion of the national interests and objectives, each organization 
responsible for a supporting strategy must revise and update it in light of the new 
priorities.  Current national strategy documents were written out of sequence and often do 
not reflect the current environment.  Some examples of this are: 
• National Military Strategy written a year before the National Defense Strategy 
                                                 
350 For a more complete discussion of national interests and objectives see Morgenthau and Weldes, 
“Constructing National Interests,” 276-278. 
158 
• Coast Guard Maritime Strategy written 2 years before the National Maritime 
Strategy 
• Homeland Security Strategy written by the Homeland Security Office and 
contains budget priorities for FY ‘04. 
These documents describe a great many initiatives that are underway, complete, or 
overcome by events.  They do not reflect existing budget constraints, interim decisions, 
or the current global environment.  This revision will improve the strategic alignment and 
enable decision makers to understand the totality of effort directed against any strategic 
objective. 
6. Update U.S. Supporting Strategies Annually 
Each agency and committee responsible for a national strategy document must 
publish an annual update document.  This document should describe the progress made 
since the last report, any changes to policy and programs, and the focus for the next 
reporting period.  This may sound counterintuitive, but supporting strategies are more 
about the operational details of how an instrument of power is going to act to achieve 
strategic objectives.  These actions take the form of policies and programs which may 
change year to year for any number of reasons.  These updates should be published at the 
start of the budget cycle and include budget priorities that have been synchronized across 
the departments.  This will serve two functions.  First, it will provide the American public 
an annual report of progress in the GWOT and an appreciation for the way ahead.  
Second, it will provide the President a tool during the budget process to ensure that key 
programs do not become the victim of bureaucratic politics. 
7. Plan to Maintain Power 
The nation’s grand strategy evidences little planning for maintaining the 
instruments of national power.  During World War II there were multiple efforts 
underway to maintain power; these ranged from victory gardens to Disney anti-Nazi  
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cartoons.  This effort is absent from today’s strategy.  Some of the strategy documents 
include a nascent effort to maintain power, but there is no comprehensive plan at the 
national level.351 
The NSC and HSC should begin studying policies and programs to maintain and 
further develop the sources of national power.  This is a cross departmental initiative that 
should focus on things like geography, resources, population, economic development, 
political structure, national morale, and national reputation.  These sources of power are 
interrelated, and combine to produce an aggregate level of national power, but they 
cannot be directly employed.352  Because they are not the direct responsibility of any one 
department or agency, little thought has gone into maintaining these sources for the 
conflict.  That must change if the nation is going to stay the course in a protracted 
conflict. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This paper does not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
each supporting strategy, only to identify gaps in the nation’s strategic framework, and 
suggest broad strategic themes.  It is impossible to study these cases however, without 
identifying some common strategic themes, and where appropriate these themes were 
incorporated into recommendations.  Further study and analysis is required to determine 
the most effective supporting strategy for each instrument of national power.  It would be 
impossible to undertake such a study without a significant background in Islam, the 
Middle East, and each discipline.  This study must begin with an agreed upon set of 
national interests and strategic objectives to focus the analysis. 
One of the most important recommendations of this study is that the U.S. should 
engage international actors with the capability to influence transnational terrorist 
organizations or target populations.  Additional study is needed to determine who those 
influential actors are and how they can contribute to this effort.  This study should be 
objective and attempt to ignore national biases against any individual actor.  The study 
should also avoid limiting itself to America’s partners in the GWOT.  Many countries 
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that openly oppose U.S. interests may be able to exert significant pressure on al-Qaeda.  
These opportunities should be identified and presented to national leaders. 
Additional study and debate by national leaders is required to clarify the threat 
facing this country.  It is not enough to say that terrorism it the threat, and attempt to 
define this tactic more clearly; the threat is continually evolving, and may in fact be much 
more complex.  Grand strategy is concerned with the totality of national security; this 
means that while planners may concentrate on the threat of transnational terrorism, they 
cannot ignore potential threats from emerging peer competitors, or other sub-national 
actors such as drug cartels.  However, it seems that the true nature of the violent 
transnational Islamic movements is poorly understood.  This threat has been described at 
various times as criminal, military, and ideological, but it has never been clearly 
explained so that planners from across the spectrum of national power can craft an 
effective response to it.   
The U.S. must develop an information strategy that simultaneously enhances 
situational understanding of the direct terrorist danger and actively engages the Muslim 
world on substantive issues.  Current grand strategy contains a long list of policies and 
programs to improve intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination; 
however, there is no organization or prioritization to this list.  Almost every national 
strategy document recognizes the information content of policies and programs, and each 
at least mentions the need to conduct some form of public diplomacy.  None of these 
documents define how the nation will accomplish this critical task however.  Additional 
in depth study is required to determine the best way to communicate with each of the 
disparate groups that make up the Muslim world.  This work should form the basis of a 
national information strategy that focuses the actions of each agency to achieve 
appropriate national strategic objectives. 
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